

**ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH
REPUBLIC: A STUDY OF DELTA AND OYO STATES.**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, **AGAH, Benjamin Ekevwoyoma** declare that this thesis is an original research work carried out by me in the Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka. Nigeria.

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CERTIFICATION

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to God Almighty who gave me the grace, strength and wisdom to reach this height in my academic career.

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Date.....

ABSTRACT

The study examined electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, using Delta and Oyo States. The Ex-Post Facto research design with the questionnaire technique was adopted for the study to elicit information and data from respondents from both states. Three hypotheses were formulated for the study and tested, using the Chi-square statistical technique. From the analyses of the responses to the questions used for the testing of the hypotheses, the study established that, there was a significant relationship between the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state and electoral violence. It was also established that there was a significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy and thirdly, the study also discovered that there exist a positive relationship between electoral violence and the democratization process in Nigeria. These significant relationships were also evident from the data analysed with the distribution tables, bar charts and pie charts. The study also established that mass unemployment, ethnic and religious cleavages, zero-sum nature of politics and unabated corruption are major precursors to electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Resulting from these findings, the study recommends that, for democracy to thrive in Nigeria, the state should be de-emphasised as a measure of last resort to public office holders, government at all levels in the country must embark on aggressive creation of job opportunities for the teeming youths, effective measures should be put in place to check corruption of public office holders and that the citizens must be re-oriented to imbibe new values devoid of primordial sentiments in national politics.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACN	Action Congress of Nigeria
AD	Alliance for Democracy
AG	Action Group
ALF	African Leadership Forum
ANPP	All Nigerians Peoples Party
APGA	All Progressive Grand Alliance
APLP	All Peoples Liberation Party
ARP	African Renaissance Party
BCOS	Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State
BNPP	Better Nigeria Progressive Party
CD	Campaign for Democracy
CDHR	Committee for the Defence of Human Rights
CNPP	Coalition of Nigeria Political Party
CPC	Congress for Progressive Change
DA	Democratic Alternative
ESBS	Ekiti State Broadcasting Service
EVER	Electoral Violence Education and Resolution
FCC	Federal Character Commission
FEDECO	Federal Electoral Commission
FRCN	Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria
GNPP	Great Nigerian Peoples Party
GPN	Green Party of Nigeria
GSMC	Gombe State Media Corporation
IBC	Imo Broadcasting Corporation
ICA	Igbo Citizens Assembly
IFES	International Foundation for Election System
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IYM	Ijaw Youth Movement
JP	Justice Party
KTRTV	Katsina State Radio and Television Station

L.G.A	Local Government Area
LDPN	Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MDJ	Movement for Democracy and Justice
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
NAC	National Action Council
NAP	Nigeria Advance Party
NBA	Nigerian Bar Association
NBC	National Broadcasting Commission
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria Citizens
NCP	National Conscience Party
ND	New Democrats
NDC	Niger Delta Congress
NDP	National Democratic Party
NDVF	Niger Delta Volunteer Force
NEPU	Northern Elements Progressive Union
NMMN	National Mass Movement of Nigeria
NNPP	New Nigeria Peoples Party
NPC	Northern Peoples Congress
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPRC	National Political Reform Conference
NRP	National Reformation Party
NTA	Nigerian Television Authority
NYM	Nigerian Youth Movement
OPC	Oodua Peoples Congress
PAC	Progressive Action Congress
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PLP	Progressive Liberation Party
PMP	Peoples Mandate Party
PRP	Peoples Redemption Party

PSD	Party for Social Democracy
PSP	Peoples Salvation Party
PTF	Petroleum Trust Fund
UDP	United Democratic Party
UNPP	United Nigeria Peoples Party
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

From the early 1960s, when most African countries got political independence, violence during the period of elections has been a reoccurring decimal of national and global concern because of its negative impact on the society. Indeed in many African countries, violence during elections pre-date the era of political independence. In the words of Hoeffler (2004), election related violence in Africa has become a burning issue that has occupied academic discourse as well as media circles. Electoral violence creates political instability, retards democratic reforms, growth, the hope of economic progress, and creates human suffering and in some cases may degenerate into civil wars. African democracies without any shadow of doubt have become associated with violence even with the slightest provocation. Elections related violence have created avenue for groups seeking power to truncate or manipulate what commonly is regarded as a peaceful process of transiting power from one regime to another and groups within the political space. Indeed, Anifowose, (1982:1), contended that many political elite see violence as a veritable means to remain tenaciously in office. As such, elections time in African countries is seen as war, due to the use of undemocratic means by politicians to acquire power at all cost.

The frequency at which violence is used to gain power varies from society to society and from situation to situation. For instance, acts of violence are infrequent and sporadic, particularly, when the system fails to respond to the yearnings and demands of the citizens. In some situations, violent acts have become more common and are now seen as institutionalized features of electoral process in many parts of the developing world. Without doubt, many independent African states are still engrossed in primordial and informal social relations. Thus, states officials' actions are based on non objective rationales favouring informal relations as they perform their official functions. In order to ensure that the situation do not change and remain in power, what obtain is violence, patrimonialism and perverse civil society superimposed by the political elite. As Chabal and Daloz (1999:14) pointed out, the state of disorder in Africa inevitably sustains the

political elite in power. The manifestations of this has been further accentuated through ethnicity, proliferation of arms on the continent, leading to and acting as catalyst to political violence, which repeatedly occur in alarming proportion at all stages of electoral process throughout the continent.

Though, violence during the period of elections remained a marked feature of electoral process in Africa, there seems to be an upsurge in the incidences of election related violence, albeit with significant transformation in form, character and dynamics. This has created an inherent dysfunctional nature of electoral process that often manifest in instability, lack of respect for due process and ultimately the prospect of democratic consolidation. As observed, many elections in contemporary times in Africa have been characterized by violence. For instance, previous elections in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, resulted in massive disputes that eventually resulted in mass protests and violence (Omotola,2008).

However, Ake (2000) cited by Omotola (2008) noted that violence during the period of elections in Africa cannot be fully understood without a recourse to the effect of colonialism. The colonial African States offer a useful point of entry. Ake (2000), argued that violence during the period of elections has a strong linkage with colonial rule in Africa. In his words, the introduction of the elective principle in the 1922 constitutional review provided grounds for power tussle that in many instances led to violence in Nigeria. Although the level of violence was very minimal as a result of the fact that democratic substance was limited to individuals and certain levels of income and residential qualifications. The limitation imposed by the income and residential qualifications provided limited opportunities for mass participation, this however created tension within the polity and by extension creating avenue for violence. The implication of the pre-independent political process was that it narrows political participation and as such made democratic process in this period essentially an elite-driven process, while the majority of the citizens were relegated to the back water of political irrelevance(Ake 2000:33–36).

In the words of Omotola (2008), as the state began assuming a more central position over power and resources, primordial sentiments, became appealing. Sooner than

later, the divisive factors assume the position of dominance within the political space. The events of the early years of Nigeria political independence ably captured how primordial sentiments became dominant features of the political process in the country. Beginning from 1964–65 general elections, violence became a dominant characteristics of the electoral process in Nigeria. The 1964 elections were largely seen as power tussle between the Southern region dominated by National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Northern region dominated by Northern People's Congress (NPC). As should be noted, NPC had dominated politics at the federal level since independence in 1960 and saw the 1964 election as another chance to consolidate its position. The NPC and NCNC were in coalition that ruled the country from 1960 – 1966. However, by 1964, the NPC further sought to spread her influence to the south, particularly the Western region, when it became apparent that Chief S.L. Akintola's Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) which hitherto was part of the Action Group (AG) have broken away and was thus willing to form an alliance with the NPC. However, the 1965 election was an opportunity to prove that it was still very much on the ground in the region by regaining its lost paradise (Omotola, 2008:59). The attendant violence, including arson, looting, killings, destruction of properties and the total collapse of public order especially in the Western region, led in many ways to the death of the First Republic (Osaghae 1998; Akinwumi 2004).

The Second Republic was not in any way different from that of the First Republic. Omotola (2008:59-60) stated that electoral process during the Second Republic in Nigeria (1979–1983) was also highly laced with violence, especially during the second election of 1983. The features of politics, despite the modification of the federal structure from three (later four) regions of the First Republic, to nineteen States, was still dictated by primordial sentiments, influenced by the desire of each party to remain strong in their various regions. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), was seen as an obvious replica of the Northern People's Congress's, eventually occupied the centre government between 1979 and 1983. In the 1983 elections, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) desired very strongly to extend her tentacles to other parts of the country, this explained the vicious predisposition of the party to win at all cost. The desire to achieve this goal could explain the gargantuan of electoral fraud that characterized the 1983 elections, which resulted in

an unprecedented outbreak of violence in the South-West, where the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), AG'S successor, held sway. The ensuing crisis perhaps led to the demise of the Second Republic in Nigeria. Thus, the negative state of electoral process resulting in electoral violence of course became the hydra-headed monster threatening democratic process and partisan politics in Nigeria. Associated with the incidence of violence pervading the political space and governance at large, violence during the period of elections in Nigeria has not provided a measure of politics of rationality and tolerance, which sanctifies maturity of public debates, productive dialogue, negotiations, and give-and-take compromises based on win-win scenario.

A study by the Nigerian Alliance for Peaceful Elections (NAPE,2007) found evidence of 77 cases of elections related violence between January 13 and February 13, 2007. These cases ranged from violent clashes at political rallies and polling centres, to kidnapping and assassinations of political opponents. Between February 14, and 28, 2007, the number of incidence of electoral violence increased to 114 incidents of which there were cases of intra-party clashes, 20 cases of assaults, intimidation and threats to life and physical attacks on competing prospective candidates by opponents' groups(Amnesty International index: AFR 44/004/2007). From all indications, it appeared that Nigeria have acquired an unenviable position, where violence during the period of elections has become a means for attaining political power. Violence, it would seem have become a defining characteristics of democratic process and transition from one government to another in Nigeria, such that all elections since political freedom was granted in 1960 to date have virtually become a cesspool of violence. From available records, nine elections have been conducted since 1960. Unfortunately, almost all these elections have been characterized by violence. Meanwhile, every attempts designed to restructure the state in order to enthrone a more viable and credible elections have also not yielded the desired results. Unfortunately politics have been mostly reduced to a zero-sum process, where might has become right and the will of the people has been reduced to nothing in governance, the consequences of this has also resulted in an unmitigated struggle for control of government by various individuals and groups, hence, this study examined the issues associated with electoral violence and their impact on democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, with a focus on Delta and Oyo States.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Since Nigeria's attainment of independence in 1960, violence and myriad irregularities have persistently marred the process of electing the country's leaders. Nigeria political landscape has thus been inundated by antidemocratic characteristics defined by fraud, corruption, intimidation, and violence, as if these are the necessary weapons of political winners. The electorate in many ways has been denied their very basic democratic rights to vote and be voted for. Indeed, the lack of credibility in the electoral process and the resultant violence has increased in recent elections. Local and international electoral observers for instance described the 2003 and 2007 polls as an undemocratic charade and the most blatant and visible rape of the people. (International Crisis Group, 2007).

The ever increasing trend of elections related violence have continued to generate scholarly interest, especially against the backdrop of the appreciation that only peaceful and fraud free electoral process can ensure the improvement in Nigeria's nascent democracy. The country has continued to witness growing disappointments and apprehension about free and fair elections whose results are generally acceptable to be credible enough (Igbuzor, 2010; Osumah & Aghemelo, 2010, Ekweremadu, 2011). It is a truism that almost all previous electoral process from 1960 till date have generated increasingly bitter controversies and violence (Gberie, 2011). Although there were relative improvement in the conduct of the 2011 and 2015 elections, the process was not totally free from malpractices and violence (Bekoe, 2011; Gberie, 2011; National Democratic Institute, 2012). Thus, with unprecedented political thuggery and uncontrolled violence during the period of elections, Nigeria is best described as warfare state. Incidences of violence are further accentuated by flagrant and official rigging of election results. Further violations of established process have invariably transformed election periods in Nigeria as a-matter-of-do-or-die or a-matter-of-life-and-death (Rawlence and Albin-Lackey, 2007). In fact, elections, remained notable sources of conflict which often result to confrontations that continued to threaten national unity and development. It would appear that since the enthronement of democratic governance in Nigeria in 1999, violence of varying degrees have been an unfortunate staple of Nigeria

elections. Evidently in Nigeria, elections have been about power; controlling it, undermining it and distributing it. This explains why Nigeria elections have not been issue based nor about providing for the most pressing yearnings of the people. The failure to respond to the yearnings of the people in terms of provision of basic needs, services and development have made governance a worrisome trend that has become a precursor for violence during the period of elections.

Whether sponsored or spontaneous, election-related conflicts are destructive, signifying discontent around highly interwoven social and economic concerns. In Nigeria, these concerns include the rent seeking behaviour of government officials including citizens, resulting in little or no respect for due process. The lack of respect for due process have resulted in the collision of personal and public interest in determining what is socially and economically relevant. The absence of means to mitigate the hopes, fears and expectations of individuals, groups and elites often raised tensions during election period and violent competition.

In 1999, violence occurred but between 2003 and 2007 general elections, the violence was more blatant, intense, sophisticated and widespread. Intra-party clashes, political assassinations, and community unrests in already volatile areas such as Nigeria's oil producing Niger Delta characterized these elections. In all elections, similar pattern were on display. Merely signaling intention to seek for political office was enough to put one's life at risk. In fact, in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, electoral violence had become such a credible risk despite Nigeria's return to democracy, that the mere threat of it sends chivers into the spine of large swaths of voters on election days (Omwudime and Chloe 2010).

In the words of Orji (2003:10), one common trend during elections in Nigeria is that violence has assumes higher sophistication with time. In today's politics in Nigeria, many actors do not see ability to deliver as a credible means for seeking for office or getting elected, rather, violence and other unorthodox means are employed. This situation has made it difficult to enthrone stable democracy in Nigeria. Most scholarly works on elections have tried to identify the causes of electoral violence without looking at their impact on democracy in Nigeria. Thus, the thrust of this thesis was to examine the issues

associated with increasing electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, 1999-2011 and their impact on democracy, using Delta and Oyo states as study states.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this thesis was to examine the issues associated with electoral violence and their impact on democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The specific objectives are to:

- i. Examine the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state and how these had contributed to electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.
- ii. Highlight the nature and character of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.
- iii. Examine the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria's democratization process.
- iv. Examine the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria's democracy in the Fourth Republic.

1.4 Justification of the Study

- i. In this age of global democracy, Nigeria, being an active member of the comity of nations, cannot fail to democratize its political institutions, hence the need for this study.
- ii. Secondly, democracy is premised on sound electoral principles which have eluded this country since its independence. The need to account for the increasing intensity and the sophisticated nature of electoral violence which had continuously hampered stable democracy requires urgent attention in this country.
- iii. The study is also designed to create a reasonable platform for ensuring scholarly discussions on how to ensure peaceful process of political succession through elections in Nigeria.
- iv. Another justification for the study lies on the ground that electoral violence is now publicly seen as a critical issue of national and international proportion that has made it impossible for the country to develop because of its longstanding effects, this, therefore requires a careful study.

1.5 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were stated and tested in the study.

Ho¹: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state.

Ho²: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Ho³: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

1.6 Research Questions

The following research questions were carefully examined in this thesis so that solutions provided will go a long way in alleviating the chronic problems associated with the conduct of elections in Nigeria. These include:

- i.** What is the nature and character of electoral violence in Nigeria?
- ii.** What is the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria's democratization process.?
- iii.** What is the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria's democracy in the Fourth Republic, 1999-2011?
- iv.** How has the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state, promote electoral violence in the Fourth Republic.

1.7 Significance of the Study

This thesis is significant for the following reasons.

- i.** It will contribute immensely to the existing literature on elections related violence in Nigeria, and since the study used Delta and Oyo as study States, the findings of this study will be useful as referral materials for scholars undertaking similar studies on electoral process thereby contributing to knowledge production on election matters.

- ii. Results emanating from this study will provide data for cross-cultural study on electoral violence in other states in the country and by so doing, will allow room for effective comparison on election violence matters.
- iii. The study is also significant because it will provide necessary information on how to curb the problems associated with elections violence in Delta and Oyo States in the near future, Nigeria and Africa in general.
- iv. The study is also significant because it will account for electoral violence as a debilitating political phenomenon that has made it impossible for Nigeria to attain stable democratic culture since 1999 till date.
- v. The research is also significant in that it attempted to answer an inquiry about a conflict between moral goods, legitimacy and search for power.

1.8 Scope of the Study

The scope of this research was limited to the 1999-2011 general elections in Nigeria. However, references were made to materials and information as they relate to past general elections in the country with a view to properly situate them. The essence of limiting the scope between 1999 - 2011 general elections with particular reference to Delta and Oyo States as study areas was to enable the researcher undertake an in-depth study of issues at stake so that findings could be adequate in terms of coverage for cross-cultural studies elsewhere in Nigeria. This scope was adopted for this study because, since the inception of this Fourth Republic, 1999 to 2011, Delta and Oyo States have been major flash spots of electoral violence in Nigeria politics.

The choice of Oyo State as one of the study states was informed by the fact that Oyo State happened to be the core of the old Western region which has been a major theatre of electoral violence till date. As for the choice of Delta, Delta State is an heterogeneous State having all the traits inherent in the Nigerian nation in terms of different cultural backgrounds, religious differences and ethnic groupings. These attributes have influenced people's attitudes toward voting and their reactions which can inform the nature, course and trends of election violence in the state. Delta has a long history of inter-ethnic rivalries and violent conflicts over lands, lakes and rivers over the years. Added to these, is that ethnicity has been identified as one of the major

determinants of voting behaviours of Deltans and a viable source for electoral victory since the creation of the state. The need to understand the place of ethnicity in Delta politics necessitated the choice of Delta State. In addition, Delta state is an oil producing state in the country which obtained extra revenue from the federation account through the 13% derivation. This gives the state an edge over other states, which do not produce crude oil, hence, there is always the fierce struggle as to who controls the state and its resources, including the distribution of oil revenue and resources. Consequently, electoral process is often heightened by tension in the state, leading in most cases to electoral violence. The need to underscore the place of oil revenue and inter-ethnic rivalries and violent conflicts in election related violence gave rise to the choice of the state. In addition, this scope was adopted in order for the researcher to be able to show the increasing intensity of electoral violence over time and since the researcher was a participant observer in the 1999-2011 general elections, his experiences provided some of the unwritten information that helped in enhancing the quality of this thesis.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

- (a) Information Hoarding:** Owing to the sensitive nature of the issues at hand, relevant information relating to electoral process in the States were not released, since those who are assumed to have shuttled to the top through election malpractices are directly in control of such information. To overcome this problem, the researcher embarked on making informal friendship with some (INEC) officials who are in charge of such information. This provided avenue to have access to some of the information needed for the study.
- (b) Security Challenges:** The tense security condition of some areas, especially among riverine communities in Delta State, as a result of kidnappings was a cog in the course of data gathering. However, the security challenges were ameliorated by assistance received from some security operatives who were personal friends of the researcher.
- (c) Difficult Geographical Terrain:** The researcher was also constrained by the delicate geographical terrain of some communities in Delta State while administering questionnaires for information for this thesis. The geographical features, made accessibility to some communities very difficult. This necessitated

the recruitment of field assistants to gather information from such affected areas who had knowledge of such terrains.

- (d) **Collection of Administered Questionnaires:** Some sampled respondents in the two states, especially civil servants were of the opinion that whatever response they may give will not affect the trajectory of future elections in the country. According to them, electoral violence is already a means to winning political opponents, provided politicians are ready to hire the required “area boys” and thugs” to do the rigging for them. To overcome these biases and sentiments expressed by the civil servants, the researcher with his field assistants have to do a lot of persuasion to change the mindsets of the respondents on the issue before committing them to complete the questionnaires given to them for information needed for this study.

1.10 Operational Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this thesis, the following terms were operationally defined.

Elections: It is defined as the institutional mechanism or process by which individual or groups of individuals are selected into official positions. It is the entire process involved usually by the citizens of any democratic nation from the age of 18 years and above to give legitimate mandate for those who are to rule them as stipulated in the constitution.

Democracy: This is a government through representation. Democracy provides greater opportunity for people’s involvement in governance and policy formulation for the majority of the people.

Electoral violence: This involves all actions that result in bodily harm death, and destruction of private/public property during the whole stages of electoral process often perpetrated by either losing or the winning candidates, political parties or allies.

Electoral Fraud: This involves the various forms of malpractices that distort the normal procedures of choosing people to govern. It involves deliberate efforts to influence, manipulate and subvert the electoral processes in one’s favour.

Democratization: This simply means the expansion of society’s structures and values and how these structures and values allow or encourage people to participate in and determine the processes of exercising state power, and to what degree the exercise of state power, is in the interest of the electorate and consented to by them.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

The concept, democracy has no universally acceptable definition. However, it is generally accepted that democracy is a form of government that demands that leaders must be elected periodically as constitutional provided for. As such, those in leadership position are expected to be accountable and responsible to the people. In a democracy, emphasis is usually placed on multi-party elections at regular intervals with eligible voters' participation. The electorate must therefore chose who become their leaders and those elected to lead must give account of their actions and decisions to the people. As must be emphasised, elections in democratic system are expected to ensure and create an atmosphere where there can be confirmation or reconfirmation of the right to rule or power to govern. Furthermore, elections provide avenue where the will of the majority of people become paramount and develop.

Unfortunately, Democracy in Nigeria, especially elections have been characterized by pessimism, uncertainty and fears for the safety of people's lives and property. Violent confrontations and struggles for power have from time immemorial become defining features of elections in Nigeria. In many instances, the rights of the voters have often been violated due to violence. This is why electoral process rather than becoming a platform for the aggregation of the interest of the people in governance has often turned into a conflict ridden exercise, that has continued to cast negative shadows on the survival of the country. As must be noted, elections in Nigeria have always been violent ridden, from the beginning to the end, that is pre-election time, election time and post election period. This trend runs counter to democratic principles premised on election as stipulated in the country's 1999 constitution. The centrality of election and participation to the enthronement of a viable political culture has been stressed by (Diamond 2002:16). In his words,

Democracy thrives on the tripod of mass process of interest aggregation, involving the periodic conduct of election and negative zero sum attitude to governance, a significant respect for people's right to vote and be voted for under a credible electoral process, such that the universal adult suffrage is not undermined, and further placing paramount emphasis on people's right to choose, voice their opposition to certain governmental policies, freedom to express their thought in writing and join or form any organization, albeit with sufficient respect for citizen's right to join any association of people with similar political interest and values.

These scholarly opinions of writers and researchers on democracy, recognize that the rights to vote and be voted for constitute the plank of any viable democratic process. Democratic theories place elections under laid down laws as precursors of the success of democracy globally. As a matter of fact, past efforts at defining the concept democracy, suggest that periodic elections is without measures the singular most important feature of democracy anywhere in the world. In the view of Schumpeter (1947:270), democracy is about conducting elections and choosing political leaders. Robert Dahl, in his theory of a democratic polyarchy considered elections to be quite germane. Dahl (1991:72-75) identified seven criteria that a polyarchy must possess. These include:

elected officials must accord the electorate their basic rights to choose those who rule over them at periodic interval under a credible process devoid of force; that sovereignty lies with the people; there is respect for universal adult suffrage; political sovereignty lies with the people; there is a system of public accountability and probity, and there is an enforceable right to form and join political organizations including political parties and interest groups.

Implicit in Dahl's conceptualization is the point that, elections symbolize popular will premised on "social pact" between governed and the government; defining the framework of political authority, legitimacy and citizens' obligations to the state. It is the foundation of political accountability and respect for popular will as entrenched in the laws of the land. Rose (1978:19) argues that the more consent authority has, through elections, the better rulers can economize on using their limited resources for compelling

obedience. The import of these definitions are that any claim to democracy by any regime or State must essentially be based on popular will, competitive choice through elections. The respect for popular sovereignty, through respect for the rule of law. It is against this backdrop that Okoye (2003:33) defines election

as a formal act of collective decision that occurs in a stream of connected antecedents and subsequent behaviours; it involves the right of the people to vote and be voted for, and respect for people's choices in decision. Elections cover all activities that pre-date and post-date the actual period of voting those who eventually govern the state.

Other scholars, define election from other perspectives. For instance, Osumah & Aghemelo (2010) saw election as a process through which the people choose their leaders and indicate their policies and programme preference and consequently invest a government with authority to rule. They see election more as a means of pacifying various groups in society. They further contend that elections provide a platform for guaranteeing legitimacy of government actions, choices and decisions as they impact on the citizens. Eya (2003) on his part sees election simply as a process of selecting individuals among competing persons for position in governance through the ballot boxes. Ozor (2010) aptly gave a more broader definition of election when he said that election involve the exercise of suffrage especially by qualified adults over those who should govern them or represent them in the legislative organ of the state. Osumah (2002) added that election simply entails the selection of those who are to hold public offices in trust for the people, and with power to make decisions on behalf of the people. He posited further that election increases the platform for mass participation in governance.

An essential deduction from these conceptual clarifications is that election in a democracy should be credible. Mackenzie (1967:35) has identified four conditions necessary for a credible electoral process,

an independent judiciary to interpret the electoral laws, an honest, competent and non-partisan electoral umpire, a democratic party system with a clear concept of public service for the electorate to choose from, and a respect

for the rules guiding electoral process, that help to curtail the zero-sum tendencies of political actors.

Unfortunately, these conditions stipulated above by Mackenzie are almost absent in Nigeria when these are examined against the reality of the nature of electoral process in Nigeria. Since 1922, when the Clifford's Constitution provided the elective principle, Nigeria has conducted numerous elections, the major ones being the elections of 1951, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1979, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. It must be noted that the partitioning of Nigeria along six geopolitical zones has further intensified the problems of electoral violence in the country. Below is a tabular presentation of the six geo-political zones into which the country was subdivided.

Table 2.1: Composition of Nigeria's Six Geo-political Zones

North West	North East	North Central	South West	South East	South South
Kaduna	Bauchi	Plateau	Lagos	Enugu	Delta State
Katsina	Gombe	Nasarawa	Osun	Anambra	Rivers State
Jigawa	Borno	Niger	Ogun	Ebonyi	Cross Rivers
Sokoto	Taraba	Kwara	Oyo	Abia	Akwa Ibom
Kebbi	Adamawa	Kogi	Ekiti	Imo	Bayelsa
Kano	Yobe	Benue	Ondo		Edo State
Zamfara					

Source: Ugbekwe P. (2008) A Political Geography of Nigeria. Ibadan, Kings Resources Limited, p. 39

The partitioning of the Nigerian state into these geo-political zones also showcased the pattern and trends of electoral violence across the country. Nonetheless; the trigger, machinery and methods used may vary and the underlining causes may as well vary across zones and States. Researches on election related violence are scarce and often times focus broadly on mixture of political and electoral violence. However, some researchers have made attempts to critically examine electoral violence. Fischer (2002:7), defined electoral violence (conflict) as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through all known antidemocratic behaviour. The work of Fischer (2002), resulted in a more broad based study by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) on electoral violence, which later set the tone for the Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project that has been implemented in nations across the world such as Ghana,

Kyrgyzstan, Guyana, Iraq, and East-Timor. The EVER study is presently undergoing experimentation in Nigeria and the results have displayed a deeper understanding of the nature of election related violence.

Anifowose (1982:41) contended that

Violence during elections is the use of or threat of , physical acts perpetrated by individuals and groups on persons and properties, with a premeditated action to cause injury or death to persons and/or damage or cause destruction to properties; and whose objective, victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and effects have political significance and tend to alter the behaviours of others based on pre-determined status-quo of a power arrangement with some implications for system stability.

Some observers of Nigeria's politics since 1999 have argued that, violence during elections witnessed so far were products of a political culture in which every contestant always want to win, but none is ready to accept defeat. This position has been supported by Agbegunde (2007:144), in his words:

losers in an election who assumed they have been shortchanged from reaching an important goal to which they feel entitled, usually become frustrated and aggrieved at the winner and decide to inflict injury on, or death to, persons and destruction of properties.

From the various summation of the context of electoral violence, it can be deduced generally that electoral violence involves the actions of key stake holders in the electoral process (Fischer, 2002). This summation is similar to the conceptualization of electoral violence in a cross country study of the period preceding the Second World War, in which Hibbs (1973) opined that electoral violence must involve specific victim(s), perpetrator(s) and occurs within a time frame and location. Electoral violence also comes with motive(s) and the victims can be people, places, things or data (Hibbs, 1973:34). This presupposes that electoral violence is not limited to anti-democratic actions perpetrated during elections period only but also those acts perpetrated before and after elections. Fischer (2002: 27), highlighted four possible factors suggestive of the

causes of violence during elections. He equally suggested possible reasons that may give rise to such violence related acts during elections: These are:

- i.** Aggrieved electorate who are dissatisfied with the state from perceived unfairness in the election process
- ii.** The government versus the electorates over the outcome of the elections
- iii.** Struggle among party rivals over power and
- iv.** A combination of two or more of the above categories.

Oshiomhole (2011:44) in a lecture organized by the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), also highlighted three forms of electoral violence since the enthronement of democracy in 1999 namely;

- i.** Violence unleashed by individuals or at the instance of individuals to forcefully ensure that the elections swing in their favour or against their parties, their godfathers or their cronies. This may take different forms, including assassination, use of thugs, and ballot snatching.
- ii.** In addition, there is the structural dimension in which the State through its custodian applies violence to tilt the political balance in the favour of a candidate or simply to overwhelm the voters into accepting a predetermined outcome.
- iii.** The fluid form of violence is often the collateral violence involved in popular resistance to electoral fraud or in legitimate protest of election rioting.

In today's world, election provides avenue for peaceful transition from a crisis ridden situation to a more stable polity. It increases the scope of political association and mobilization from an autocratic regime. It offers a government a unique opportunity for legitimacy and is also a recognised way of building trust in former authoritarian States and also a way to validate negotiated political pacts (Brown, 2003:4 ; Sisk,2008:11) . Election also provides the platform to strengthen the peaceful change of leadership. Moreso, due to the freedom associated with election and the momentum it generates, it thus allows individuals, groups and parties to use words and/or actions that are capable of intimidating, coercing, humiliating or causing even bodily harm to the electorate. Because, elections provide the space whereby people retain, regain and usurp power and also the space to highlight social differentiation of individuals and party opponents, players tap into the deep vulnerability created by such interaction to create violence (Sisk

2008:20). As such, (Sisk 2008:22) warned that negative expression of social differentiation is likely to lead to extreme clashes between opposition supporters as witnessed in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Guyana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe.

Such tendencies can lead to high scale violence and bring a country to near level of terrorism and un-governability. It also lead to proliferation of arms because more often, the machinery for perpetrating election violence are mostly unemployed youths, which thereafter resort to the use of those arms for other social vices. Legitimacy of any government also depends on the acceptability of the election outcome by all parties. Thus, a credible election gives the government, the confidence and legitimacy to ensure they respond appropriately towards improving the welfare of the citizens through effective service delivery. However, when on the contrary and based upon false or forced legitimacy, the reverse might as well be the case. Ivory Coast is the nearest case in mind (Sisk 2008:22).

Election in every country provides the platform for debate among competitors, persuasion and common rules for selecting those that govern, especially those who can serve in the executive, legislative, and other institutions of government. Elections are in this sense a veritable means of aggregating the interest of the people that ultimately leads to the authoritative allocation of values, in which parties abide by the pre-election promises and the looser given the opportunity to provide constructive criticisms to aid the party in power, while opposition parties prepare against the next election.. In this case therefore, election becomes in the word of Robert Dahl, a mutual security pact (Dahl, 1973:67); and operates with the consistent consent of elites under conditions of bound uncertainty (Przeworski, 1991:12). In a study carried out in San Francisco in California USA 2008, Sisk (2008:2) highlighted election as two sides of the same coin proving voice and legitimacy when the process is followed and all stakeholders adhere to the agreed framework and processes and also a violence induced factor when on the contrary, particularly in fragile States (Sisk, 2008: 2). The next sub-headings will be devoted to the review of some critical factors that promote violence, pre during and after elections in Nigeria and beyond. These are discussed one after the other, beginning with ethnicity and regionalism.

2.1.1 Ethnicity and Regionalism

The history of politically and election motivated violence in Nigeria began before the attainment of political independence. This is because, election violence, though had not reached the magnitude it is now, its symptoms were obvious in the Nigerian state before 1960. The Constitution of 1946 gave constitutional sanctity to the 1939 partition of the country into three regions, namely, North, East and West. The North, built around the Hausa-Fulani, the East around the Igbo and the West around the Yoruba (Michael 2007:102). However, in these regions were other ethnic groups whose identities, interests and agitations were sought under the domination of the major ethnic groups. This led to agitations by these groups for self-determination and separatist movements. These microcosmic imbalances in the region also played out at the centre where the Northern region alone was larger in size and population than the rest of the country put together. The Northern region exploited this advantage to the fullest. It controlled the central government, though in a coalition with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) representing the East; it received the highest amount from the federal government account; it assumed the toga of one who was 'anointed to rule' the others. The North, through (Northern Peoples Congress) exercised hegemony over the rest of the country, especially using its numerical advantage in parliament. Accordingly, the centralization of power in the centre and in the regions promoted violence as those groups and individuals excluded from power and whose interests and identities were precariously balanced resorted to violence (Michael 2007:103).

Thus, the politics of the First Republic from 1960-1966 was characterized by political violence, intolerance and exclusion leading to frustration and bitterness. This period has been described regarding the Western part of the country (the main theatre of contestations) as the 'wild-wild west' reflecting the nature of political violence at the time. According to Michael (2007:104), for groups and individuals alienated from power and the perks of office, political violence became the only means of expression of grief and dissatisfaction. It is a known fact that politics by its nature is inherently segmentary, involving conflicts and confrontations, as people and groups organize to have access to and then control or exercise power in a given society. Ayoade (1983:26) posits that

though, ethnic groups are not the organizing units for political control in Nigeria, nevertheless ethnicity plays a very critical role in the expression and organization of interest groups. This is largely the result of two main factors. First, politics and government are regarded not only as means of distributing patronage and therefore creating and maintaining alliances and support from critical areas of the society, but, access to political control and to government is an insurance against domination or oppression of one ethnic group by another. It is thus a means of asserting personal and group pre-eminence in Nigeria.

There is, therefore, vested interest in the ethnic control of those organizations called political parties which are the open and the direct units in the competition for the prime places in national politics. However, Rothschild (1981:3) noted that ethnicity by itself does not create political cleavages, but it becomes important when its interests are given a political translation through their role in the structure and function of political parties in Nigeria. These aspects of ethnicity were crucial in the organization of political parties in an independent Nigeria. Coleman (1960:25) gave the chronology of the introduction of ethnicity into Nigeria politics, following the ethnic based crises that rocked the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) in 1937 and the subsequent formation of the three major political parties, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in 1949, the Action Group (AG) in 1951 and the National Council of Nigerian and Cameroun (NCNC), in the 1941. The NYM had a nationalist character and outlook from 1938 aimed at the unification of Nigeria's diverse people and culture and sectional interests, but its political elites from different parts of the country, were disorganized on grounds of ethnicity only three years later. The three successors factors in the names of the three political parties had the core of their supporters in the Northern, Western and Eastern Regions as well as among the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and the Igbo (Otite,1977:39-40). This format reflect the three regional groupings into which Nigeria was arranged by the Richard's Constitution of 1946. Thus there was a tripod for promoting the struggle for ethno-political supremacy.

The pattern of ethnic support remained substantially unchanged during the First Republic (1960-1966), as well as the Second Republic (1979-1983). Locality and support

were expected and went from members of the ethnic group to a leader from the same or allied group. (Dudley, 1986:252). This was perhaps a natural event since ethnic loyalty and cleavages were stronger than class or any other form of social organization. Members of one's ethnic group were regarded classificatory and putatively as kinsmen who were distinguished from "strangers", with the implied kinship trust and obligations. In analyzing the votes and voting behaviours of Nigerians during the Second Republic, Eleazu (1984:26) pointed out that although each presidential candidate chose his running mate from a different ethnic group, the usual pattern of voting for the ethnic notables did not change... The Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) candidate received the highest number of votes from the home State of the leader, Borno, 54 percent. The People's Republican Party (PRP) candidate, Alhaji Aminu Kano, polled 76.4 percent of the votes in Kano. Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) candidate, carried all the Yoruba States. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe carried the two Igbo States, while Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who emerged the winner, drew much support from the Hausa-Fulani States. The implication of the above analysis showed that ethnic factor played a decisive role in the politics of the First and Second Republics. As was in many ways responsible for the political violence that was to define the whole electoral process in this period. Even at present, the situation has not changed substantially. Ethnicity has continued to create a situation in which the unity of Nigeria remains a mirage. Current researches have shown however that ethnicity is no longer a major determinant of voting behaviours in Nigeria. It has been established that corruption is now tilting voting behaviours of Nigerians in the Fourth Republic. The replacement of ethnicity by corruption as a major determinant of voting behaviour was demonstrated by Ehwarieme (2011:194). According to him,

Corruption of the electoral process, especially of the nature and magnitude in Nigeria, simply means that votes do not count. Consequently, standards variables known to influence electoral outcomes, such as personal qualities of candidates, issues, party programmes and ideologies, can hardly be used to explain electoral outcomes. Even if it can be conceded that, there could have been a few instances in which victory

or defeat had depended on such variables in local elections, they have hardly been significant bases of differentiation between candidates and parties in Nigeria especially in elections that cut across ethnic boundaries. Parties are hardly ideological or programmatic and politics is rarely issue-oriented. This is why ethnicity and money have played more determinate roles in electoral outcomes and many popular candidates have failed to get elected.

Regionalism which became a forerunner to ethnic politics was noted by Osaghae (2002) to have been reflected in the marginalization of the minorities. In his words, regionalism created a platform in which people are discriminated against because of region or tribal origin and consequently denied certain access to public goods. This implied the use of various illegal means to exclude certain group of citizens based on their ethnic differences. The discrimination that resulted from regionalism further accentuate the degree of domination and the cry for emancipation from the plethora of ethnic groups in the country. For example, the Tivs people in the North, the Ijaws in the East and the Urhobos in the West during the First Republic. Thus, rather than promote national cohesion and unity, regionalism, the Nigerian kind, based on ethnic nationality stimulated ethnicity, and formed the umbrella of ethnic competition and distrust with attendant crisis in the country. The major effect of regionalism as the offshoot of Richard's Constitution was the multiplication of groupings along ethnic or tribal lines. The 1954 and 1959 elections witnessed manifestations of ethnic politics. Notable political parties like the Action Group (A.G), National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C), Northern People's Congress (N.P.C), Niger Delta Congress (N.D.C) and Northern Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U), were formed along ethnic/tribal lines. This ethnic configuration reflected in the voting pattern of the people(Osaghae, 2000).

For instance, Table (1) showed clearly party performance in the 1959 general elections.

Table 2.2 Party Performance in Strongholds, 1959 Elections

	Area of Dominance	Total no of Seats	No. of Seats Won
NPC	North	174	134
NCNC	East	73	58
AG	West	62	33

Source: Nnoli (1978:166-167). Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu; Fourth Dimension.

Although the N.C.N.C went into coalition with the N.P.C to form a government at independence, it however did not douse the air of ethnic bias that already pervade the political system and the desire to promote national integration. For example, the exclusion of the Tiv people from the benefits that they ought to obtain from the N.P.C led to series of violent crisis in the Northern region. According to Tarka (1982:112),

there was persistent refusal by N.P.C local and regional authorities to show more than casual concern to the grievances and petitions of the Tiv people individually and collectively. Arising from this state of powerlessness, the people rightly developed the feeling that they would never be heard or get justice anywhere. Thus, this persistent feeling of alienation and felt injustices bred frustration and the natural resort to retaliation against N.P.C members and their property.

There is need to emphasize too that all the parties that grew up in the First Republic were ethnically or regionally based and their leadership recruitment were all done along ethnic lines with the result that till the present day, the country have had no leaders that have gained general acceptance to rule from the Nigerian populace except perhaps, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan who gained general acceptance by receiving majority votes across the States during the 2011 general elections to govern. His victory in the 2011 Presidential elections was laced with some unproven allegations that resulted in what can be described as an ethnic motivated violence in some Northern states. Even, his quest to contest the 2015 elections was challenged by the North based on ethnic or regional colouration, proving once again that ethnic/regional biases still pervade the

political landscape and continued to be major cause of election related violence in the country.

2.1.2 The Nature of Electoral Process in Nigeria

It has become a truism that electoral processes in Nigeria often feature violence, corruption, rigging, ethnic influence, thuggery, kidnappings and all sorts of anti-social behaviours. These features have always replayed themselves right from the first election conducted in the country up to this present Fourth Republic (Obi, 2004:12). Under the First Republic, election campaigns were visibly characterized by palpable violence, thuggery and different types of physical assaults on political opponents. According to Dudley (1973:25), much of the violence resulted from the intra-party crisis that rocked the Action Group (AG) which was led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The AG crisis, initially started as a form of inter-personal conflict between Awolowo and his deputy, Chief S.L Akintola, which eventually snowballed into total breakdown of law and order and a declaration of a state of emergency in the Western region. The violence that was associated with this incident also resulted in a free for all fight between the supporters of Akintola and Awolowo on the floor of the regional house. Dudley (1973:29) further noted that arising from ethnic factors that became prominent in Nigeria politics, party campaigners and candidates were freely molested in areas where their parties were not popular. For example, Action Group candidates were denied electoral registration forms in the North while the Helicopter that brought Awolowo to Sokoto for a campaign rally was refused landing. Similarly, the campaigners of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) and electoral officials were physically assaulted and kidnapped in the North and West.

The Second Republic, like the first, also witnessed a lot of election violence particularly in Ondo and Oyo States with the former witnessing a lot of criminal arson (Nwabueze, 1984:12). The situation in Ondo was very tense. The 1983 election was particularly rated as one of the worst election ever held in Nigeria because of the violence that accompanied it. There was fear of violence so much that results were announced at night for fear of violent attack (Eleazu 1984:17). Violence in Nigeria's politics assumed a more disturbing dimension during the present Fourth Republic. This is because, apart

from the usual form of violence that has crept into the body politics, unwarranted and mindless assassinations and killings had gradually and systematically become defining features of Nigeria body politics. Still fresh in our minds are the killings and unfathomed assassinations of Harry Marshal, Bola Ige, Funso Williams and Deji Daramola, the last two, being PDP governorship aspirants in Lagos and Ekiti States respectively (Akpor,2004).

However, Ayoade (2007:3) argued that political violence can also be traced to the role of the organs responsible for the regulations of elections in Nigeria. In his words, the inability of the electoral bodies from independence to the present to exert its independence amidst political influence often attract rancor from the aggrieved party and their supporters. The case against the conduct of the 2007 general elections by (INEC) and the consequent nullification of some States elections by tribunals and courts demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the INEC to conduct credible elections. In all however, it must be added that the growing incidences of election related violence in Nigeria has a strong correlation with the zero sum nature and the uncontrollable desire to capture power by all means by politicians.

2.1.3 The Nature of the Nigerian State and Its Political Elite

The evolution and character of the Nigerian State is quite an essential input in understanding the nature and behaviour of Nigerians generally and, political leadership in particular (Adejumobi,1998:5). The State, in its evolutionary process, particularly in the colonial era, shaped the outlook and provided the orientation of the elites and citizens(Dudley,1973:9). Nigeria as is known today, was born in 1914, after the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates. The unilateral merger of the two regions has been largely described as a ‘fraudulent’ social contract and not of a ‘negotiated will’ of the welded parts. The expediency of economic imperialism was the sole rationale. Lady Flora Shaw (1904) (later Mrs. Lugard) who coined the name ‘Nigeria’ comments:

as in India, so is in Nigeria, we meant to trade, but conquest was forced on us. Having conquered, we are obliged to administer and the hope that lies before us is to develop from small beginnings, which have been made in Nigeria, such another great or prosperous dominion as our ancestors have created for us in India (Shaw,1904:8)

These coerced groupings of diverse peoples, with varied backgrounds and cultures, created both horizontal polarization and primordial loyalties which invariably made national integration difficult (Adejumobi, 1998:11). This in many ways helped to explain the current negative and warped State of development in Nigeria. Agagu (2005:4) however added that, the colonial politics of divide and rule, and its strategy of regionalism effectively laid the foundation for ethnic chauvinism, sectional political parties, and parochial cum disunited indigenous political elite. This essentially turns politics into warfare, a situation in which power is overvalued.

The colonial State also imposed a patrimonial system of administration (in the ideological guise of indirect rule) on the country. This was targeted at enlisting the dominant status group in the service of colonial rule and to contain the political consequences of changes in class structure. In this case, the political relations that existed were vertical in nature. It was one of domination and dependence. The British resident became the Great White patron at the zenith of governance (William, 1980:19). The whole governmental structure was characterized by a military-like chain of responsibility extending from the Governor down to the village heads (Oyediran,1988:6). The local potentates (native chiefs) were judged only by their loyalty to and dependence upon the colonial friends. No room was given for opinion dissent; public institutions like the bureaucracy, police and the army only reify the State, and acted as its vehicles of domination and plunder. Succinctly, the colonial State was a police State (Adejumobi, 1991:16).

Yet, it has been argued by Anam-Ndu (1998:45) that the commonest diagnosis of the Nigerian sickness is bad leadership and it seems the situation have developed indignant resistance for ages now. The post colonial State and its leaders are products of

the institutions of the colonial regime, and its vices. It inherited and nurtured the military chain like administration, which guarantees a relation of domination and control between the leaders and the led, a system of patronage of public offices, the practice of political intolerance, and the notion of political opposition being an anathema (Adejumobi, 1991:21).

The Nigerian State at independence was therefore a disabled, underdeveloped and crises - ridden State in many senses. These disabilities as Ogunsanwo (1990:79) identified, exist in the structural, economic, elite orientation and value areas. The first supported by Adejunmobi (1991:56) is in the dysfunctional tripod upon which the country is laid, in which, one region in area is twice as big as the other two regions put together. This negates Wheare's (1947:56) concept of federalism which holds that the units should be equal, coordinate and independent, thus, makes the practice of cooperative federalism difficult.

The second problem with the country was in the area of her economic structure. The nation inherited a totally peripheral dependent economy, which is outer-directed and cut off by and large from the economies of the neighbouring countries. A poor and dislocated economy could therefore not meet the revolution of rising expectations of the citizens nor could it secure a good material base for the governing elite. The consequence of this is two folds, first, political repression is used to suppress the masses and secondly, the governing group is bound to be gruesome and violent. The third disability has to do with the orientation and attitude of the newly created indigenous elites and citizens. The colonial government perfectly produced 'foreign' multidimensional elites, who are entirely British, save for their pigment, and were neither patriotic nor selfless. This was a veritable means to protect the colonial structures and interests in a neo-colonial State.

The fourth disability is in the duality of values. Colonialism produced what Ekeh (1975:89) called the two publics. There is the primordial public which is socially moral, and the amoral civil public that tolerate immorality. Unfortunately, it is the amoral civil public which dominates governance and public actions. As such, the tendency is to regard public property, assets, or resources as something that must be vandalized and misappropriated, while the nation is viewed as something that must be assaulted and if

possible privatized. After independence, there emerged out of continual agitations with the colonial authority, political leaders whose interests were based on primitive accumulation of the commonwealth and this predisposition was not easy to accomplish under colonial rule. This orientation of attitude of the elites, according to Dudley (1973:59),

was not accidental, nor was it self-generative, but was due to the heterogeneous direction provided by the colonial predators who for their own convenience divided the country into three administrative areas grouped round the major ethnic groups. This, later created political antagonism among the elites along the cultural divide.

Despite the fact that these elites operated against colonial regime, their alliances were never free from tensions and conflicts. As the prospects for political independence became imminent, the existing bond among the elites began to waiver and competition among them took the centre stage. It is within this context that the prevalent ‘loot and warfare’ mentality in politics, the ‘opposition phobia’, the pre-occupation with interests of politics of survival and personal security, (African Leadership Forum, 1988:12), the sit-tight syndrome and political killings/assassinations within this class and the citizens, all seek expression in this paradigm and Nigerian leaders seem to seek explanation in Machiavelli political thought.

2.1.4 Structural Imbalance and Electoral Violence in Nigeria

In many ways, the formal partition of Nigeria into three regions by Britain in 1946 was targeted at differentiation. These measures were aimed at granting self-rule to the three regions, while leaving the centre to the colonial government. However, the regionalization of Nigeria in 1946 was a decision which resulted in acrimony based on two main grounds. In the first place, the Northern Region was geographically and demographically larger than the other two regions combined. This situation gave the Northern Region electoral advantage vis-à-vis the rest of the regions (Claude,2002:19). In addition, the partition of the country into three regions secured regional hegemony for the three “biggest” ethnic groups in Nigeria – Hausa-Fulani (Northern Region), Yoruba

(Western Region) and Igbo (Eastern Region). In the three regions, three political parties were dominated by the three majority ethnic groups. This scenario created fear and apprehension from the smaller ethnic groups in the country about the tendency of the major ethnic groups to dominate others.

The tripartite structure of Nigerian federation enhanced the growth of cultural-nationalism among the three major ethnic groups. This was reflected in the establishment of socio-cultural associations such as the Ibo State Union and the Pan-Yoruba group: *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* – Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa (Chike, 2009:17). Although the aim of these organizations were community development and preservation of communal identity, with time, these associations acquired political importance. Through their leaders, these associations became affiliate to different factions within the nationalist movement, and later the political parties.

Akindele and Olaopa (2009:67), for instance, contend that although the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) had a national focus at its inception, it was later considered to be the political organ of the Ibo State Union. This was because Late President Nnamdi Azikiwe was able as from 1944 onwards to effectively mobilize the people of the Eastern Region through persuasion to be actively involve in politics by becoming members of the NCNC. This led to the translation of the activities of the Ibo State Union to be in alliance with the NCNC programmes of actions. The NCNC was now reflecting every attribute of the Ibo State Union in her objectives in national politics, hence, it was seen as an outfit of the Ibo State Union. The Action Group (AG) on its part was seen as a political protrusion of the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*. The promotion of cultural nationalism by the leading ethnic groups as well as their preponderant influence in regional and national politics generated a lot of anxieties among the elites from the minority groups. The elites from these groups made several efforts to remain relevant by mobilizing different socio-cultural organizations and political parties to press for the creation of new States. As the terminal date for colonial rule approached, the minority groups became even more articulate, unrelenting and forceful in their demand for the restructuring of the federal system.

With the opening up of the democratic space in 1999, many ethnic groups became vocal in their demands for a more inclusive federal structure. The hitherto federal

structure was perceived by many as constituting a barrier for national unity and cohesion, while many others also contended that the dysfunctional nature of the existing federal system has been the foundation of the numerous ethno-religious conflicts that have plagued the country over the years, including electoral violence and insurgencies in the country. In various regions, agitation by these groups epitomize the conflicts inherent when sub-national groups seek greater political and economic clouts and use the language of Human Rights and the democratization struggle as 'basis of their campaigns' (Fasehun,2002:6). While these groups operate on one hand between the primary units of society and ruling collective institutions, they emphasize the collective identity of specific groups, and are willing to use confrontation and violence to realize their goals.

In its structural and political context, Nigeria's federalism may be likened to a biological cell capable of dividing and reproducing itself (Dent, 1995:35). This has resulted in the continued division of the units. In 1954, it began as a federation of three regions but by 1964, it became four with the creation of the Mid-Western Region from the then Western Region. By 1967, the federal structure became subdivided into 12 States and by 1976, it was further split into 19 States. By 1989, it became a federation of 21 States, increasing to 30 by 1991 and by 1996 it has become a federation of 36 states. In addition, the creation of more states have often led to further subdivision of the local government areas. Thus, from 12 states and 301 local governments in 1976, Nigeria became a federation of 36 states and 774 local government areas.

Implicit in the above description is that the federal system in Nigeria lies on the tripod of administrative structure- the federal, States and local governments. While it is not unusual to have, in a federation, of more than two tiers so as to cope with diverse exigencies, the seemingly division of the country, however, has not produced a satisfactory outcome for the component units. This is evidently so because every attempt at further administrative division of the country to accommodate more ethnic units have been followed by increased agitations for more (Agbaje, Diamond and Onwudiwe,2008:56). It is thus fair to state that the expansion of the federal structure has often ended up creating more tensions and agitations among the federating ethnic groups in the country. Apart from this, there has been a tendency for agitation among and between people hitherto living together within an existing federating units. The

lopsidedness in the federal structure and actual practice has continued to generate reactions on the need to pattern the present federal system to that which truly reflect the cardinal principle of federalism as practised especially in the United States of America. The dysfunctional nature of the federal system has in recent time given rise to various agitations from various ethnic nationalities for self realization and self determination in the country.

Indeed, self realization and self determination are expected to lubricate the enthronement of a stable and prosperous national community. Unfortunately, the inherent contradictions that have given rise to the quest for self determination have constantly remained a source of worry. To give more insight into the contending issues, researchers have advanced theories to buttress or refute the operational deficiencies and defects in the practice of federalism. Chief among the theories put forward are the lopsided pattern of relationships among federating units in a federal structure and imbalance in power relations. This is why Ojo (2005), argued that the federal system in Nigeria present a dysfunctional anomalies that manifested in structural variation in size and scope that often create the false impression of regional superiority in terms of size and population that unfortunately has become over the years a yardstick for authoritative allocation of values that is not commensurate with regional contributions to national wealth. As noted by scholars, the Northern Protectorate with its 281,782 square miles (729,815.38km²) constitutes more than three-quarters of the country(Crampton, quoted in Gofwen, 2004:19; Jinadu, 1994:6) and as such, the largest of the two protectorates.

As Akinyemi (2001:4) noted, politics in Nigeria has transcended the realm of Zero-sum game of what the north gains, the south losses or vice versa. Rather, it is a multiple sum game in which units would agree on some issues while they disagree on some others. For instance, issues such as having a State police, instituting the Sharia law and even control over resources, as volatile as they were, did not completely take on a north-south divide. A federal system is largely expected to only provide means by which the federating units will find avenue to express themselves so that issues of common interest will be adequately addressed to restore some form of confidence and sense of belonging among the federating units. The institutionalization of the federal character principle in Nigeria points in this regard. Although there are challenges with how this

principle is implemented, as already noted by scholars (Ojo,2005:34; Onyeoziri, 2001:9), such problems are not a direct aftermath of how a federal system is practised.

Furthermore, there has been views on how military rule impacted on the practice of federalism in Nigeria, including how the central government have come to be dominated by leaders from a particular ethnic group as if it is the exclusive birthright of that group (Nwabueze, 1999:4). Having ruled for a total period of 29 years (between January 1966 and October 1979 and between 1983 and 1999), it is without contention that the military constitute a significant influence on Nigerian government and politics, especially in the area of centralization of power in Nigerian federalism. It should be Stated, however, that, the pendulum of federalism usually swings either in the direction of centralization or decentralization depending on the peculiar circumstances of the polity. The circumstance of its emergence coupled with its dynamics within the system is what determines the extent to which power is centralized or decentralized in the federation. Unfortunately, the centralization of power have remained a defining feature of federal system in Nigerian till date. Even older federations such as the United States of America (USA) which started as decentralized system have continued to evolve through time towards centralization, though in the United States of America, the government knows its limit.

Nigeria's federalism began on a decentralized note because considerable powers were devolved to the regions. However, due to the ever burgeoning powers of the region, the practice became problematic. As it would later revealed, the excessive regionalism of the period draw the country to the verge of disintegration that more or less led to the military take over of 1966. Interestingly, the mood of most Nigerians at this period favoured a centralization of power as a way of breaking the hegemonic tendencies of the regional governments that were largely seen as responsible for the tense ethnic relations within the country at that particular time. In addition, it has been alluded that the creation of more states from existing ones was seen by many as desirable in order to forge a sense of unity to the already frustrated minorities in each region. The military, by creating more States and moving the country towards a centralized federal structure, was merely giving formal backing to what Nigerians themselves desired. The joy and elation that followed

the creation of states in Nigeria attest to the deep seated desire for ethnic groups to attain some form of self-recognition and actualization.

Like every policy decision, there must be intended outcomes as well as unintended outcomes. The manifest outcome of certain decisions should take the place of the positive outcome of the policy option. Relatedly is the contention that some part of the country have remained marginalized and under-represented because of the domination of its political leadership by people of a particular ethnic extraction. But while at the surface level, there may be a predominance of people from a particular section (the North) as Heads of State and in some other key posts, however, probing into bureaucratic representation showed that this is firmly under the control of the South. For instance, while the North may have dominated political leadership (cumulatively, the north has produced 9 out of 12 Heads of State between 1960 and today), the bureaucracy is manifestly in favour of the South, the region which has persistently alleged marginalization. Indeed, going by the 1996 federal staff audit, the entire Northern region is said to have provided less than 20 percent of workers in all categories at the federal level (Ojo, 2005:105). Even till date, there seem to have been no improvement in this trend especially when we juxtapose the figures of 1999 and 2007 for officers on grade level 15 and above. Table 2.2 Below shows a graphic representation of this trend.

Table 2.3: Federal Officers on Grade Level 15 and Above.

Zones	1999	2007	Zones	1999	2007
North-West	339 (12.2%)	969 (10.6%)	South-West	820 (29.6%)	2202 (24.1%)
North-East	291 (10.2%)	883 (9.7%)	South-East	437 (15.8%)	1751 (19.2%)
North-Central	456 (16.4%)	1589 (17.4%)	South-South	429 (15.5%)	1660 (18.2%)

Source: Federal Character Commission (FCC), Abuja

Similarly, according to the 2005 federal staff audit , the entire Northern geo-political zone has about 38.4 percent of officers on grade level 07 and above in the 158 federal Parastatals against the Southern geo-political zone's 61.2 Percent. The point of reference from the information above is that despite the fact that Nigeria federal system has displayed series of dysfunctional features, resulting in numerous calls for modification or alternative model, it is however a truism that the problem inherent in the Nigeria federal

system is not in the framework per se, but from the refusal of the leadership to adhere to the provisions of the constitution that in many ways define how the federating units should co-exist.

Moreover, past experiences have shown a deeper danger in applying the unitary system as exemplified by the introduction of the unification decree by Late General Aguyi Ironsi, which, *ab initio* was unpopular among all sections of the country, which was also one of the major factors that precipitated his removal from office through a military coup in July, 1966. Similarly, the excessive regionalism and the seeming weakness of the centre are part of what many argued led the secession attempt by the Eastern region and the consequent war of unification between 1967 and 1970. Going by Nigeria's past experiences, it appears that there is no better alternative to federalism in Nigeria. Even the call for the so called 'true federalism' leaves much problems.

In any political system, be it federal or otherwise, effective leadership cannot be over-emphasized in the governance of a country. This is because the leader more than ever needs to give direction in order to engender commitment on the part of the people towards achieving national greatness. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, the dearth of good leadership with a clear concept of public service ethics has further undermine the realization of the potentials of federal system in Nigeria. In many cases, leaders that emerged have often pursued sectional interest or have been accused to pursue only sectional interest, this scenario has made it difficult to form a consensus for national unity and development in Nigeria. Indeed, the series of leadership crises experienced since independence axiomises this perspective.

Without doubt, structural imbalance manifesting into intense ethnic competition and violence in the political process has become a logical factor in Nigeria's federal structure. It has become a weapon used by most regional leaders to garner support for political solidarity or agitation. In the Nigerian federation, ethnic chauvinism have dominated many forms of relations between and among various ethnic groups in the country. Ethnic factors have become rallying point that political leaders often adopt to either generate support or sentiment when they perceived that their interest is at stake within the political space. In the past, the country had experienced ethnic and sectional violence that threatened the very corporate existence of the country (Asaju, 2006:19). The

proliferation of armed brigandage and ethnic groups claiming to be fighting perceived imbalance and marginalization have emerged and become a recurring decimal in the country's federation. As it stands, there is an increasing lacuna in social relations between and among ethnic groups in the country. The situation is such that there is mutual suspicion and mistrust among various groups and this more often than not rear its ugly head during electioneering period. Indeed, since 1999, ethnic groups from the Southern part of the country have repeatedly clamoured for the correction of perceived marginalization arising from the dysfunctional nature of the federal system in the country. This perhaps also explained why a significant numbers of electoral violence have arised from the region in recent elections.

As such, one can infer that the structural imbalance is a plague that is undermining democratic consolidation in Nigeria (Agbaje, Diamond, Onwudiwe, 2008). This is so because inherent imbalance have created a superior-inferior level of relationship that has further intensify tension and political instability, especially during and after elections in the country, hence, in the contest for the control of State power and resources, electoral violence have since 1999-2011 been employed by both minority and majority ethnic groups in the pursuit of national resources and political representation.

However, this structural imbalance can be addressed through the restructuring of the Nigerian state, by the devolution of powers from the centre government to the states' governments and from the states' governments to the local government councils. Presently, the federal government has powers to legislate on the exclusive list which contained sixty-eight (68) items, while the states' governments have powers to legislate on the concurrent list which contained thirty-four (34) items. It is our contention that these powers have to be reduced so that every level of government could actively be involved in policy making so as to reduce the overbearing powers or influence of the centre government and the states' governments respectively within the Nigerian state.

2.1.5 The Nature of the Electoral Management Bodies and Political Violence in Nigeria.

As should be noted, elections that is free, credible and fair, are not restricted to events that take place on election day alone, but comprises a plethora of activities that covers the whole gamut of election administration that includes, the provision of credible

and updated voters' register, a functioning party system, nomination of candidates, electoral campaign that is violent free, adequate provision of voting materials, the conduct of the voting proper, quick counting of ballot papers, results declaration, and all necessary post elections activities including elections petitions and resolution of all litigations emerging from the conduct of the electoral process (INEC 2006:49). These important issues that make up the electoral cycle are expected to be overseen by an independent electoral institution. This requirement places the electoral body at an important position in a nation's democratization process, as it remains the principal body with the onerous responsibilities of superintending the electoral process. In view of this, the outcome of any electoral process has a direct relationship with the capacity of the electoral umpire.

The history of the conduct of elections in Nigeria has no doubt demonstrated a strong relationship that exists between the conduct of elections and the managing institution. History has demonstrated that a non-competent, partisan, bias and resource starved institution cannot midwife successfully an important, highly delicate and complex issue like elections and electoral process. The nation's history abound with instances where efforts at sustaining democracy have been marred on the alter of badly managed electoral process. The present Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was inaugurated on August 11, 1998 by the then Head of State, General Abdulsalam Abubakar (Rtd) to manage the transition process expected to lead the nation to its Fourth Republic.

INEC derives its legal existence from Section 153 (F) of the 1999 Constitution. Also the Constitution under Section 14 of the Third Schedule provides for the composition of the Commission, while Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Constitution stipulates the functions of the Commission. INEC has garnered experience in conducting elections into elective positions in Nigeria. INEC has organized and administered the transitional elections that heralded this Republic in 1999 and conducted the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 civilian-to-civilian general elections. By virtue of its critical stake to the conduct of elections, its capacity, sensitivity, independence and competency are highly crucial to the successful conduct of general elections (Aiyede 2006:46). However, it is on

record that INEC's performance of its constitutionally assigned duties particularly in the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 post elections violence leaves much to be desired.

To most observers and stakeholders, INEC's handling of the 1999 transitional elections were highly commendable given the minimal period under, which it conducted the elections. However, with respect to the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 elections, the story was markedly different. INEC was confronted with mirage of logistic problems that seriously marred its successful conduct and administration of the 2003 elections (Akinboye, 2005: 299). While the Commission strive to overcome certain pertinent problems confronting it, the Commission's institutional weakness were more glaring. The most critical was the voters' register review exercise, which was characterized by many irregularities, as was the situation with previous process in the nation's political history (Omotola, 2004:131). The problems that bedeviled the review exercise were later extended to the period of elections and official declaration of winners.

In some reported scenario, candidates for the legislative positions who never contested were announced as winners in the elections, while the controversy that surrounded Dr Chris Ngige, the erstwhile governor of Anambra State, was the executive version of declaring loser a winner in the elections by INEC (Akinboye, 2005:306; Aiyede, 2006:46; Ogunsanwo, 2003). All these issues brought to question the independence, competency and integrity of the Commission. Compared to the conduct and administration of the 1999 transitional elections, INEC's performance in the 2003 elections was nothing but abysmal. The woeful performance of INEC in 2003 from all indications was re-enacted in April 2007 and the violence that followed the declaration of results of the 2011 general elections.

However, as observable in most political transitions, democratic societies are founded on the principles of elections and on opinion expression capabilities. Most sovereign nationalities are governed by pure democratic ideals where citizens express their rights through the conduct of an election in choosing a leader whom, they believe their nation's destiny can be entrusted with. In March 2015, Nigeria held its fifth general elections since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Previous elections in Nigeria have been marked by allegations of fraud and disputes over results. As a result of these problems, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the government,

civil society groups and Nigeria's development partners initiate and implement electoral reforms. Part of these reforms led to the introduction of the Smart Card reader in the conduct of the 2015 general elections.

Stakeholders hailed INEC for introducing card readers in the 2015 general elections, which they said, helped in no small measure in reduce election fraud across the country. The use of card readers for elections is highly commendable because it has helped reduced election fraud like multiple registrations and multiple voting. With the card readers, the true identities of card holders were matched with the details contained in their permanent voter's cards (PVCs), during accreditation and the process helped in reducing fraudulent accreditation that marred electoral processes in the past,(Ekuwem, 2015). In addition, the card reader makes the process of counting of votes faster than the conventional process. The smart card reader also reduces to a great extent the quantity of papers used, thus saving a large numbers of trees making the process eco-friendly. It reduces the cost of printing almost nil as only one sheet of ballot paper is required for each polling units(Sanjay & Ekta, 2011). It must be noted however, that the card reader can only be effective when there is constant electricity supply, availability of honest and competent personnel and a sound maintenance culture in the country.

It will be good if INEC takes into consideration the observed lapses from the use of the machines, and perfect them in subsequent elections in order to surpass the election credibility and transparency it achieved in the 2015 general elections and thus reduce the incidence of electoral violence that often arise from perceived manipulation of electoral results (Amenaghawon, 2015). This will reduce drastically the cases of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

2.1.6 The Media and Electoral Violence

The media often referred to as the Fourth Estate or the Fourth Realm of government is a vital instrument in the entire electoral process in any country in the world. This is based on the fact that the positive or negative nature of media reportage of events or marketing of political parties and contestants influences in many ways the possible outcome of an election, influence the electorate's supports for a party and

candidates, and ultimately shape the image of an election of any country to the outside world.

The early political baptism in the country remained a strong factor in the influential interventionist role it has been playing in the political history of Nigeria. As such, irrespective of the type and temper of the government (military or civilian) in the governance system, do not preclude the fact that the media in the country has always played the people's tribune is hardly ever disputed (Arogunde 2004:109). The Nigeria media did not attain the present position as the gate keepers through any act of benevolence, but earned it from making vital contributions to societal development. The most visible and significant evidence of that position is the mandate given the media by the 1999 Constitution which saddles the media with the task of monitoring governance and holding the government accountable to the people (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).

Conflict or Violence, by its very nature, holds a forceful attraction for the mass media. In the words of Owens-Ibie (2002:32), the media play a critical role in conflict reportage and are often crucial gatekeepers that often influence issues that are discussed around conflict situations. Often time, the media brings an emotional angle into discussions about conflict and by so doing, objectivity are often relegated to the background. Objectivity in media reportage are often put to several tests when your nation goes to war (Adie as cited by Allan & Zelizer, 2002:3). Often time, a journalist finds it difficult to separate personal sentiment from issues on ground, because the issues on ground also affect them psychologically. As Allan and Zelizer (2002:3) have aptly Stated, confronted with the often horrific realities of conflict, any belief that a journalist can remain distant, remote, or unaffected by what is happening 'tends to go out of the window' in a hurry. This cannot be less true when one consider how elections are conducted in the country.

By all prevailing norms and values guiding media practitioners in the country , the media in the country could best be described as highly propagandist in their reportage, if only to stay in the market. This is amply justified by the headlines that often characterized their reportage of news event, stories and issues generally. Since it is unethical for news houses to sensationalized news report, it has however become

important to succinctly x-rayed how media reportage has contributed to incidences of electoral violence in Nigeria. As must be pointed out, the media are critical agents of entertainment, information and transmission of values from one generation to another within any given society (Dominick, 2002: 34). How a media reports event especially conflict situations goes a long way in influencing the dimension of the conflict. In its information function, the media is a critical gatekeeper that help to moderate how economic, political and social issues are discussed to ensure even attention and by extension stability in the polity (Mu'azu, 2002:47). In performing this role, the media often bring to the fore those hidden issues and agenda that affect the decisions and choices of both the government, individuals and groups as they relate with one another in the polity. In fulfilling this critical role to the society, it has equally become important to examine how the media goes about providing information that is objective of prevailing situations in order not to distort or sensationalized issues so as not to further heat up the polity especially during elections in the country.

However, owing to the number of political parties and contestants during elections, it has often been difficult for the media to be fair especially in the area of coverage of the activities of contestants during elections. Regardless of this situation, it is pretty impossible to excuse the overall lopsidedness of media coverage of the campaigns and elections. In the campaigns for Presidential elections between 1999-2011, the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) dominated the media for the durations of the campaigns and elections. There were perceived lopsidedness of how the media covers campaign rallies and events of the ruling party and that of the opposition in the country (Agbese,2006:9). Besides the extent of coverage they received, the ruling party and the President were often shown in good light in most of the reports while some of his opponents were frequently portrayed negatively.

This is particularly true of General Buhari, widely believed to be the then President's strongest rival, who received a lot of negative coverage arising from several issues including an earlier Statement credited to him that no Muslim should vote for a Christian candidate as President. Another Statement also reportedly made by him during an interview on the Voice of America was that the proposed National Identity Card Scheme was not in the interest of the North, his failure to appear in the Presidential

debates; the reported funding of his election campaigns by some Islamic countries; and the alleged wastefulness and corruption in the Petroleum Trust Fund, which he presided over as Executive Chairman under the governments of the late General Sani Abacha, and his successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Constant reference was also made to his military background and antecedents when he governed the country and in his dealings with the politicians whom his government overthrew, with the media and other sectors of the society (Bajraktari, and Parajon,2007:8). President Obasanjo's similar military antecedents were often not mentioned or overlooked. Rtd General Buhari carried particularly heavy baggage over his government's promulgation of the controversial Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree No. 4 of 1984. His Statement during his campaigns that he had no regrets over the promulgation of the decree only served to anger many journalists and earned him more negative coverage.

Conversely, President Obasanjo's record of having banned the *Newbreed* magazine during his earlier rule as military Head of State, his establishment of the infamous Ita-Oko Detention Centre, and other sundry abuse of people's rights perpetrated by his regime were not brought to the front burner of discussions. Likewise, while the Justice Party's presidential candidate, Reverend Chris Okotie, was frequently ridiculed in many newspapers' stories and articles over his claim that he had been called by God to run for President, President Obasanjo's similar claim to divine inspiration was not a subject of media attention (Digby-Junger,2006:4).

It is conceded that objective reportage of elections and campaigns is a difficult challenge as facts which are reported will often seem to be injurious to contending contestants and political party or to the advantage of the other party or candidate. An appearance of bias or lack of accuracy may also come from the point that such issues can be reported from different perspectives different from the party. Besides the PDP/President Obasanjo and the ANPP/General Buhari, other candidates and parties who received varying degrees of media coverage were Chief Emeka Ojukwu, of the then All Peoples Grand Alliance (APGA); Senator Jim Nwobodo, of the then United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP); Senator Ike Nwachukwu, of the then National Democratic Party (NDP); Reverend Chris Okotie, of the Justice Party (JP); Mrs. Sarah Jibril, of the Progressive Action Congress (PAC); Chief Gani Fawehinmi, of the National Conscience

Party (NCP); Alhaji Balarabe Musa, of the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP); and Alhaji M.D. Yusuf, of Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ) (Frohardt and Temin,2007:12).

The campaigns by these contestants and their parties received some coverage in the media, but the other parties and their presidential candidates were almost completely forgotten and got no more than occasional mention. There was relatively little or no media focus on them and their rallies and where some of them had media mention, it was sometimes too negative or meant to ridicule them. An impression was thereby created that they were not serious candidates or parties. While this lopsidedness in coverage was most glaring in the Federal Government-owned media, similar situations played out in media houses owned by private organizations. Several factors apparently give credence to this situation (Galadima,2006:9).

Firstly, there was a tendency by those in power at both the federal and State levels to view the government-controlled broadcasting stations as the propaganda arms of their governments and, as such these media houses were used to further the political interest of those in power while denying other stakeholders access. For instance, the PDP being the party in power influences significantly how government media house functions during elections period, particularly the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) (Igboanusi, 2006:11).

Although both the NTA and the FRCN made commendable efforts to provide some coverage for other political parties and candidates, their coverage was far from equitable. The FRCN, (2007) for instance, issued House Rules on Political Coverage to its staff on January 28, 2007. Although this directive was to ensure a somewhat level playing grounds for all the parties the station remained the mouthpiece of political leaders within the Federal Government, particularly for the candidates of the then ruling party. Many of the provisions in the laws establishing both the NTA and the FRCN ensured their susceptibility to political manipulation and were exploited by government officials to ensure that the organization remain glued to the party interest of the then ruling party. These provisions include those of sections 10, 11, and 12(2) and (4) of the NTA Act and Sections 10(1) and (2), and 11(3) and (4) of the FRCN Act.

These provisions impose a duty on the stations to broadcast government announcements. However, the stations were often unable to distinguish between government activities being carried out by public office holders, which were newsworthy, and the activities of government officials that amounted only to election campaigns. Often times, the campaign speeches of contesting ruling party members especially the President were routinely reported as government activities without commensurate airtime given to other political parties or candidates. This situation led to some protests in 2003 by some newly registered political parties in Abuja against perceived lopsidedness in news reportage by Nigerian Television Authority. The group also complained of discriminatory charges by the Nigerian Television Authority before reporting their activities. However, as alluded to earlier, the tendency of the ruling party to dominate the government-owned media was not limited to the Federal Government or the PDP alone, but was also evident in virtually all the States and cuts across the different political parties in control in those States. Many opposition candidates were frequently denied access to such State media (Keeble,2005:9).

A number of politicians complained about the activities of various State-run broadcast stations, which they claimed were blacking out news of their political activities, especially campaigns while virtually singing the praises of the incumbent governors round the clock. One such complaint came from Mr. Femi Falana, a lawyer and Human Rights activist who contested the governorship race for Ekiti State on the platform of the National Conscience Party (NCP). Mr. Falana petitioned the National Broadcasting Commission in February,2007 over the selective coverage of political activities in the State and complained of lack of coverage of his election campaign in the State by the Ekiti State Broadcasting Service (ESBS),he called on the NBC to prosecute the ESBS. In a letter to Mr. Falana, NBC Director General, Dr. Silas Babajiya Yisa, apologized over the situation saying that the "Commission is as a matter of urgency investigating your complaint and will definitely initiate necessary follow-up actions after this process" Dr. Yisa pointed out that "before now, the Commission had taken adequate steps to educate broadcast stations across the country on political broadcasts which it said should accommodate the principles of fairness and equity and promote pluralism of views and ideas (Tumber,2004:3).

But there were a number of complaints from other States over the unfair use of government-controlled broadcast stations. In Katsina State, for example, there were complaints that the then Katsina State Governor, Alhaji Yar'Adua, had turned the Katsina State Radio and Television Stations (KTRTV) to his campaign organisation. One complaint came from an indigene of the State, Sada Sodangi, who asked the NBC to check the activities of the station so that the indigenes can get balanced programmes from it. Mr. Sodangi said in a letter to the NBC: "Of the 30 political parties now in place, you will not hear or see anything about them except the governor's party which is the Peoples Democratic Party. If your opinions differ from that of the government, even if you are a member of the PDP, you will neither be heard nor seen on the stations (Udomisor, 2007:8).

In Imo State, Dr. Ezekiel Izuogu, the protem chairman of Progressive Liberation Party (PLP) alleged that the PDP government of Chief Achike Udenwa was monopolizing the Imo Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) as he was not allowing other candidates to air their views on the State radio and television stations. Similarly, Senator Rasheed Ladoja, who contested the governorship race in Oyo State under the PDP and later won the elections, was in January, 2003 locked out of the offices of the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS), which was then controlled by the ruling party in the State, the Alliance for Democracy (AD). Senator Ladoja had gone to the BCOS office as part of his campaign tour of broadcasting stations but was not received by any of the corporation's officials. The State Ministry of Information had similarly rejected his written request to be allowed to appear on a phone-in programme, *Eyi-Ara*, which is aired weekly on the station (Udomisor, 2007:8). In Gombe State, Alhaji Danjuma Goje, the PDP gubernatorial candidate for the State, alleged that the ANPP government in the State dominated the Gombe State Media Corporation and that it has denied other political parties access to the station. He said the station had refused to accept or air jingles from the PDP, among other acts of denial of equal opportunity to all stakeholders as required by the National Broadcasting Code.

In a press Statement signed by Mr. Isa Magaji Bangus, the public relations officer of the Alhaji Goje Campaign Organisation, the politician appealed to the NBC to investigate the Corporation's refusal to allow other parties and the candidates of other

political parties access to the airwaves. In Ogun State, the PDP governorship candidate, Otunba Gbenga Daniel, also petitioned the NBC alleging that the AD government of Governor Segun Osoba, was monopolizing the State Radio and Television stations. Otunba said all the campaign advertisements he sent to the station were rejected while the State media refused to use any news item from his campaign tour. Rtd. General Buhari, the ANPP presidential candidate, protested in March complaining that his campaign tour of Yola, the Adamawa State capital, on March 12 was blacked out by the FRCN and NTA, both federal stations. He said that the coverage of the presidential campaigns by both stations had been “one-sided and partial”, contrary to the demands of equity and fair play.

A second factor responsible for the favourable coverage often received by ruling party candidates in relation to the other political parties and candidates was the financial advantage which the ruling parties wielded as the ruling party and its candidates had or controlled far more resources than their opponents. Because of the absence, both in law and in fact, of mechanisms for accounting on campaign finances, it was impossible to determine the source of these funds and, in particular, whether they were public funds. The issue is of critical importance because besides being in control at the Federal level, the PDP also controlled a majority of the States in the country and therefore had unlimited access to State resources. There was indeed a widespread perception that public funds, both at the Federal level and in the various States, were misappropriated and deployed for electoral campaigns by the chief executives that attracted wide outcry from the opposition (Udomisor,2007:9).

In any event, the huge resources at the disposal of the ruling (PDP) across board played to their advantage and possibly explained why they are often able to buy more air time for their rallies than the opposition parties. The situation was aggravated by the absence of any policy of providing free slots for electoral campaign broadcasts for all contestants to outline their programmes and introduce their candidates for the elections both at the federal and State levels. The absence of a media policy on electioneering campaigns and the dearth of resources by opposition party members, meant that majority of them could not create the necessary visibility for their campaigns. A third factor responsible for the lopsided coverage is that right from the inception of the political

campaigns, especially in the Presidential elections, the media actively promoted the notion that the elections were a straight fight between the PDP's Presidential candidate, and the Presidential candidate of the ANPP, Rtd. General Buhari and thereby dismissed all the other candidates.

Arising from this situation, many media houses focused their attention on candidates they perceived has more chances of success at the polls to the disadvantage of other contestants and parties in the elections. As indicated earlier, while the coverage of President Obasanjo was largely positive, media coverage of Rtd. General Buhari was often negative. ANPP's Assistant National Publicity Secretary for the North Central Zone, Mr. Ismaila A. Sani, protested the negative media coverage of General Buhari in March saying "Time and again, and almost on a daily basis, especially since his emergence as the ANPP presidential flag bearer, our sensibilities are assaulted and affronted by what appears to be a deliberate and calculated negative reportage of Muhammadu Buhari by a section of the press. Both space and prominence are devoted to slanted stories and skewed comments often with scarcely concealed mission to disparage, blackmail and malign. Alleging that the *Nigerian Tribune* newspaper led the campaign, Sani said a content analysis of the stories, features, comments, cartoons and other publications carried on General Buhari since January 1, 2003 showed that the newspaper had waged a hate propaganda against the ANPP presidential candidate. He cited as an example of the alleged hate campaign the newspaper's March 11, 2003 editorial comment entitled "Buhari and the ID Scheme" which was repeated the following day (Udomisor,2007:9).

On September 6, 2010, a respected trade union leader, Comrade Issa Aremu used the back page of the Daily Trust to attack the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) for grand partisanship in favour of the incumbent President of Nigeria- Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. Comrade Aremu made reference to the 9'oclock prime time news of the Nigerian Television Authority of September 3, 2010, allegedly aired four news items in quick succession in favour of Goodluck Jonathan. In 2011, the European Union Election Observation Mission, in its final report on the 2011 general elections, also gave a damning report on the activities of the federally owned media houses. The organization accused government media houses of bias against opposition parties in campaign and

rallies reportage. The government owned Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) lacked balance in the coverage allocated to the candidates and their parties: 80 percent of the coverage devoted to political actors were given to PDP, five to ACN and CPC each; 75 percent of the direct speech in the NTA's news was dedicated to President Goodluck Jonathan; Buhari received eight, Ribadu and Shekarau three percent each. The editorial policy of the government-owned Federal Radio Cooperation of Nigeria(FRCN) stations was better than the one of NTA: PDP was allotted 64 percent of the coverage in the Abuja-based Kapital FM and 61 percent in the Lagos-based Radio Unity. However, Jonathan was the only presidential candidate quoted on FRCN Kaduna. On Kapital, FM Jonathan received 85 percent of direct speech and 87 on Radio Unity (the European Union Election Observation Mission,2011).

While the State-owned media were encumbered by the inconveniences of their ownership, the private media were largely free of such constraints. They generally provided greater access to the media for political parties and candidates in opposition than the State-owned media. However, the private media also suffered from two major disabilities. Firstly, their proprietors often had political and economic interests, which sometimes resulted in their aligning with particular political parties or specific candidates. Such proprietors' interests sometimes influenced the coverage by various privately owned media establishments either in the volume of coverage given to particular candidates or parties or in the nature of such coverage and by implication created a tense atmosphere that often resulted into political violence.

2.1.7 The Nature and Dynamics of the Nigerian State and Electoral Violence.

There are scholars who believed that the character of the Nigerian State, as reflected in her role in the economy is a major factor to be properly examined. Osaghae (2003); Ake (1981); Obi (2004); Dudley (1973) are major proponents of this argument. The crux of this argument is that the emergent independent Nigerian State is rich, controls major economic heights and services as a measure of last resort to all those who seek public office and wealth. This gives room to a situation where public office seekers use any means available to them to get to the centre with a view to controlling the wealth

of the state and its distribution to themselves and their kinsmen. In this regards, politics in Nigeria is seen as warfare.

According to Osaghae (2003:45-46), the States of post colonial Africa (Nigeria) inclusive have very limited autonomy, particularly from the hegemonic social classes and are immersed in class struggle. This limited autonomization reflects the limited development of the productive forces especially as they have compared the commercialization of commodity production and exchange. We may interpret the limited autonomization as meaning that the country is still rudimentary since autonomization is the unique quality of the process of domination in question. Some may prefer to look at it as a deformity since further development have been stalled for ages. However, what needs to be kept in mind is that limited autonomization means that the country is extremely weak to perform adequately the essential functions of the State. It also means by extension that the structure of the country undermines the ability of the Nigerian state to improve her capacity to create wealth by properly harnessing her resources. It hampers them because it is weak to mediate on the conflicts between social capital and particular capitals. Thus, the progress and growth of the State within the social formation remains at a level not much higher than the stage of primitive accumulation, with massive intervention of forces in the labour process to the detriment of the realization of the law of value.

The State in post colonial Africa (Nigeria) inclusive is unable to mediate on the conflict of interest between classes and even within classes particularly the hegemonic class. The results of this is that political contest has been reduced to zero sum contest, where the only thing that matters lies in getting access to power and enjoying all the perks that comes with access to state resources by the political elite. This has created a situation where might is coextensive with right. In these circumstances, government in power cannot claim legitimacy, only power, political instability is thus endemic due to the normlessness and extremist's pattern of political competition. The political class operates in a State of siege. One of the paradoxes of social formation in Nigeria is that despite the centrality of power, political order does not appear to have emerged. Rather,

violence is endemic, anarchy lurks just below the surface and the political system is as disarticulated as the economy.

There is also the problem of legitimacy, arising from the lack of autonomy of the Nigerian State and the style of politics, which is associated with it, produces governments, which are lacking in legitimacy. Given the Hobbesian character of politics, only limited range of social forces are articulate enough and the government which emerges from the political struggle has been unfortunately been based on a primordial interest. Thus, it becomes extremely impossible to see the government with any veneer of legitimacy. The high incidences of violence that now characterized political contestations have also created a heavy reliance of the government on coercion. This further showed starkly the nature of the political system as a form of domination. The effect of the foregoing, according to Ake (2001:25), is that the material conditions of the state has foster a system of governance that thrives on the centralization of power by patrimonial networks of power that reproduces themselves by capturing State (oil) power, distributing oil largesse to members, while excluding non-members. The emerging system offers no real incentive for the decentralization of State power, accountability or development.

Governance is, therefore, reduced to a hegemonic class project, directed at sharing the spoils, of oil, but excluding the enemies of the group in power, and holding on to power. Politics is highly personalized and factionalised, and political institutions are weak, thus making it difficult for a coherent national ruling class to emerge, and for a developmental ethos to take root within the State. This had unfortunately provided ground for the use of force in the quest to have access to power, that again create political instability in the polity. This type of instability is a cause for concern not just because the State is an actor in conflict, but that it is difficult for it to effectively mediate conflicting demands because it is captive to the elite who are often the cause of conflict in the society.

For this reason, some groups of the marginalized but contesting forces distrust the state, see it as an alien force, and either seek the use of violence to seek redress from the system or to challenge it. The implication of this is that violence and instability assumes the appearance of permanence in governance (Obi, 2004:8). This also means that the elite

determine the location, allocation and distribution of scarce resources. It is in line with this contention that Dudley (1973:20) submits that

the shortest cut to affluence and influence is through politics. Politics means money and money means politics, there is always a price. Access to government means access to public resources amongst others.

The basic assumption here is that the opportunistic tendencies of the political elite is basically to control the riches of the State and as such, politics is seen as an avenue for creating wealth, hence, competition for access to government power. It also precludes why every form of anti-democratic behaviour is employed during elections. According to Osaghae (1995:33),

the central position of the government over all socio-political and economic affairs makes access to the political market, control of apparatuses of States as well as control of resources represent important sources of competition among the various cleavages present in the Nigerian State.

By implication, the control of governance structures allows the controlling groups/parties to redistribute income and wealth to the advantage of its members and supporters. Consequently, the competition for scarce resources induces individuals mobilized along ethnic or political cleavages to involve in conflictual attitude so as to ensure that access to public resources are continually guaranteed. The failure of development and the failure to put development on the agenda in Africa and Nigeria in particular is often linked to negative political conditions. According to Ake (2005:51), one salient negative conditions is the conception of politics as ‘warfare’ by the politically active segment of the elite. The result is that such situation create an atmosphere of tension and mistrust that ended up creating instability in the polity. According to Ake (2005:4), a culture of elections that is marked by violence and warfare is thus totally anathema to the possibilities of development.

2.1.8 Godfatherism and Political Violence in Nigeria.

The politics of godfatherism, no doubt, constitutes a serious problem to the democratization process in Nigeria. It promotes intra-party and inter-party problems and wranglings and sustains enduring political crises in the management and administration of State affairs. Godfatherism has been implicated in political crises in Oyo State, Anambra State under Governor Chris Ngige and Kwara State under the late governor, Mohammed Lawal, to mention just a few. In the words of Onwuzuruigbo (2006:40),

among the orthodox Catholics, Anglicans and Pentecostal churches and in Islam, the Mallams and Almajiris, the godfather is one who command respect among his people either through his knowledge, skills, wisdom and wealth or on account of his popularity and public acceptance. The godfather, therefore, is a father-figure and mentor who guides the godson to the path of achieving success, skills and excellence in the aspirations or professional calling of the individual. By raising knowledgeable and skilled individuals in commerce, religions, politics, the godfather and his godson(s) become critical factors in the development agenda and process of their community.

According to Uzoigwe (2004:146), the godfather also exercised social, economic and political leadership which was collective, never dictatorial or oligarchic, and sometimes almost outrageously democratic. As Tibenderana (1989:74) observed,

patrons were also expected to fulfil their customary obligations to their clients if they were to retain their allegiance. These included protecting their clients' civil liberties and economic interest. When in office, patrons were expected to reward their most loyal and able clients with administrative positions or to grant them trade concessions. In fact, political

clientage entailed mutually beneficial relations and solidarity of interest of clients and patrons.

Godfatherism was also an integral aspect of Yoruba pre-colonial structure. The Baba-Ogun (war patron) played a prominent part in pre-colonial government and politics of Ibadan. As Falola (1985:100), noted

Baba – Ogun was a warrior who had distinguished himself in the numerous wars and battles that characterized inter-group relations in Yoruba land especially in the 19th century. He exercised control over numerous people of several scattered compounds, collected taxes, tributes and levies from them. In addition, he settled disputes in his domain and recruited eligible male members of compounds under his control to be soldiers in his army during periods of wars.

According to Awe (1964:109), prominent Ibadan warriors and leaders like Ogunmola, Osungbeku, Fijabi and Are Latosa began their military careers this way.

The concept of godfatherism as espoused so far presents a practice of godfatherism that focuses on the stability and progress of the community and seeks to prepare the individual – godfather and godson to be an active agent of development of the community. Norms of benevolent and altruism are its guiding principles, and the godfather is expected to be a benevolent mentor and patron; the interests of people involved in the relationship – the godfather, godson and the community it accommodated are adequately protected. However, the notion of godfatherism as applied to Nigeria's politics in the Fourth Republic is at variance with this earlier notion of the concept. According to Joseph (1991:51),

an individual seeks the support and protection of an oga or a godfather in order to acquire the basic social and material goods-loans, scholarships, licences, plots of urban land, employment, promotion and the main resources of the patron in meeting these requests is quite

literally a piece of the State. Such a view can easily be made in the case of ministerial appointments, or positions on government boards. It also applies, however, to individuals within the nominally private sector, since the business world is hemmed in by bureaucratic regulations which arose from the nationalistic and development concerns of post-independence governments.

This conception of godfatherism differs significantly from the notion of godfatherism identified earlier. It suggests some notion and motives that differentiate it from the previous notion. According to Onwuzuruigbo (2006:11),

godfatherism suggests a practice deeply rooted in individualism and selfishness that discounts and subverts the interest of the community. The godfather maintains a selfish and parasitic relationship with his godson and community. Not only are the needs of the godson and community abandoned in fulfillment of those of the godfather, but the godson and community are coerced to work and make sacrifices for the self interest of the godfather.

In Nigeria, however, the system of government in practice has provided avenue where everybody from all walks of life wants to form a relationship or link with government or those in position of authority: builders, farmers, traditional rulers, teachers as much as that of politicians and politically motivated individuals in the usual sense of these terms (Joseph,1991:35).

According to Adeyemo (2007:305), party donations often gives room for the rise of godfather politics. Since parties need funds to fulfill their obligations, individuals who are financially buoyant are contacted for assistance. Once the funds have been received, the donors see themselves as highly placed stakeholders of the party. They do not only enjoy the goodwill of party members, they also take decisions for the party. Godfathers decide who get nominated for party positions such as ministers, board members and Commissioners or who represent the party in elections. Many godfathers see these

donations as “investments” that must yield “dividends”. Such dividends may come in the form of unmerited contract award or in form of cash rewards. In this last case, the original amount donated plus the interest is expected back by the “godfathers”. In order not to lose their “investments”, elections must be won at all cost. Once the godsons assume office, negotiations are made on how to get their ‘investment’ back.

The News Magazine (2004:12) reports the relationship between Uba (godfather) and Ngige (godson) was smooth till modalities for sharing the booty of office set them and their supporters apart. This disagreement led to Ngige’s abduction and forced resignation and the spiral of violence that follows in July 2003. In another scene of this godfather/godson drama involving Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu and Governor Rasheed Ladoja of Oyo State, The News Magazine (2004:19) reported that Rasheed Ladoja went down in history as the governor of Oyo State who was booted out of office for daring to challenge Adedibu, “the Ibadan garrison commander”. The Anambra case seems more despicable. Emeka Offor, a multi-billionaire businessman held his home State hostage from 1999 to 2002 because he alleged governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju reneged in an earlier agreement to allow him have unrestricted control over the State and its allocation. Chris Uba, self-styled godfather of Anambra State politics taught the world a new version of political godfatherism. He moved against Governor Chris Ngige, made him signed a resignation letter abdicating his office and also got him abducted for failing to pay him N3 billion from the State treasury.

Anambra State has not known peace since the birth of this democratic dispensation, no thanks to the rapacious godfathers. Indeed, the impact of godfatherism in Nigeria’s political process cannot be over emphasized. Elections are won not because the candidates are popular or enjoy the people’s goodwill but that the godfather wishes it so. The choice of candidate is based on whom the godfather thinks will accept to be used as “pawn” for their selfish interests. In order to have their way, their candidates must win the elections. This creates room for rigging, and manipulations of election results. This stems from the unwholesome behaviour of politicians and their so-called ‘god-fathers; their political manoeuvre and manipulations, electoral practices, violence and killings. According to Olaoye (2005:36),

the syndrome of “political god-fathers” usually diverts the attention of the power-holder from the concerns of positive governance either to the satisfaction of a “political godfather” or to survivalist maneuvers that ultimately detract from the ends of governance.

In addition to these arguments about the place of political godfathers in politics, Kolawole (2004:22) sees godfatherism as a

form of disguised individual colonization whereby the political godfather either by force of acquisition or conquest, colonises the political godson. It is described as a mutual prebendalised relationship of exchange between two individuals based on political surrogacy involving financial and moral assistance where the ‘godfather’ is the first major donor and the “godson” the primary beneficiary or receiver.

The Fourth Republic in Nigeria has witnessed the ugly trend of political godfatherism, from inception soon after the government was sworn in 1999. According to Uwhejevwe-Togbolo (2005:45), in Christendom, the godfather assists the godson to attain the level of a responsible person in society.

In the case of Nigeria however, the political godfather is another ball game altogether, it is the opposite. Godfathers are usually those who decide and influences who gets what, when and how. Whenever a political godson wants to free himself from the ‘political web’ of his godfather, such political waywardness is always attended by violent or adverse consequences because the estranged godfather is naturally not ready to loose the anticipated gains on his investments in the election of the godson. Such anticipated returns are usually in forms of contracts, government loans, jobs and special allowances. Similarly, Olusola Saraki sees himself as the pacesetter of Kwara politics, and he proved

this in 2003 when he brought to bear his political wizardry by making sure his son Bukola Saraki won the governorship seat.

According to Akin (2006:1), to all intents and purposes, Saraki the father may be the real governor, while Saraki the son is no more than a surrogate governor with no obvious mandate. In the case of Oyo State, Lamidi Adedibu boasted openly about his control of the entire Oyo political terrain, his vast knowledge of the true situation of issues and his deadly knockout munitions for whosoever dares to cross his part to victory in any election. Violence erupted in Ibadan after the Appeal Court nullified the impeachment of Ladoja on November 1, 2006 because Adedibu wanted to maintain the status quo by controlling the State indirectly through his political stooge ;-Akala. According to Oluwatosin (2007:121),

at the grassroot level, political power means the ability to put friends and clients on the payroll as council employees, thus ensuring for them secured salaries as well as other benefits to divert development initiatives, to favoured communities. Party primaries usually feature shootouts and attempted assassinations between different factions of the same party in order to win nominations to run for office.

As already stated, the godfathers not only want a quick return on their investments but equally desired the control of the State. As such, it breeds corruption, thuggery and political violence among others. Corruption in the sense that the adopted political son will involve in sharp practices to meet the demands of the godfathers. It will lead to thuggery and violence should the adopted political son decides to confront the godfather. From the discussion so far, certain deductions could be made with regards to the features of Nigeria elections. These include the fact that primitive accumulation is a critical defining feature of Nigerian politics. The violent nature of the electoral process therefore is a necessary evil emanating from the desire to extrapolate from the political system by any means possible including the monetization of the process through the

instrumentality of the godfather syndrome that has become a common phenomenon of the polity under the present democratic dispensation.

2.1.9 Voters Education and Enlightenment and Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Available literature have suggested that election violence in Nigeria's political history could be traced to poor and inadequate voters education and enlightenment as from 1964 till the present Fourth Republic. It has been established that the absence of election violence in some African Countries like Ghana and Cote d' Ivoire could be attributed to effective and adequate voters' education and enlightenment. Sustainable voters' education is usually directed towards providing proper advertisement and registration of voters, effective campaigns directed toward marketing existing political parties and their candidates and programmes of actions, orderly conduct during general election and an independent electoral umpire to defend the people's franchise whenever they are tempered with.

In a paper titled "Voters Education and Enlightenment in Nigeria: The Bayelsa State Experience, Etekpe (2015:2), identified two types of elections, namely democratic and undemocratic elections. He went further to state the conditions under which they operate.

According to him:

Democratic elections are conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Act and Constitution with transparency, fairness, justice and equity without the interference of the incumbent leadership, there is an absence of electoral violence and other forms of malpractices because the contestants and supporters are well educated to understand and appropriate virtues of the "diversity and different" positions of each other while undemocratic election negates all accepted norms of democracy (Etekpe 2015:2)

In an undemocratic election, there is poor voters education, incredible voters register, acute rigging, unlawful exclusion of validly nominated candidates, poor organizations and the emergence of unpopular candidates. The aftermath of undemocratic elections are protracted violence and litigations and these have been the trend, nature, character, pattern and the dynamics of the Nigerian electoral processes since 1964 till date. He went further to state that all post-independence elections in Nigeria lacked integrity of voters education, voters enlightenment and the conduct of general elections have systematically declined since 1964, with that of 2007 as the worst in the country's history (Etekpe 2015:2).

The main argument of his paper was that poor voters' education, poor enlightenment and unholy alliances are some of the causes of electoral violence since independence in Nigeria's politics. He went further to demonstrate that the 2007 general election was bound to fail from the beginning. In his opinion,

This was because there was no sustained voters education, disputable voters register, very little enlightenment, corruption, high tendency of exclusionary politics where validly nominated candidates, including Atiku Abubakar, former Vice-President were unlawfully excluded, evil alliance between law enforcement, security and INEC officials, and outright rigging. The voters registration exercise was marred by acute shortage of materials that prevented many eligible voters from registering. There was so much confusion when the voters register were eventually displayed (Etekpe 2015:3).

Other facts emerging from the paper are that some of the political parties in this Fourth Republic have no internal democracy to really appreciate the role, voters education and enlightenment could play in the selection of party flag bearers. Candidates for election are usually selected at the whims and caprices of the god-fathers and these are imposed upon the electorate to vote for. This creates room for violence because, the candidates chosen by the god-fathers might not be the people's choice and this creates further room for aggression which has to be filled through violence. Secondly, since

independence, Nigeria's elections have not been democratic, hence all the elections have witnessed one form of violence or the other. The resultant impact of electoral violence have been, stagnation of the nation's economy, rise in terrorism, general political instability, persistent and increasing cases of litigations about elections' outcomes, political assassinations and corruption of public office holders.

The table below gave a graphic picture of how non sustenance of voters education, lack of enlightenment and unholy alliances among political parties gave rise to major indices of election violence in Nigeria since 1964-2011.

Table 2.4: Major Indices of Electoral Malpractices in Nigeria, 1964 – 2011

S/N	Year of General Election	National Political Parties	Political Alliance	Forms of Malpractice	Consequences
1	1964	Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) National Convention of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) Action Group (AG)	NCNC – AG = United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) NPC-NNDP=NDC Nigerian National Alliance (NNA)	Poor voters register Mass arrest of UPGA and Opposition candidates and pooling agents Preventing opposition candidates filing nomination papers Massive rigging	UPGA boycotted the election Political parties rejected the results Bloody civil resistance especially in Western Nigeria
2	1976	National Party of Nigeria (NPN) Great Nigerians Peoples Party (GNPP) Unity Part of Nigeria (UPN) Progressive Redemption Party (PRP) Nigerian People's Party	None	Poor voters register Rigging and intimidation	UPN and NPP rejected Presidential election results Filed election petition against Shehu Shargari at the Supreme Court The unresolved question of 2/3 of 19 states
3	1983	Ditto	None	Dumping of ballot papers by Presiding Officers and pooling agents Rigging	General dissatisfaction on electoral processes Military seized powers

4	1999	Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) All Peoples Party (APP) Alliance for Democracy (AD)	AD and APP (to produce single Presidential candidate)	Poor voters registration Falsification of results by Returning Officers Massive rigging	General dissatisfaction Threat to the unity and stability of Nigeria
5	2003	PDP, AD, ANPP	None	Fraud Unlawful exclusion of candidates Evil alliance between law enforcement /security agencies and INEC officials	General rejection of results by TMG Litigationss at the Supreme Court
6	2007	PDP, AD, ANPP, Action Congress, CPC and 46 other parties, making a total of 50 parties	None	Poor voters register Monumental fraud Poor organization Outright rigging	General rejection of results by Nigerians Unprecedented litigations (1,249)
7	2011	PDP, AD, ANPP, CPC, etc.	None	Poor voters education Some level of rigging	Less litigations General acceptance

Source: Etekpe, A (2015). Voters Education and Enlightenment in Nigeria: The Bayelsa State Experience. An unpublished paper on Student Sanitization Programme, Niger Delta University (NDU), March 4th.

To reduce the incidences of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, Etekpe (2015:5-8) identified eight (8) stakeholders in the electoral process whose roles can put to an end the increasing cases of electoral violence in Nigeria politics. These are:

- i. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
- ii. National Orientation Agency (NOA)
- iii. Political Parties
- iv. Faith-Based (Religious) Organisations
- v. The Media
- vi. The Federal, States and Local Governments
- vii. Civil Society and Community Based Organisations (CSOs/CBOs)
- viii. Students' Union Governments.

Since these identified groups have assigned functions to perform, with regard to elections in the country, they should come together to develop a synergy towards intensive, massive, awareness and re-awakening campaign (IMARC) about elections which will help to change the people's mindsets toward elections. The IMARC will bring about a positive change in the minds of the electorate toward seeing election as a process that will produce the right caliber of people who can provide the needs of the people rather than those who are to exploit state resources to satisfy their primordial interests. The IMARC model will reverse the declining value system and ethics in the political process among Nigerians in which corruption and ethnicity will have no role to play in determining who govern the people but will be determined by party manifestoes or programmes of actions across the country.

2.1.10 The History of Political and Electoral Violence in Nigeria.

Elections, in terms of their origin in Africa and Nigeria in particular were a colonial contrivance that evolved as part of the institutional transfer of the superstructure of liberal democracy. In the words of Jinadu (1995:76),

although the pre-colonial political systems in Africa has some shades of democratic principles, and practices embedded in them, the concept of voting and the notion of a political majority and minority were not part of the African political tradition.

Consequently, dialogue and the political collective were emphasized, as opposed to individualism, atomization and the majoritarianism of the Western capitalist political system. Thus electoral history in Africa is an early 20th century phenomenon. For instance, in Nigeria that this thesis is dealing with, the elective principle was introduced in 1922 with the Clifford's Constitution. However, from 1945 the process of political decolonization was marked by the extension of both the franchise and the scope of representative institutions, indeed as Cohen (1983:73) argues, the electoral procedure was generally used to determine, or at least to legitimise, the form, rate and direction of the decolonization process.

While electoral administration took place under colonial rule, colonialism produced three sharp contradictions or paradoxes for post-colonial electoral politics and behaviour, particularly of the leadership (Adejumobi, 2000:63). First, colonialism by its very nature and character is antithetical to the logic and philosophy of elections and democracy, having been constructed on the bases of authoritarianism and domination. Thus superintending the electoral processes, particularly when the electoral regime itself was deeply interested and involved in the politics of power transfer, was very complex and problematic and the extent to which an impartial or a free and fair colonial electoral process was possible was therefore questionable. Second; although the decolonization project was woven around democratic principles and the ideals of self-determination and social justice, the emergent political elites were educated and socialized under a highly centralized and authoritarian order (Chazan, 1993:56). Third, the statist character of colonial rule which survived the era was later to determine the object and terrain of electoral competition. Given this situation, what are the implications of electoral politics in post-colonial Africa and Nigeria in particular?

A demeaning politics of de-participation and the shrinking of the electoral arena which characterized the post-colonial era in Africa and Nigeria in particular had its roots in earlier colonial history. Post-colonial politics was constructed on the logic of neo-patrimonialism in which State offices and rents were appropriated, with the State serving as the focus of capital accumulation and the fulcrum of social control (Adejumobi, 1998:145). The way of doing politics, to use the words of Max Weber, was therefore not to live for it, but to live from it (Ibrahim 1994). Elections in this context could at best be restricted and at worst, anomalous. One party rule; military regimes and what Luckham (1994:79) calls “garrison socialism” littered the continent, all placing little value on the issue and importance of elections and the electoral process.

Africa leaders generally and Nigeria in the same way had a lethargic disdain for open and competitive elections which might threaten the bases of their power and authority. Thus, Milton Obote, former President of Uganda, was reported to have made the remark that an election was a way of controlling the people rather than being a means through which they could control him (Cohen, 1983:85-86). According to Olaoye

(2003:7), it operated mainly by a mixture of financial rewards with appeals to ethnic sentiments and ultimately; it sounded the death knell for the First Republic. It has been argued that there has hardly been any election conducted in the country that has not been tainted by one manipulation or the other (Jinadu and Edoh, 1990:18). The Second Republic was arguably worse. Despite series of cautions taken both to ensure that political parties were ‘national’ in structure, outlook and in the composition of their executive committees; and in spite of the lengthy and detailed registration, campaign and electoral laws and guidelines that were made available, there was rigging of unimaginable proportions during actual voting, vote counting and result declaration (Ofonagoro, 1979:19; Kurfi 1983:40). According to Iyayi (2005:25) all the elections in Nigeria have thus been negatively impacted upon by ethnic and hence primordial considerations.

Table 2.5: Ethnic Distribution of Leaders of the Major Nigerian Parties in 1959 as Percentage of the Total Vote Cast

Party	Igbo	Other Eastern Group	Yoruba	Other Western Groups	Hausa Falani	Other Northern Groups	Others
NPC	-	-	6.8	-	51.3	32.4	9.4
NCNC	47.3	9.9	26.7	5.6	2.8	-	5.6
AG	4.5	15.2	68.2	7.6	3.0	-	1.5

Source: Sklar and Whitakeer, Jr. (1966) “Nigeria”, in J.S Coleman C. Rosberg Jr; Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkeley. University of California Press p.206

Between 1985 and 1993, the Third Republic witnessed series of political contraptions under the regimes of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Abacha. There were many elections with cases of electoral malpractices but the most serious case of election rigging took place under the Babangida regime, following the annulment of the results of the June 12, 1993 presidential election. That election was believed and adjudged by the 3,000 accredited local and international observers to be the fairest and the best in Nigeria’s political history. According to Oshun (1999:17),

the election has been monitored and uncharacteristically endorsed by poll-watchers from developed countries... to the last person in all the monitoring teams, the consensus was that the election has been well conducted, free, fair and therefore credible... a significant and laudable departure from past patterns.

Finally, on June 23, 1993, the Federal military government announced the annulment of the presidential election in an unsigned paper that was circulated by the then press secretary to the Vice President. That event set the stage for the bitterest struggle for the defense of democracy Groups, professional associations, students bodies, market women and the international community began a long-drawn battle against the dictatorial regime which leadership was at the centre of an ethnically hatched plot for self-succession of Ibrahim Babangida. According to Olurode (1993:14),

the cancellation of the results has proved once again that no matter how elaborate the legal framework for an orderly succession, those who may lose in the process of power transfer may deliberately throw spanner into an otherwise perfect arrangement to undermine the country democracy.

The very manager of Nigeria's transition to civil rule programme are the very people that have aborted a successful transfer of political power. In response, both Britain and America imposed several sanctions on Nigeria all of which are directed at the military. According to Olurode, (1993:10).

the American government announced the suspension of the entire package of economic and military assistance to Nigeria totaling \$750 million. Nigeria's military attaché to the Nigeria embassy in Washington was also expelled and his Nigeria counterpart was asked to stay at home by the American government.

Nigeria's pro-democratic bodies – Campaign for Democracy (C.D), the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (C.D.H.R); the Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity

Association (G.F.S.A) and many others organized successful public protests between the 5th and 10th of July 1993. According to Osaghae (2002:16), the annulment of the election was the greatest catalyst of Nigeria's descent into anarchy. Spontaneous riots and demonstrations sprang up every where, but were serious in Lagos and other capitals in the Southern part of the country. Rioting paralyzed activities in the Southern part of the country, especially Lagos and it took the intervention of anti-riot police and military squads on orders to shoot-at-sight for it to abate. The Fourth Republic was ushered in with the short but brief transition programme that was put in place by the then General Abubakar Abdulsalami administration after the death of Abacha. Six political parties participated actively in the 1999 general elections. These include, the Peoples Democracy Party, Alliance for Democracy, All Nigeria Peoples Party, United Democratic Party, United Nigeria Peoples Party, and All Progressive Grand Alliance.

The 1999 April general elections that produced Rtd. General Olusegun Obasanjo as President was not so violent when compared to those of 2003 and that of 2007. The reason for this was that the political class were not too sure that the military will actually relinquish power to a civilian led administration in the country. For the conduct of the 2003 general elections, thirty political parties were registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission. These include:

Table 2.6: Number of Registered Political Parties

S/N	Registered Political Parties
1.	African Renaissance Party (ARP)
2.	All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
3.	All Peoples Liberation Party (APLP)
4.	All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA)
5.	Alliance for Democracy (AD)
6.	Better Nigeria Progressive Party (BNPP)
7.	Community Party of Nigeria (CPN)
8.	Democratic Alternative (DA)
9.	Green Party of Nigeria (GPN)

10.	Justice Party (JP)
11.	Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria (LDPN)
12.	Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN)
13.	Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ)
14.	National Action Council (NAC)
15.	National Conscience Party (NCP)
16.	National Democratic Party (NDP)
17.	National Mass Movement of Nigeria (NMMN)
18.	National Reformation Party (NRP)
19.	New Democrats (ND)
20.	New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP)
21.	Nigeria Advance Party (NAP)
22.	Nigeria Peoples Congress (NPC)
23.	Party for social Democracy (PSD)
24.	People's Redemption Party (PRP)
25.	Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)
26.	Peoples Mandate Party (PMP)
27.	Peoples Salvation Party (PSP)
28.	Progressive Action Congress (PAC)
29.	United Democratic Party (UDP)
30.	United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP)

Source: INEC office, Abuja 2007.

While INEC was battling to put infrastructure on ground for a free and fair elections, the political class were heating up the polity by some negative behaviours. The approach of the 2003 general elections increased the tempo of conflicts such as communal crisis and political violence culminating in politically motivated assassinations. The Nigeria April 2003 general elections were characterized by acute violence, thuggery and politically motivated assassinations which created fear in the minds of the people.

Table 2.7: Records of Politically Motivated Assassinations.

S/N	Names of Victim	Position	Party Affiliation	Date Murdered	State of Origin
1.	Hon. Odunayo Olagbaju	Member, State House of Assembly	A.D	21/12/2001	Osun
2.	Chief Bola Ige	Minister of Justice and Attorney – General	A.D	23/12/2001	Osun but killed at Ibadan
3.	Mrs. Janet Olapade	Women Leader	PDP	12/8/2002	Ondo
4.	Alh. Ahmed Pategi	Chairman, Kwara PDP	PDP	15/8/2002	Kwara
5.	Mr. Victor Nwankwo	Publisher 4 th Dimension	N/A	29/5/2002	Anambra
6.	Mr. Barnabas Igwe and his wife Abigail	Chairman NBA Anambra State	Not Known	Sept. 1, 2002	Anambra
7.	Mr. Dele Arojo	Gub. Aspirant	PDP	25/11/2002	Ogun
8.	Alh. Kabiru Mohammed	Party Chairman	UNPP	Dec. 2002	Kano
9.	Chief Ogbonna Uche	Senatorial Candidate	ANPP	8/2/2003	Imo
10.	Mr. Theodore Egwuate	Civil Servant: Principal Secretary to Gov. of Imo State	Not Known	15/2/2003	Imo
11.	Alh. Kola Kasum	Party Chairman, Kwara	PDP	Feb. 2003	Kwara
12.	Prof. Chimere Ikoku	Former VC UNN	N/A (Not available)	Oct. 2003	N/A (Not available)
13.	Mrs. Emily Omope	Women Leader	A.D	3/3/2002	N/A (Not available)
14.	Chief Harry Marshal	South-South Party Leader	ANPP	5/3/2003	Rivers
15.	Mr. Udo Akpan	Federal Commissioner	PDP	August 2003	Akwa-Ibom

Source: Guardian Newspapers of 2/9/2002; 29/12/2002,3/3/2003;

Fears were heightened as a result of the massive resurgence of identity based conflicts in different parts of the country with return to a constitutional framework of government in 1999. For instance, in the North-Central parts of the country inhabited by ethnic minority groups, conflict expressed in ethno-religious forms, but fought around issues of citizenship and access to local power and resource, had led to mass killings, destruction of property and displacement of thousands of people. In Jos, and the Southern

part of Plateau State, as well as in Nasarawa, communal conflicts threatened civil activities including elections.

The spectre of conflicts and violence remained outstanding in Warri, Ife/Modakeke, and in Umuleri/Aguleri area of Anambra State. Added to these were the violent outbursts associated with militia groups such as the Niger- Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) and the Ijaw Youth Congress (NYC) in the Niger-Delta, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the South-East and the Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC) in the South-West. According to Egwu (2007:22),

in terms of such violence the North-Central zone closely followed the Niger-Delta in the South-South zone. In the Northern zone, Benue State recorded over 40 deaths. In one single incident, as reported by ANPP gubernatorial candidate in an interview, 22 people were shot dead.

In Delta State, the tension in Warri area linked to the politics of oil, but outwardly expressed in the unending disputations over the ownership of Warri, created a unique condition of tension. Two issues stood out in the tendency of people to resort to violence in expressing their grievances. First was the perception by political parties, contestants and the generality of people that INEC was partisan and was willing to do the bidding of the ruling PDP (Peoples' Democratic Party). The second was the undue sensationalism exhibited in the media reportage of political events and conflicts. These issues gave rise to intense conflict in the polity which eventually climaxed into electoral violence. Beyond Olufemi's (2003:19) view of politics as a phenomenon that evokes a great deal of apprehension and uneasiness among ordinary citizens all over the world, the situation in Nigeria has gone to a level that the popular perception of politics is that of "dirty game".

Table 2.8: Some Cases of Unresolved Political Assassinations in Nigeria.

NAMES	DATE	LOCATION	MODE	OUTCOME
Kola Tokunbo	January 31, 1999	Lagos	Shot	Unresolved
Patrick Okoye	January 31, 1999	Lagos	Shot	Unresolved
Sunday Ugwu Igwe	September 9, 1999	Enugu	Shot	Unresolved
Francis Nwankwo	February 15, 2000	Anambra	Shot	Unresolved
Nicholas	June 2000	Lagos	Shot	Unresolved
Okhuakhua	September 2000	Lagos	shot	Unresolved
Mohammed	October 17, 2000	Onitsha	shot	Unresolved
Shuaibu Obatou	November 5, 2000	Ondo	shot	Unresolved
Mumbo Idowu	December 4, 2000	Benin	shot	Unresolved
Braimoh Joseph	December 10,	Lagos	shot	Unresolved
Osayande	2000 August 19,	Port Harcourt	shot	Unresolved
Chief Layi Balogun	2001 August 23,	Ebonyi	shot	Unresolved
Monday Ndor	2001 August 23,	Ebonyi	shot	Unresolved
Onyebuchi Ede	2001 August 23,	Ebonyi	shot	Unresolved
Chibueze Idah	2001 August 23,	Ebonyi	shot	unresolved
Ogbonna	2001 December	Ife	shot	unresolved
Odimbaiwe Ifeanyi	20, 2001	Ibadan	shot	unresolved
Nnaji Odunayo	December 23,	Abuja	Stabbed	unresolved
Olagbaju Chief	2001 January 7,	Calabar	Shot	unresolved
Bola Ige	2002 April 2002	Lagos	Shot	Unresolved
Eyo Eyo Ifeanyi	May 9, 2002	Nsukka	Shot	unresolved
Igbokwe	May 26, 2002	Cross River	Shot	d unresolved
Musa Dayo	June 11, 2002	Onitsha	Shot	unresolved
Christopher	September 1, 2002	Owerri	Shot	Unresolved
Ogbonna Maria-	February 8, 2003	Imo	Shot	unresolved
Theresa Nsa Chief	February 13, 2003	Owerri	Shot	unresolved
& Mrs. Barnabas	February 22, 2003	Ibadan	Shot	unresolved

Igwe	March 3, 2003	Abuja	Shot	unresolved
Mr. Ogbonnaya	March 5, 2003	Yamatu	Shot	unresolved
Uche E. Emenike	March 17, 2003	Deba Ibadan	Shot	unresolved
Theodore Agwatu	June 21, 2003	Delta	Shot	unresolved
Emily Omope	February 6, 2004	Ibadan	Shot	unresolved
Marshal Harry	July 16, 2005	Benin	Shot	unresolved

Source: Adapted from Igbinovia, P.E (2003); *The Criminal In All Of Us: Whose Ox Have We Not Taken*, University of Benin Inaugural Lecture Series 71, p.143; Human Right Watch 2007.

2.1.11 Empirical Cases of Electoral Violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic (1999-2011)

Electoral violence is as old as Nigeria's democratic history. Indeed, Nigeria's elections had been generally characterized by violence and all forms of anti-democratic behaviours. Since the commencement of democratic rule in 1999, the same features of electoral violence and anti-democratic behaviours have characterized all elections. In 1999, an election to usher in a democratic government was conducted by the then military government of General Abdulsalam Abubakar (rtd). The election from all observations was relatively peaceful, perhaps, due to the fear of military force and the thinking among the political elite that the military may not likely relinquish power to an elected civilian government. This thinking gave rise to the limited cases of electoral violence that were recorded. However, in subsequent civilian to civilian transition programmes, cases of electoral violence skyrocketed. The following discussion will thus give account of empirical cases of electoral violence throughout the country, specifically from 2003-2011. Most of the details of electoral violence used here were extracted from the records of Human Rights Watch (HRW), Transition Monitoring Group(TMG), Civil Liberty Organizations (CLO) and other election observers that covered the elections during the period under consideration.

Rivers State

Violence and blatant rigging were widely used in Rivers State to secure victory at the elections, primarily by the ruling PDP and other parties (TMG,2003). The police were widely reported to have supported the PDP's interests in Rivers State (HRW,2003). In 2003, an armed All Nigerians Peoples Party (ANPP) supporter called Nnena Mwuzi was killed by PDP supporters in Etche local government, outside the local government headquarter where INEC was preparing materials for distribution (CLO,2003). He was killed during a dispute between ANPP and PDP supporters over whether INEC could distribute a photocopy of the election results form rather than the original. In other areas in Rivers State, many incidents of violence, including several killings, were reported in different parts of Ikwerreland, which covered four local government areas. Many other incidents of violence in Rivers State were reported by election observers, non-governmental organizations, political activists, and others. These included incidents where members of the security forces used excessive force, for example in Port Harcourt on April 19,2003 when soldiers whipped ANPP supporters who were protesting at the INEC office. A petition by the ANPP in Rivers State submitted to the INEC Chairman also contains examples of violent intimidation and other abuses by the PDP during the National Assembly elections (HRW,2003).

Delta State

As one of Nigeria's most important oil-producing state, the race for government position in Delta State was even more desperate, and the financial benefits of gaining political office even higher, than in other states (HRW,2003). Not surprisingly, therefore, it experienced a high level of violence before, during and after the elections. Not all of these violence were directly related to the elections, but the elections contributed to heightening of existing tensions in the area. The TMG (2003)reported that in Ughelli, angry youths burnt down the INEC office in protest at the postponement of elections. In other locations, armed thugs snatched ballot boxes and vandalized election materials. An TMG (2003) election observer in Warri described vehicles full of PDP thugs screeching into view at polling stations, large numbers of youths jumping out and leaving the doors open to show that the vehicles were full of guns and ammunition. The thugs then stood

over voters, asking them who they would be voting for. Some voters were so frightened that they replied: “who do you want us to vote for?” Many others simply did not vote.

Most of the violence in Delta State were noted by the TMG (2003) to have been carried out by PDP supporters. However, opposition party supporters were also reported to have engaged in violence and intimidation, as groups of armed youths affiliated to particular ethnic groups, rather than political parties. For example, on April 11, 2003 on the eve of the National Assembly elections in Koko, the headquarter of Warri North Local Government area, Ijaw militia launched an attack in which at least one government soldier and perhaps tens of civilians were killed. They also destroyed about fifty buildings, including the local government secretariat (TMG, 2003). On May 2 and 3 2003, there were confrontations between armed Ijaws and the Navy in Warri, and armed youths tried to disrupt the state house of assembly elections. At least, eight people were reported to have died in clashes between political thugs in some locations, including Okpe and Burutu, during the state house of assembly elections. In Delta State, the re-scheduled Delta North Senatorial district primary was marred by sporadic gunshots at the Cenotaph venue, Asaba. The State chairman of the party, Chief Peter Onyeluka Nwaoboshi escaped being lynched by some angry delegates during the senatorial rerun (TMG, 2011).

Electoral Violence in the South-East Geo-Political Zone

Imo State

According to HRW and TMG (2003) widespread rigging and armed intimidation at polling booths were reported by independent observers in Imo State. As in other Southeastern states where the Igbo ethnic group forms a majority, the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) presented a strong challenge to the ruling PDP in the state. In the evening of April 19, 2003 in Amaimo, Ikeduru local government, Onyewuchi Iwuchukwu, an ANPP member, was shot in front of his family by PDP supporters associated with the PDP's local chairmanship candidate, Samuel Anyanwu, known as Samdaddy. He died on his way to the hospital (TMG, 2003).

On April 19, 2003. Tony Dimegwu, an ANPP state House of Assembly candidate from Ahiazu-Mbaise local government, was seriously injured by PDP supporters.

According to TMG (2003), Tony Dimegwu heard rumours that PDP agents were carrying marked ballots into his constituency. When he challenged them, he was severely beaten by PDP thugs, who were reportedly led by Chidi Ibe, the local government's transition committee chairman. Dimegwu was taken to hospital, where his political associates said he remained for several days before being flown to Italy for more medical treatment resulting from injuries. An ANPP leader in Ahiazu-Mbaise local government described to TMG (2003:6) of how Tony Dimegwu was attacked:

We met the transition committee chairman and a whole lot of [PDP] thugs. They had five or six vehicles. Tony challenged them [the PDP supporters], saying he suspected they were carrying ballots or boxes. I saw Chidi Ibe hold Tony while boys were beating him, some with bare hands, some with irons [iron bars]. About five policemen were there with Ibe. I saw the police were just shooting into the air. Finally Tony fell down. I thought he was dead. The PDP thugs raced off and the police went with them. One other vehicle collected Tony; I learnt later they took him to hospital. I saw him two days later in hospital. He was still bad then, he couldn't talk at all.

The Civil Liberty Organisations (2003) recorded at least twelve cases of assassinations of ANPP members in Ebonyi State, believed to have been orchestrated by the PDP, in March and April. Among the victims were Anthony Nwodu, secretary of the ANPP in Ezza North local government, who was abducted from a police station by armed PDP supporters on March 21, 2003 and killed, allegedly in the house of a prominent PDP politician in the state. Two of the leaders of the group who allegedly killed Anthony Nwodu were charged with his murder. A few days later, on March 27, 2003. Ikenna Ibor, a councillorship candidate for the ANPP, was shot dead at the ANPP secretariat in the state capital, Abakaliki. The incident was reported to the police, who confirmed that he had been shot in the stomach, thigh and hand, and that they were investigating the case (CLO, 2003).

In Uwana, in Afikpo North, there was serious inter-communal violence following the May 3, 2003 State House of Assembly elections. The former minority

leader from the State House of Assembly, Arinze Egwu, who before the elections had defected from the ANPP to the PDP, was from this area, and had been attacked and beaten before the elections. On the day of the House of Assembly elections on May 3, an APGA supporter known as Ziko had been shot and killed. Reprisal attack and counter-reprisal ensued. Supporters of opposition parties, who had come together in the wake of earlier elections, organized to disrupt the elections and destroy ballot boxes, and burnt the house and car of the PDP supporter suspected of killing Ziko. In response, PDP supporters burnt homes and attacked opposition supporters (HRW,2003).

Godwin Aleke, a headmaster who was appointed a ward presiding officer in Umuoghara, Ezza North local government, was beaten to death on the night of April 12,2003 the day of the National Assembly elections (Human Rights Watch,2003). In another case of electoral violence in Ebonyi State, a local Human Rights group reported that in Effium, in Ohaukwu local government, on April 12, 2003, House of Assembly PDP candidate, Bernard Uzimu was beaten and kicked by ANPP supporters after he tried to snatch a ballot box; they abducted him and detained him for three days. An ANPP ward chairman, Hyacinth Ekebe, was also reportedly beaten in his house on the day of the National Assembly elections(HRW,2003).

Electoral Violence in Other Northern States

The level of violence in the north was not as severe as in other parts of the country. Nonetheless, some incidents of violence were recorded. For example, in Tudun Wada area of Kaduna town, capital of Kaduna State, there was a clash between ANPP and PDP supporters two days after the State House of Assembly elections of May 3,2003. Local sources reported that a PDP supporter attacked an ANPP campaign coordinator (CLO,2003). The police arrested a large number of people, but not the perpetrator of the attack. Majority of those arrested were reportedly released after paying ransom to the police.

In Sokoto State, election observers recorded at least two deaths as a result of clashes between ANPP and PDP supporters. Both incidents occurred in the aftermath of the National Assembly elections of April 12, 2003, one in Tureta local government, the other in Kebbe local government. In both cases, ANPP candidates to the National

Assembly won the elections, displacing the PDP. Celebrations by ANPP supporters turned to violence as they clashed with PDP supporters. Election observers reported that in Tureta, a PDP supporter was stoned to death, while in Kebbe, an ANPP supporter died after being severely beaten (HRW, 2003).

In Niger State, the trouble there started with violence during the campaign. In Suleja for instance, hand-held explosives were thrown into the venue of the Niger East Senatorial campaign flag-off by unidentified persons. Angry youth protesting the results of the elections stormed the Nigerian Christian Corps Fellowship Secretariat in Minna, Niger State Capital and locked 50 corps members serving in the State in the building and set it ablaze. The lucky ones among these corps members were relocated to the army barracks at Minna for safety. In Plateau state, the flag-off of the Labour Party (LP) Gubernatorial campaign led by Pauline Tallen was marked with a sad beginning as twelve of the party supporters were involved in a ghastly motor accident on their way to Jos.

In Kano State, during the primaries, there were cases of disagreements over the primaries. For examples, Governor Ibrahim Shekarau of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) had fallen apart with his deputy, Alhaji Abdullahi Tijani Gwarzo over his support for Alhaji Sagir Takai, as the governorship candidate of the party. On the other hand, within the All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP) the governorship ticket was controversially handed over to (Rtd) General Lawal Jafaru Isa, former military administrator of Kaduna State instead of the much-touted Mohammed Abacha. Even though, the position was surrendered to Mohammed Abacha, the aftermath of the election was not favourable. Aside, property worth hundreds of millions of naira owned by the Emir of Kano, Dr. Ado Bayero, the Galadima Kano, Alhaji Tijani Hashim, chieftains of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) like former speakers, House of Representatives, Ghali Umar Na'Abba and Salisu Buhari were reduced to rubble. The All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) Elders Committee leader and former presidential candidate of the defunct National Republican Party (NRP), Alhaji Bashir Tofa's residential building was also burnt. Hundreds of Kano residents were severely injured, their cars damaged by the aggrieved youth who claimed the presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) was denied victory at the polls (TMG, 2003)

In Zamfara State, thousands of youths went on the rampage in Tsafe Local Government area of the State where they destroyed dozens of shops and vandalised three churches. Major roads were also barricaded, bonfires were made to disrupt vehicular movement while about 47 suspects were arrested. The violence that broke out in Katsina state escalated to many areas such as Malumfashi, Kankara, Daura and Jibia which claimed scores of cars and at least five churches. The PDP Secretariat, Kankara private residence of local PDP Chieftains and Governor Shema campaign offices were destroyed in the melee. In the same vein, nearly all the States in the North-East also experienced violence. In Gombe, 17 people lost their lives during the post-presidential poll violence in Gombe and 100 suspects were arrested. The Acting Head of Clinical Services and Training of the Federal Medical Centre, Gombe, Dr Ali Shaliza stated that 71 patients of post-election violence were brought to the hospital.. In Bauchi State, 10 Youth Corpers who served as election umpires, a Divisional Crime Officer (DCO) and a policewoman lost their lives. Over 4,500 people were displaced following the mayhem unleashed on the residents of Bauchi of supporters of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP). Four INEC offices were equally burnt down in Bauchi, Dambam, Misau and Jama'are local government areas while 500 laptops used for the voters registration exercise were looted by the irate youths. In Taraba State, many people were shot by the police during a protest at Mutum-Biyu headquarters of Gassol Local Government Council.

Electoral Violence in the 2007 General Elections, South-South Nigeria

Edo State

Several deaths and incidents of violent intimidation were reported in Edo State during the elections. Voting on April 12, 2007 was violently disrupted by party thugs in several locations, especially in the state capital, Benin City. An ANPP returning officer reported that on April 19, 2007 three ANPP members of his escort were killed outside the collation centre at Ehor, the headquarter of Uhumwode local government, while he was inside, but the identity of the perpetrators was not confirmed. Later that same night, he refused to sign the result sheets, because he had received a message that results had already been announced in Benin City, even though the votes were still being counted in the collation centre. In an interview with TMG, (2007:9), the returning officer stated thus:

I wrote, I disagree with the result and I signed. That's when everything went wild. The INEC official yelled at me, asking me: "how could you do this to us?" A soldier came and pointed a gun at me. Other ANPP supporters were waiting outside, monitoring and making sure I was safe. There was shouting and then we heard repeated rapid gunshots from outside; everyone including my driver ran away, so I was left alone.

The same ANPP agent who escaped the above incident unharmed told TMG (2007:11) that he witnessed the killing of an ANPP youth leader called Obadiarho in Oredo local government:

We heard gunshots from where the voting was taking place. As we drove closer, we saw people running away. We stopped. We were scared to move forward. Someone who was shot was still running. He fell down and others came to rescue him. I drove back to look for mobile police who were supposed to be guarding, but they were nowhere to be found. Before he (Obadiarho) died a few minutes later, he said "the military killed me. The same witness told TMG that Sgt. Ofabuo Khen, a police officer who had been sympathetic to ANPP complaints about the elections, was also killed on May 3, 2007

However, in a separate interview with the Transition Monitoring Group (2007), the ANPP governorship candidate in Edo State reported that four ANPP members were killed at Anegbette in Estako Central local government area in a dispute with security agents over access to the collation centre. A PDP official claimed that violence had also been committed by ANPP supporters against PDP supporters in Edo State. He gave the example of an attack in Irrua, in Esan central local government, in which two PDP supporters were killed by ANPP supporters, during elections for members of the National Assembly. Another source reported that in Estako West local government, a former PDP local government chairman was beaten by ANPP supporters. This angered PDP supporters who started shooting into the air, and reportedly killed one of their own group by accident (TMG, 2007). In Edo State, protests came over the way the primaries were

conducted. Matthew Uroghide who lost to Ehigie Uzamere in Edo south alleged that he won, while Theo Okoh and Onikolease Irabor both claimed victory in Edo Central as they alleged that the announced winner, Herberta Okonfua rigged the election. There were also protests from House of Representatives and State House of Assembly aspirants (Aliu, 2011:65).

Electoral Violence in other South-South States

States in the South-South were equally engulfed in electoral violence. Thus in Akwa-Ibom, political campaigns took destructive dimension when both Ikot-Ekpene and Uyo were turned into theatres of political war. The face-off was between loyalists of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). The ACN had its gubernatorial campaign rally at Ikot-Ekpene while the PDP had its own in Mkpato Enin and Abak Local Councils at Uyo. Different versions of the cases of the quarrel were advanced, but, it was certain that the quarrel took place between the supporters of ACN and those of the PDP which resulted into the death of fifteen people while many were wounded. The presidential campaign office of Goodluck Jonathan/Namadi Sambo situated along Abak Road was set ablaze. 127 Peugeot, 307 Salon Cars and 157 Keke NAPEP tri cycles belonging to the state government were burnt. 20 vehicles belonging to well meaning Nigerians were equally burnt at different locations. About 51 suspects were arrested in connection with the political violence at Uyo (Akpan-Nsoh, 2011:22 and 23). Akwa-Ibom is also a place where a Diaspora aspirant had his mother brutally assassinated.

Electoral violence in Cross River has been on the low side as there were no reported cases of politically motivated killings. However, at Ugep, there was violence and some people were injured and cars destroyed while guns were used freely. The violence led to the arrest of one of the aspirants to the Federal House of Representatives, Mr Patrick Okomiso and the incumbent member, Chief Bassey Ewa.

Electoral Violence in the South-West

In Ondo State, three people were shot dead in Obanla area with four people reportedly injured in Iro street in a clash between supporters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the ruling Labour Party (LP). The electoral violence and irregularities

that marred the election at Ondo State prompted the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) to submit a 47 page petition to the election tribunal in Akure seeking a rerun of the election. Meanwhile, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had already declared the Labour Party (LP) candidate, Rapheal Nomiye as winner in the National Assembly election. The ACN claimed in a petition EPT/ODS/NAE/HR/2/2011 that the election was marred by violence, unprecedented irregularities, voters intimidation and various instances of ballot snatching in two riverine councils of Ilaje and Ese-Odo which made up the constituency (TMG, 2011).

In Ado-Ekiti, the Ekiti State Capital, two supporters of the PDP identified as Ayo Kehinde Faluyi and Michael Ipindola were killed by assassins dressed in police uniform during a brawl between the supporters of the PDP and the ruling Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). The clash in Ado-Ekiti caused pandemonium as the corpse of one of the casualties, Ayo Michael was dropped at the Governor's office by protesting members of the PDP in the state. Ogun State had before the elections thrown itself into a confused state by presenting two controversial lists of candidates to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Adetunji Olurin and Gboyega Isiaka. However during the campaign, no fewer than two people died in a clash between supporters of the governorship candidate of the Labour Party (LP) and commercial motorcyclists. In Osun state, the leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) accused Elijah Adewale, Governor Babatunde Fashola's Special Adviser of leading hooligans from Lagos State to Osun State to foment trouble during the National Assembly election. It was pointed out that the assignment of the immigrants was to scare the electorate from performing their civic rights(CLO,2011). The squad being sponsored by the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) in the state was allegedly spearheaded by Prince Sola Adewumi, Dr Elijah Adewale, Dr Gbenga Ogunleye, Chairman, Care Taker committee of Obokun and Taiwo Fatiregun, Caretaker Chairman, Oriade Local Government. This could not be far from the truth as six members of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) were later arrested and arraigned at the magistrate court at Osogbo over alleged arson and political violence.

Electoral Violence in 2011 General Elections

In the 2011 general elections, electoral violence was more prominent in the Northern states. However, most of the empirical cases of electoral violence were post

election violence in nature. Most of the victims of the electoral violence were members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) who were drafted to participate in the conduct of the elections in various parts of the country. The corps members were butchered like animals by rioters. They have been become known as the “NYSC 10”. The Corpers include Adewuni Paul (Ekiti), Okeoma Okechukwu Chibudom (Imo), Ukazeone Amsalem Chukwunonyere (Imo), Olawale Tosin (Kogi), Akonye Ibrahim Sule (Kogi), Gbenjo Ebenezar Ayotunde (Osun), Adeniyi Kehide Jelil (Osun), Anyanwu Agnes (Imo), Okpo Kori Obina (Imo) and Adohe Elliot (Beyelsa). In a bid to assuage the families of the victims, the president decided to pay a compensation of #5 million each to their families. According to the then inspector General of police, Hafiz Ringim, the cost of the 2011 elections was alarming, 520 persons were killed, six policemen, 157 churches, 46 mosques, 1435 houses were burnt, 437 vehicles, 219 motor cycles and 45 property belonging to the police were burnt, 22,141 persons become internally displaced in Kaduna state, 77 persons injured, 987 shops burnt. Besides this cost, the country spent a total sum of #89 billion to conduct the elections. (CLO,2011; TMG,2011)

From the analysis so far, it is clear that electoral violence has almost become an institutionalized culture in Nigeria politics, and the nature, scope and pattern of electoral violence have also been changing and becoming more sophisticated. What emerged from the picture so far in Nigeria’s electoral violence has been that the party in power do not at any time want to accept defeat from the opposition. Hence, all the instances cited in the thesis point to this direction, which confirmed the assumption that African political leadership hate opposition. In addition, as long as the state still remains the major distributor of wealth to public office holders, electoral violence will continue to play dysfunctional roles in Nigeria’s democratic project. In addition, the rising rate of unemployment of youths in the country has continued to pose danger to any attempt at ensuring credible elections in the country. Furthermore, as long as the premium placed on wealth, status and affluence remain high, and access to public office serve as viable means for wealth acquisition, elections to public office in the country will unfortunately be violent ridden.

Summary of Reviewed Literature

In this chapter, the researcher examined related literature on the meaning and relevance of election to any democratic country in the world and the causes of electoral violence in Nigeria. In discussing the causes of electoral violence in Nigerian politics, issues such as ethnicity and regionalism, the nature of the electoral process, the place of political elite in the democratic process, the structural imbalance of the Nigerian state, the role of electoral management bodies, the media, the place of Godfatherism and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state, including the place of voters' education and enlightenment were carefully examined. Furthermore, an excursion into the history of politically and election related violence in Nigerian politics were discussed. In reviewing the extant literature on electoral violence in Nigeria, one obvious observation that emerged was that most of the scholarly works on election violence stressed the causes of electoral violence without empirically looking at how these variables affect Nigeria's democracy. The thrust of this thesis was therefore to bridge this gap. This was done by empirical examination of how the variables discussed in the literature review have impacted on Nigeria's democracy with particular reference on the Fourth Republic.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Bearing in mind the importance of theories in research as a result of the roles they play in providing explanations to social and political phenomena, no meaningful research can be undertaken in the absence of a sound theoretical base, hence the need for a theory of explanation in every research endeavour. For the purpose of this thesis, the Marxian political economy theory, premised on dialectical and historical materialism was adopted. The Marxian political economy theory owes its origin to the works of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels and Lenin. Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) are the creators of what they called "scientific socialism". Karl Marx continued to develop his thought in collaboration with German thinker Friedrich Engels and published various works, of which the two most well-known are the 1848 pamphlet *The Communist Manifesto* and the three-volume *Das Kapital*. Lenin's work called "Leninism" comprises socialist political and economic theories, developed from Marxism, and Lenin's interpretations of Marxist theories, for practical application to the socio-political conditions of the Russian Empire of the early 20th century. Their work has since

influenced subsequent intellectual, economic and political history. The subject matter of Marxian political economy is the production (economic) relations between people. These include the forms of ownership of the means of production, the position of the various classes and the social groups in production and their interrelations and the forms of distribution of the national wealth. Marxism is based on a materialist understanding of societal development, taking as its starting point, the necessary economic activities required by human society to provide for their material needs. The form of economic organization, or mode of production, is understood to be the basis from which the majority of other social phenomena including social relations, political and legal systems, morality and ideology arise. These social relations form the superstructure, for which the economic system forms the base. As the forces of production (most notably technology) improve, existing forms of social organization become inefficient and stifle further progress. These inefficiencies manifest themselves as social contradictions in the form of class struggle (Tucker,1961).

As Hegel,(1953) observed:

At a certain stage of the development, of the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, the forms of development of the productive forces turn into their fetters. These inefficiencies manifest themselves as social contradictions in society in the form of class struggle. Under the capitalist mode of production, this struggle materializes between the minority (the bourgeoisie) who own the means of production, and the vast majority of the population (the proletariat) who produce goods and services. Taking the idea that social change occurs because of the struggle between different classes within society who are under contradiction against each other, leads the Marxist analysis to the conclusion that capitalism exploits and oppresses the proletariats.

According to Nikitin (1983), political economy, clarifies the laws governing production, distribution, exchange and consumption of the material wealth in human society at various stages of its development. According to Lenin (1977) it is not production that political economy deals, but with the social relations of men in production with the social

system of production. Marxian method of political economy is dialectical materialism which according to Nikitin (1983) presupposes

The investigation of the production relations in the process of their emergence and development, the consideration of this process as an objective reality and the revelation of the internal contradictions of development inherent in social production.

Accordingly, the system of economic production is the foundation on which the institutional and ideological superstructure of society is built. In other words, man's material condition alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world. The significance of the Marxian political economy is that it provides the working class and all working people with a knowledge of the laws governing the economic development of society and allows them to fulfil successfully, the task facing them. According to Iain (1996) the concern of the classical political economists was to identify the social classes which comprise society, define the economic relationships between these classes and discover the laws which regulate these relationship. The structure of society is thereby conceptualized on the basis of an understanding of its economic foundation. As an approach, Ake (2005:1) sees political economy as a method which gives primacy to material condition, particularly economic factors in the explanation of social life.

For liberal theorists, the market lies at the centre of economic life. Economic progress results from the interaction of diverse individuals pursuing their ends. Scholars use the term political economy to refer to a set of questions generated by the interactions of economics and political activities, questions that are to be explored with whatever theoretical and methodological means that are readily available. According to Sodaro (2007:344),

political economy is the study of how people pursue collective economic goals and deal with conflicts over resources and other economic factors in an authoritative way by means of government .

In other words, political economy is about the relationship between the economy and the State and about the various ways people try to use the State to improve their economic welfare. As a result of the fact that economic transactions and political activity go on all the time, the relationship between politics and economics is frequently interactive. That is economic variables affect political variables which in turn affect economic variables and so on. A central purpose of political economy is to clarify these interacting relationships. One of the most important of these relationships is the relationship between States and markets. Such terms as “markets” “the market economy” and “market forces” refer mainly to the private sector. They apply broadly to the production, buying and selling of goods and services by private companies or individuals with prices and salaries determined largely by the forces of supply and demand rather than by government fiat. Political economy examines such questions as how do government policies affect market forces and vice versa.

Having examined the major thrust of the Marxian political economy theory, its relevance to explaining electoral violence in Nigeria politics can now be closely looked at. In applying the theory to understand electoral violence and sustainable democracy in Nigeria politics, one has to understand the role the Nigerian State plays in the nation's economy. The Nigerian State plays a dominant role in the national economy in the face of the underdevelopment of private capitalist enterprise. This throws up the State as a primary instrument of accumulation. As a facilitator of the capitalist development process, the Nigerian State is a major owner of the means of production. Buoyed by the expanded oil revenues of the early 1970s, the State effectively dominated all aspects of the national political economy (Jega, 2000:30). This made the State not only the biggest spender of resources but also the largest employer of labour. As noted by Joseph (1991:56), the expansion of petroleum production and the resultant increased revenues heightened the centrality of the State as the locus of the struggle for resources for personal advancement and group security. Under this circumstance, access to the State becomes a platform for primitive accumulation. Ake (1996:23) captures the immensity and the ubiquity of State power under this situation when he observes that, the State is everywhere and its power appears boundless. There is hardly any aspect of life in which

the State does not exercise power and control. That makes the capture of State power singularly important.

This character of the Nigerian State encourages clientele politics which, according to Huntington (1997:378), exists where the State controls opportunities for commerce and a wide range of jobs in the academics, administrative and legal fields. Within this context, politics means more than competition for political power but assumes the character of a desperate struggle for positions in the bureaucracy or for access to those who have influence over government decisions (Leeds, 1981:353). Arising from the profitability of State power for primitive accumulation, the struggle for State power is reduced to warfare by factions of the governing elites. In this struggle, commitment to public service and ethics of governance becomes secondary (Egwu, 2005). Thus, political (State) power does not only represent the license to wealth, it is also the means to security and the only guarantor of general well-being (Ake, 2001:7). It is within this context of the dominant role of the State in the political economy that one can explain the desperation of Nigerians' governing elites for State power as evident in the brazen manipulation of the electoral process, many times with impunity.

Given the focus of the subject matter of electoral violence in Nigeria in the context of a struggle to secure or retain political power in democratic political environment, the theory primarily focuses on material or economic aspects of society. In other words, dialectical materialism is premised on the issue of man's inherent motivations of economic pursuits and needs. Thus, man's fierce inclinations and struggles to acquire, control and maintain political power at all cost justify the choice of the theory. Economic issues according to Marx, are the major or primary causes of tension and violence in all societies. Thus, the relations between people in the production processes are symbiotically connected with the nature and direction of the political struggles to capture political power in order to determine economic factors.

A practical relevant way by which the political economy theory was applied to our study is that in the construction of our questionnaire, care was taken to ensure that the questions were such that relate to the interplay between economic and political factors and forces. Of course, bearing in mind that this study is guided by the political economy theory framework we had earlier stated our hypotheses in ways that relate to the interplay

of economic and political forces. In other words, the relevance of this theory in the explanation of electoral violence in Nigeria lies in the fact that in contemporary times, the economic system of most societies, especially in developing countries, Nigeria inclusive is regulated by the political system; hence the competition for the control of the political space is high. This is because, who controls the State power, equally controls the economic resources of such country and its production and distribution. Based on this, the fierce struggle to win election and control State apparatuses and invariably exploit the situation for personal economic gains and advantage sparks off the roots of all electoral violence in Nigeria. This has implications for the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. It should be noted however that in the developed World, those who go into politics are the least paid. Their purpose is not to make money or wealth, but in Nigeria and Africa in general, the goal is geared towards primitive accumulation of wealth.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHOD

Introduction

The central focus of this chapter is to carefully examine the research method used in the collection of relevant data and information for the thesis. It took cognizance of the various techniques used in soliciting for relevant information and data, including the validity and reliability of the relevant instruments and the specifications of the method of data analysis.

3.1 Research Design

The study made use of the Ex Post-Facto research design, with the survey research method. The survey method of data collection focused mostly on empirical observations of political and social phenomena in social sciences researches. The survey research method uses the techniques similar to those used in pure sciences in the quest for information and the acquisition of relevant empirical data for the study of any problem of interest to the researcher. It was in the light of the above reasoning that Obasi (1999:62), opined that survey research design can be descriptive or historical, it is historical when it evaluates and explain past events for the purpose of gaining clearer understanding of the present and making a more reliable predictions of the future; and its is descriptive, when it tries to unravel major elements and characteristics of any phenomenon. The survey method of data collection was applied in the study because it is only the method best suited for the collection of data from a sample of a chosen population of any study, which was applicable in the study. In the social sciences, the survey method had been applied by scholars to obtain first hand information in empirical studies.

3.2.1 Population of the Study.

The population of any study is usually made up of all the relevant and intrinsic characteristics that the researcher is interested in studying. The population for this study was made up of all the registered voters in the 2011 general elections in the two states selected for the study. The registered voters in Delta state was put at 1,950,008, while

that of Oyo state was 2,169,719. This population was made up of both adult male and female from the age of 18 and above from the study states.

3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

The researcher made use of the stratified sampling technique to obtain data and relevant information for the study. The sample size used for the study was made up of 1,800 (one thousand eight hundred) selected subjects from the two states under consideration. Eight hundred (800) was selected from Delta state, while one thousand (1000) was selected from Oyo state. From the selected sample size, generalizations were made about the opinions of the entire population of the registered voters from the two states on electoral violence and its implication for democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The subjects selected comprised of civil society organization groups, civil servants, coalition of political parties, youth organizations/associations, party members, women groups/leaders, traditional rulers and the general public from the ages of 18 years and above.

3.4 Sources of Data and the techniques of data Collection.

The main avenues through which data and information were gathered for this study were made up of primary and secondary sources. The primary data for this study were personally sourced by the researcher with his field assistants carefully selected from the two states, while the secondary data and information were obtained from documented sources already put in place by scholars in the field of study. The questionnaire was used to gather primary data for the study. The designed questionnaire contained both close and open ended questions in which relevant questions dealing with the topic were asked from the respondents or sampled subjects. The questionnaire contained a wide range of questions and possible answers to choose from. In addition, the open ended questions were also drawn up to enable the respondents to freely give their opinion on the issues under consideration. This choice was provided for the respondents to enable them, as participant observers of the electoral process to freely contribute reasonably to issues that are outside the questionnaires that were administered to them, but important in shaping the quality of information needed for the study.

The questionnaire was divided into sections A, B and C. Section A was designed to elicit personal data as age, sex, educational qualifications, while Section B was used to obtain general information on electoral violence in Nigeria. Section C questions were designed from which the researcher obtained three questions with which the hypotheses for the study were tested. The secondary sources of data were derived from textbooks, journals, seminar papers as well as internet printouts.

3.5 Administration of Data Collection Instrument

The administration of the data collection instrument was carried out by the researcher and his field assistants in each of the two States chosen for the study in the gathering of data and necessary information for the thesis. The questionnaires were personally administered to the respondents with the assistance of the researcher's field assistants chosen from the two States to represent the population and dominant local languages spoken by the people.

The use of the field assistants was to facilitate the distribution and the collection of the questionnaires from the selected respondents. In addition, since the field assistants were taken from the area, and also understand the local languages of the people and the sampled groups, this reduced the problem of interpreting the questions to some of the respondents. Furthermore, their choice was also informed by the fact that they are familiar with the geographical terrain of the areas and this reduced the problems of transportation and access to the respondents.

3.6 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments

Reliability of Instrument

In order to ensure the reliability of the instrument for the study, the questionnaire was pre-tested before embarking on a full scale work in order to finalize the design structure and ensure that the instrument captured the desired data and information. To ensure the reliability of the quantitative data, the researcher summarized and verified the responses which came up at the end of the administered questionnaires. In addition, the researcher cross checked information from other sources and also engaged in meaningful discussion with the key informants selected for the study. Thus, the researcher was able to minimize incorrect course with maximum precision.

Validity of the Study

In order not to doubt the credibility of the information and data sourced for the study, attention was paid to the issue of validity. Because of the fact that the researcher was aware of the potential problems extraneous factors will have on respondents in giving valid answers to questions during the field work, adequate steps were taken to ensure confidentiality and neutrality of respondents who were used as sample subjects for the study. This process gave the sampled subjects, the assurance that they will not be victimized nor punished for it, hence they freely provided the relevant information needed for the study

Furthermore, attention was adequately given to the identification of the research population, data collection methods and techniques, appropriate analytical tools for data interpretation from where conclusions were drawn up. In addition, the questions drawn up for the thesis covered all the relevant segments of the variables required for the study.

3.7 Method of Data Analysis

Different instruments are available for measurement of research variables in political science. This include: tables, simple percentages, graphs, correlation analysis, t-Test analysis, Chi-square (X^2) statistic and the use of Regression and Time series. For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher made use of tables, Pie Charts, Bar charts and Chi-square tool for data collected. The Chi-square instrument for data analysis was formulated by statisticians. Chi-square, usually written as X^2 , is a statistical instrument used in the analysis of variables used in empirical research. The choice of the Chi-square statistical tool was informed by the fact that it has been used in a number of similar and related studies, with particular reference to election violence across the globe and Nigeria in particular. Such works includes the researches conducted on electoral violence by Dauda (2011) in Nigeria, Agba (2011), Alejandro and Carreras (2012). However, the analysis of data for this thesis was done with tables, Pie charts, Bar charts and Chi-square (X^2) at 0.05 alpha level of significance. The Chi-square statistic is mathematically expressed thus

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e}$$

Where

X^2 = Measure of the departure of obtained or observed frequencies from expected frequencies by chance.

\sum = Summation of all observed and expected frequencies.

F_o = Obtained or observed frequencies.

F_e = Expected Frequencies

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

The fundamental objective of this thesis is to carefully examine the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria's democracy, with particular reference to the Fourth Republic, 1999-2011. To do this, three hypotheses were raised and tested.

This chapter analyzed the data collected from the field work for the study. Out of the one thousand, eight thousand (1,800) questionnaires administered, one thousand, seven hundred and ninety three (1,793) were duly completed and returned (Delta State 798 and Oyo State 995). This represented approximately 99.7% of the total questionnaires administered by the researcher.

The following tables showed the responses to the questions asked in section A of the questionnaire.

4.2 Data Presentation and Analysis

SECTION A Socio-Bio-data

Table 4.1 Summary of Responses Based on Sex

Sex	Number	Percentages
Male	1,121	62.5%
Female	672	37.5%
Total	1,793	100

Source: Field work 2017

From the results of the data collected, it was found that out of the 1,793 persons sampled, one thousand, one hundred and twenty one (1,121) constituting approximately 62.5% of the respondents were male, while six hundred and seventy two (672) persons constituting 37.5% were female.

A pie chart showing percentage of responses based on sex is presented in Figure 4.1a




Figure 4.1a: Sex Percentage Distribution
Sources, Field Work: 2017


Table 4.2: Summary of Responses Based on Age

Age	Number	Percentages
18- 28 years	147	8.2%
29 – 39 years	567	31.6%
40 – 50 years	475	26.5%
50 – Above	604	33.7%
Total	1,793	100

Source: Field work 2017


From the table above, it was discovered that 147 persons, constituting approximately 8.2% of the sampled population falls within the age bracket of 18 -28 years; 567 persons constituting 31.6% falls within the age bracket of 29 – 39 years and 475 persons constituting approximately 26.5% falls within the age bracket of 40– 50 years and 604 persons constituting 33.7% falls within the age bracket of 50 years and above.

Figure 4.2a Age Bracket Frequency Distribution



Sources, FieldWork:2017

Figure 4.2b Age Bracket Percentage Distribution



Sources, Field Work:2017


Table 4.3 Summary of Responses Based on Group/Designation

Designation/cadre/group	Number		Total	Percentages	
	Delta	Oyo			
Civil Society Organizations	151	170	321	8.4%	9.5%
Civil /public servants	125	167	292	7.0%	9.3%
Women Groups	120	160	280	6.7%	8.9%
Coalition of Political Parties	162	173	335	9.2%	9.6%
Traditional/Community Leaders	115	165	280	6.4%	9.0%
Youth Organizations	125	160	285	7.3%	6.7%
Total	798	995	1,793	45%	55%

Source: Field work 2017


From the above data, it was discovered that 321 members of the sampled population, constituting aggregately 17.9% of the population were members of civil society organizations sampled from Delta and Oyo states, 292 respondents constituting aggregately 16.3% of the sampled population were civil /public servants sampled from both states, 280 respondents constituting aggregately 15.6% were from the women groups from Delta and Oyo states, 335 respondents constituting aggregately 18.8% were sampled from coalitions of political parties from both Delta and Oyo states. On the other hand, 280 persons constituting aggregately 15.4% were from the traditional/community leaders group sampled from both Delta and Oyo states, 285 respondents constituting aggregately 14% were members of youth organizations, sampled from both states.

Figure 4.3a: Designation Frequency Distribution of respondents from Delta and Oyo states




Sources, Field Work: 2017

Figure 4.3b: Designation Percentage Distribution of respondents from Delta state



Source, Fieldwork:2017

Figure 4.3c: Designation of Percentage Distribution of respondents from Oyo States



Source, Filed Work: 2017


Table 4.4 Summary of Responses Based on Academic Qualifications

Qualifications	Number	Percentages
WASSC/NECO	127	7.1%
OND/NCE/DIP	493	27.5%
HND/B.SC/B.ED/B.A	751	41.9%
M.Sc/M.A/M.ED/Ph.D/ professional degrees other	422	23.5%
TOTAL	1,793	100%

Sources: Field work 2017


The table above showed that 127 respondents constituting 7.1% of the sampled population possessed the Senior School Secondary certificates. 493 respondents constituting approximately 27.5% of the sampled population possessed Ordinary National Certificates, while 751 persons constituting 41.9% of the sampled population possessed First degree Certificates and 422 persons constituting approximately 23.5% of the sample population possessed post- graduate degree Certificates.

Figure 4.4a: Educational Qualification Frequency Distribution



Source, Fieldwork:2017

Figure 4.4b: Academic Qualification Percentage Distribution



Source, Fieldwork:2017

Table: 4.5 Summary of Responses to Question 18


The nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state as the main controller of the economy is a major source of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Responses	Number	Percentages
Strongly agree	1,038	57.9%
Agree	710	39.6%
Undecided	2	0.1%
Strongly disagree	26	1.4%
Disagree	17	1.0%
Total	1,793	100

Source: Field work 2017


From the above table it was established that 1,038 respondents, constituting approximately 57.9% of the sampled population strongly agreed with the assertion that the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state promote electoral violence. While, 710 respondents constituting approximately 39.6% also agreed; 2 persons were undecided, while 26 respondents constituting 1.4% strongly disagreed and 17 respondents constituting approximately 1.0% equally disagreed

Figure 4.5a: Responses to Research Question 18



Sources, FieldWork:2017

Figure 4.5b: Percentage Distribution.



Source, Field Work: 2017

Table 4.6 Summary of Responses to Question 19


Electoral violence is a major impediment to democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Responses	Number	Percentages
Strongly agree	1,024	57.1%
Agree	700	39.0%
Undecided	3	0.2%
Strongly disagree	28	1.6%
Disagree	38	2.1%
Total	1,793	100%

Source: Field work 2017


The table above established that 1,024 respondents constituting 57.1% of the sampled population asserted that electoral violence is a major impediment to democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, while 700 respondents constituting approximately 39.0%, also agree; 3 were undecided; 28 respondents, constituting approximately 1.6% strongly disagreed and 38 respondents constituting 2.1% disagree.

Figure 4.6a: Frequency Responses to Research Question 19



Sources, FieldWork:2017

Figure 4.6b: Percentage Distribution



Sources, FieldWork:2017

Table 4.7 Summary of Responses to Question 20


The Increasing electoral violence between 1999-2011 have negative impact on the democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Responses	Number	Percentages
Strongly agree	1,110	61.8%
Agree	645	36.0%
Undecided	6	0.5%
Strongly disagree	15	0.8%
Disagree	17	0.9%
Total	1,793	100%

Source: Field work 2017


From the above table, it was found out that 1,110 respondents constituting 61.8% of the sampled population strongly agree that increasing electoral violence has been the bane of successful democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. 645 constituting approximately 36.0% of the respondents also agree. On the other hand, 6 respondents were undecided. 15 respondents constituting approximately 0.8% strongly disagree, while 17 respondents constituting approximately 0.9% disagree with the assertion that intense electoral violence has been the bane of successful democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Figure 4.7a: Frequency Distribution to Research Question 20



Sources, Field Work:2017

Figure 4.7b: Percentage Frequency Distribution



Sources, FieldWork:2017

Table 4.8: Summary of Responses to Question 24

Poverty and unemployment among youths, is a major source of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic


Responses	Number	Percentages
Strongly agree	1,101	61.4%
Agree	648	36.1%
Undecided	5	0.3%
Strongly disagree	21	1.2%
Disagree	18	1.0%
Total	1,793	100%

Source: Field work 2017

The table above established that 1,101 respondents constituting approximately 61.4% of the sampled population strongly agreed with the assertion that poverty and unemployment of youths, is a major source of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. 648 constituting approximately 36.1% of the respondents equally agree, while 5 respondents representing 0.3% were undecided. On the other hand, 21 and 18 respondents constituting approximately 1.2% and 1.0% respectively were of the opinion


that acute poverty and unemployment of youths, is not a major source of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Figure 4.8a: Frequency Distribution



Sources, FieldWork:2017

4.8b Percentage Frequency Distribution



Sources, FieldWork:2017

Table 4.9: Summary of Responses to Question 25


Unabated corruption is a major factor in electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Responses	Number	Percentages
Strongly agree	1,151	64.2%
Agree	609	33.9%
Undecided	3	0.2%
Strongly disagree	19	1.1%
Disagree	11	0.6%
Total	1,793	100%

Source: Field work 2017


From the table above, it was discovered that 1,151 respondents constituting approximately 64.2% of the sampled population strongly agree with the assertion that Unabated corruption is a major factor in electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. 609 respondents constituting approximately 34.0% equally agree. On the other hand, 19 and 11 respondents constituting approximately 1.0% and 0.6% respectively strongly disagree and disagreed, while 3 respondents were undecided.

Figure 4.9a: Frequency Distribution



Sources, Field Work:2017

Figure 4.9b: Percentage Frequency Distribution



Source, Fieldwork:2017

SECTION B

4.3 TESTING OF HYPOTHESES

TESTING OF STATED HYPOTHESES FOR RESPONDENTS IN DELTA STATE

Hypothesis I

Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state.

To test this hypothesis, responses to question number 18 in the questionnaire were presented below and analysed with Chi-Square(X^2) statistical technique and interpreted.

TABLE 4.10: Observed Frequencies (FO) (5X6) Contingency Table

Responses	Civil Society organizations (A)	Coalition of political parties (B)	Civil/public servants (C)	Youth organizations (D)	Women groups (E)	Traditional/community leaders (F)	Row Total	%
Strongly agree	83	60	50	80	55	79	407	51%
Agree	49	57	61	66	50	62	345	43.2%
Undecided	2	1	0	1	1	3	8	1.0%
Strongly disagree	12	3	2	3	2	2	24	3.0%
Disagree	2	1	2	7	1	1	14	1.8%
Total	148	122	115	157	109	147	798	100

Source: Field work.2017

Step 1: Calculation of Expected Frequencies (Fe)

$$(x^2) = \sum \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e}$$

$$\text{Expected Frequency} = \frac{\text{Row Total} \times \text{Column Total}}{\text{Grand Total}}$$

Let: 1-30 Represent Row Total

While: A-F Represents Column Total

$$\text{Cell 1} = \frac{407 \times 148}{798} = 75.5$$

$$\text{Cell 2} = \frac{407 \times 122}{798} = 62.2$$

$$\text{Cell 3} = \frac{407 \times 115}{798} = 58.7$$

$$\text{Cell 4} = \frac{407 \times 157}{798} = 80.1$$

$$\text{Cell 5} = \frac{407 \times 109}{798} = 55.6$$

$$\text{Cell 6} = \frac{407 \times 147}{798} = 74.9$$

$$\text{Cell 7} = \frac{345 \times 148}{798} = 63.9$$

$$\text{Cell 8} = \frac{345 \times 122}{798} = 52.7$$

$$\text{Cell 9} = \frac{345 \times 115}{798} = 49.7$$

$$\text{Cell 10} = \frac{345 \times 157}{798} = 67.9$$

$$\text{Cell 11} = \frac{345 \times 109}{798} = 47.1$$

$$\text{Cell 12} = \frac{345 \times 147}{798} = 63.6$$

$$\text{Cell 13} = \frac{8 \times 148}{798} = 1.5$$

$$\text{Cell 14} = \frac{8 \times 122}{798} = 1.2$$

$$\text{Cell 15} = \frac{8 \times 115}{798} = 1.2$$

$$\text{Cell 16} = \frac{8 \times 157}{798} = 1.6$$

$$\text{Cell 17} = \frac{8 \times 109}{798} = 1.1$$

$$\text{Cell 18} = \frac{8 \times 147}{798} = 1.5$$

$$\text{Cell 19} = \frac{24 \times 148}{798} = 4.6$$

$$\text{Cell 20} = \frac{24 \times 122}{798} = 3.7$$

$$\text{Cell 21} = \frac{24 \times 115}{798} = 3.6$$

$$\text{Cell 22} = \frac{24 \times 157}{798} = 4.7$$

$$\text{Cell 23} = \frac{24 \times 109}{798} = 3.3$$

$$\text{Cell 24} = \frac{24 \times 147}{798} = 4.4$$

$$\text{Cell 25} = \frac{14 \times 148}{798} = 2.6$$

$$\text{Cell 26} = \frac{14 \times 122}{798} = 2.1$$

$$\text{Cell 27} = \frac{14 \times 115}{798} = 2.0$$

$$\text{Cell 28} = \frac{14 \times 157}{798} = 2.6$$

$$\text{Cell 29} = \frac{14 \times 109}{798} = 1.9$$

$$\text{Cell 30} = \frac{14 \times 147}{798} = 2.6$$

TABLE 4.11: Step 2: Computation of Chi-square (5x6) Contingency Table Formula (x^2)

CELLS	F0	Fe	(F0 – Fe)	(F0 – F e) ²	$\frac{(F0 - Fe)^2}{Fe}$
1	83	75.5	7.5	56.3	0.7
2	60	62.2	2.2	4.8	0.1
3	50	58.7	8.7	75.7	1.3

4	80	80.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
5	55	45.6	9.4	88.4	1.9
6	79	71.9	6.9	47.6	0.7
7	49	63.9	-14.9	222.0	3.5
8	57	52.7	4.3	18.5	4.3
9	61	49.7	11.3	127.7	2.6
10	60	67.9	-7.9	62.4	7.9
11	50	47.1	2.9	8.4	0.2
12	62	53.6	8.4	70.6	1.3
13	2	1.5	0.5	0.3	0.2
14	1	1.2	0.8	0.6	0.5
15	-	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.2
16	1	1.6	-0.4	0.2	0.1
17	1	1.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1
18	3	1.5	1.5	2.3	1.5
19	12	4.6	7.4	54.8	11.9
20	3	1.7	1.3	1.7	0.9
21	2	3.6	-1.6	2.3	0.6
22	3	4.7	-1.3	1.7	0.4

23	2	3.3	-1.3	10.9	3.3
24	2	4.4	-2.4	5.8	1.3
25	2	2.6	-0.6	0.3	0.1
26	1	2.1	-1.1	1.2	0.6
27	2	2.0	0	0	0.0
28	7	2.6	4.4	19.4	7.4
29	1	1.9	0.9	0.8	0.4
30	1	2.6	1.4	2.0	0.7
Total	798	798			55.7

Source, FieldWork:2017

Degree of Freedom (Df) = (r-1) (c-1) = (No of Rows - 1) x (No of columns - 1)
 (6-1)(5-1) = (5) (4)

Df = 5 x 4 = 20

Step 3: Research Decision at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated χ^2 value = 55.7

Critical χ^2 value = 31.41

Df = 20

Alpha = 0.05

Step 4: Research Result/Interpretation and Decision.

The calculated value χ^2 of 55.7 is higher than that of the critical χ^2 value of 31.41 at an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a significant relationship between the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state and electoral violence in Delta State, Nigeria.

Hypothesis II

H₀: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

To test this hypothesis, responses to question number 19 in the questionnaire were presented below and analysed with Chi-square(X^2) statistical technique and interpreted.

TABLE 4.12: Observed Frequencies (FO) (5X6) Contingency Table

Responses	Civil Society organization (A)	Coalition of political parties (B)	Civil/public servants (C)	Youth organizations (D)	Women groups (E)	Traditional/community leaders (F)	Row Total	%
Strongly agree	80	60	61	75	55	70	401	57%
Agree	52	57	50	71	50	71	351	39%
Undecided	2	1	0	1	1	3	8	0.3%
Strongly disagree	2	3	2	5	4	2	18	1.6%
Disagree	12	1	2	3	1	1	20	2.1%
Total	148	122	115	157	109	147	798	100

Source: Field work.2017

Step 1: Calculation of Expected Frequencies (Fe)

$$(x^2) = \sum \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e}$$

$$\text{Expected Frequency} = \frac{\text{Row Total} \times \text{Column Total}}{\text{Grand Total}}$$

Let: 1-30 Represent Row Total

While: A-F Represents Column Total

$$\text{Cell 1} = \frac{401 \times 148}{798} = 74.5$$

$$\text{Cell 2} = \frac{401 \times 122}{798} = 61.3$$

$$\text{Cell 3} = \frac{401 \times 115}{798} = 57.8$$

$$\text{Cell 4} = \frac{401 \times 157}{798} = 78.9$$

$$\text{Cell 5} = \frac{401 \times 109}{798} = 54.8$$

$$\text{Cell 6} = \frac{401 \times 147}{798} = 73.9$$

$$\text{Cell 7} = \frac{351 \times 148}{798} = 65.1$$

$$\text{Cell 8} = \frac{351 \times 122}{798} = 53.7$$

$$\text{Cell 9} = \frac{351 \times 115}{798} = 50.6$$

$$\text{Cell 10} = \frac{351 \times 157}{798} = 69.1$$

$$\text{Cell 11} = \frac{351 \times 109}{798} = 47.9$$

$$\text{Cell 12} = \frac{351 \times 147}{798} = 64.7$$

$$\text{Cell 13} = \frac{8 \times 148}{798} = 1.5$$

$$\text{Cell 14} = \frac{8 \times 122}{798} = 1.2$$

$$\text{Cell 15} = \frac{8 \times 115}{798} = 1.2$$

$$\text{Cell 16} = \frac{8 \times 157}{798} = 1.6$$

$$\text{Cell 17} = \frac{8 \times 109}{798} = 1.1$$

$$\text{Cell 18} = \frac{8 \times 147}{798} = 1.5$$

$$\text{Cell 19} = \frac{18 \times 148}{798} = 3.3$$

$$\text{Cell 20} = \frac{18 \times 122}{798} = 2.8$$

$$\text{Cell 21} = \frac{18 \times 115}{798} = 2.6$$

$$\text{Cell 22} = \frac{18 \times 157}{798} = 3.7$$

$$\text{Cell 23} = \frac{18 \times 109}{798} = 2.5$$

$$\text{Cell 24} = \frac{18 \times 147}{798} = 3.3$$

$$\text{Cell 25} = \frac{18 \times 148}{798} = 3.3$$

$$\text{Cell 26} = \frac{20 \times 122}{798} = 3.1$$

$$\text{Cell 27} = \frac{20 \times 115}{798} = 2.9$$

$$\text{Cell 28} = \frac{20 \times 157}{798} = 3.9$$

$$\text{Cell 29} = \frac{20 \times 109}{798} = 2.7$$

$$\text{Cell 30} = \frac{20 \times 147}{798} = 3.9$$

TABLE 4.13:Step 2: Computation of Chi-square (5x6) Contingency Table Formula (x^2)

CELLS	F0	Fe	(F0 – Fe)	(F0 – F e) ²	$\frac{(F0 - Fe)^2}{Fe}$
1	80	74.5	5.5	30.3	0.4
2	60	61.3	1.7	2.9	0.1
3	61		3.2	10.6	0.2
4	75	78.9	-3.9	15.2	0.2
5	55	44.8	10.2	104.0	2.3
6	70		-3.9	15.2	0.2
7	52	65.1	-13.1	171.6	2.6
8	57		3.3	10.9	0.2
9	50		9.4	88.4	2.2
10	71	61.1	9.9	98.0	1.6
11	50	41.9	8.4	70.6	1.7
12	71	64.7	6.3	39.7	0.6
13	2		0.5	0.3	0.2
14	1	1.2	0.8	0.6	0.5
15	-	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.2
16	1	1.6	-0.4	0.2	0.1
17	1	1.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1

18	3		1.5	2.3	1.5
19	2	3.3	-1.3	1.7	0.5
20	3		1.2	1.4	0.5
21	2		-1.4	2.0	0.8
22	5		-1.3	1.7	0.5
23	4		-1.5	2.3	0.9
24	2		-1.3	1.7	0.5
25	12		8.7	75.7	22.9
26	1		-2.1	4.4	1.4
27	2		-0.9	0.8	0.3
28	3	1.9	1.1	1.2	0.6
29	1	2.7	0.9	0.8	0.3
30	1	3.9	-2.9	8.4	2.2
Total	798	798			47.2

Degree of Freedom (Df) = (r-1) (c-1) = (No of Rows - 1) x (No of columns - 1)
(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)

Df = 5 x 4 =20

Step 3: Research Decision at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated value of $X^2 = 47.2$

Critical Value $X^2 = 31.41$

Df = 20

Alpha= 0.05

Step 4: Research Result/Interpretation and Decision.

The calculated χ^2 of 47.22 is higher than that of the critical χ^2 value of 31.41 at an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic in Delta State.

Hypotheses III

H₀: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

To test this hypothesis, responses to question number 20 in the questionnaire were presented below and analysed with Chi-square(χ^2) statistical technique and interpreted

TABLE 4.13: Observed Frequencies (FO) (5X6) Contingency Table

Responses	Civil Society organization (A)	Coalition of political parties (B)	Civil/public servant (C)	Youth organizations (D)	Women groups (E)	Traditional/community leaders (F)	Row Total	%
Strongly agree	87	77	56	86	65	90	461	61.8%
Agree	45	40	55	60	40	51	291	36%
Undecided	1	1	0	1	1	1	5	0.5%
Strongly disagree	3	3	2	5	4	4	21	0.8%
Disagree	8	1	2	3	5	1	20	0.9%
Total	144	122	115	155	115	147	798	100

Source: Field work.2017

Step 1: Calculation of Expected Frequencies (Fe)

$$(\chi^2) = \sum \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e}$$

$$\text{Expected Frequency} = \frac{\text{Row Total} \times \text{Column Total}}{\text{Grand Total}}$$

Let: 1-30 Represent Row Total

While, A-F Represents Column Total

$$\text{Cell 1} = \frac{461 \times 144}{798} = 83.2$$

$$\text{Cell 2} = \frac{461 \times 122}{798} = 70.5$$

$$\text{Cell 3} = \frac{461 \times 115}{798} = 66.4$$

$$\text{Cell 4} = \frac{461 \times 155}{798} = 89.5$$

$$\text{Cell 5} = \frac{461 \times 115}{798} = 66.4$$

$$\text{Cell 6} = \frac{461 \times 147}{798} = 84.9$$

$$\text{Cell 7} = \frac{291 \times 144}{798} = 52.5$$

$$\text{Cell 8} = \frac{291 \times 122}{798} = 41.9$$

$$\text{Cell 9} = \frac{291 \times 115}{798} = 56.5$$

$$\text{Cell 10} = \frac{291 \times 155}{798} = 44.5$$

$$\text{Cell 11} = \frac{291 \times 115}{798} = 41.9$$

$$\text{Cell 12} = \frac{291 \times 147}{798} = 53.6$$

$$\text{Cell 13} = \frac{5 \times 144}{798} = 0.9$$

$$\text{Cell 14} = \frac{5 \times 122}{798} = 0.7$$

$$\text{Cell 15} = \frac{5 \times 115}{798} = 0.7$$

$$\text{Cell 16} = \frac{5 \times 155}{798} = 0.9$$

$$\text{Cell 17} = \frac{5 \times 115}{798} = 0.7$$

$$\text{Cell 18} = \frac{5 \times 147}{798} = 0.9$$

$$\text{Cell 19} = \frac{21 \times 144}{798} = 3.8$$

$$\text{Cell 20} = \frac{21 \times 122}{798} = 3.2$$

$$\text{Cell 21} = \frac{21 \times 115}{798} = 3.0$$

$$\text{Cell 22} = \frac{21 \times 155}{798} = 4.1$$

$$\text{Cell 23} = \frac{21 \times 115}{798} = 3.0$$

$$\text{Cell 24} = \frac{21 \times 147}{798} = 3.9$$

$$\text{Cell 25} = \frac{20 \times 144}{798} = 3.6$$

$$\text{Cell 26} = \frac{20 \times 122}{798} = 3.1$$

$$\text{Cell 27} = \frac{20 \times 115}{798} = 2.9$$

$$\text{Cell 28} = \frac{20 \times 155}{798} = 3.9$$

$$\text{Cell 29} = \frac{20 \times 115}{798} = 2.9$$

$$\text{Cell 30} = \frac{20 \times 147}{798} = 3.7$$

TABLE 4.14: Step 2: Computation of Chi-square (5x6) Contingency Table Formula (x^2)

CELLS	F0	Fe	(F0 – Fe)	(F0 – Fe) ²	$\frac{(F0 - Fe)^2}{Fe}$
1	87	83.2	3.8	14.4	0.2
2	77	70.5	6.5	42.3	0.6
3	56		-10.4	108.2	1.6
4	86	89.5	-3.5	12.3	0.1
5	65	36.4	28.6	817.9	22.5
6	90		5.1	26.0	0.3
7	45	52.5	-7.5	56.3	1.1
8	40		-1.9	3.6	0.1
9	55		-1.5	2.3	0.0
10	60	44.5	15.5	240.3	5.4
11	40	41.9	-1.1	1.2	0.0
12	51	53.6	-2.6	6.8	0.1
13	1		0.1	0.0	0.0
14	1	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.1
15	-	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.7
16	1	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.0

17	1	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.0
18	1		0.1	0.0	0.0
19	3	3.8	-0.8	0.6	0.2
20	3		-0.2	0.0	0.0
21	2		-1.0	1.0	0.3
22	5		0.9	0.8	0.2
23	4		1.0	1.0	0.3
24	4		0.1	0.0	0.0
25	8		4.4	19.4	5.4
26	1		-2.1	4.4	1.4
27	2		-0.9	0.8	0.3
28	3	3.9	0.9	0.8	0.2
29	5	2.9	2.1	4.4	1.5
30	1		-2.7	7.3	1.9
Total	798				44.5

Source, FieldWork:2017

Degree of Freedom (Df) = (r-1) (c-1) = (No of Rows - 1) x (No of columns - 1)

(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)

Df = 5 x 4 =20

Step 3: Research Decision at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated X^2 value = 44.5

Critical value $X^2 = 31.4$

Df = 20

Alpha= 0.05

Step 4: Research Result/Interpretation and Decision.

The calculated value of X^2 of 44.5 is higher than that of the critical X^2 value of 31.41 at an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic in Delta State.

TESTING OF STATED HYPOTHESES FOR RESPONDENTS IN OYO STATE

HypothesisI

Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state.

To test this hypothesis, responses to question number 18 in the questionnaire were presented below and analysed with Chi-Square(X^2) statistical technique and interpreted.

TABLE 4.15: Observed Frequencies (FO) (5X6) Contingency Table

Responses	Civil Society organizations (A)	Coalition of political parties (B)	Civil/public servants (C)	Youth organizations (D)	Women groups (E)	Traditional/community leaders (F)	Row Total	%
Strongly agree	89	79	70	80	77	79	474	47.6%

Agree	61	65	61	79	81	72	419	42.1%
Undecided	2	1	9	5	1	3	20	2.1%
Strongly disagree	11	8	6	4	4	2	35	3.5%
Disagree	7	14	14	5	2	4	47	4.7%
Total	170	167	160	173	165	160	995	100

Source: Field work.2017

Step 1: Calculation of Expected Frequencies (Fe)

$$(x^2) = \sum \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e}$$

Expected Frequency e = $\frac{\text{Row Total} \times \text{Column Total}}{\text{Grand Total}}$

Let: 1-30 Represent Row Total

While: A-F Represents Column Total

$$\text{Cell 1} = \frac{474 \times 170}{995} = 80.98$$

$$\text{Cell 2} = \frac{474 \times 167}{995} = 79.55$$

$$\text{Cell 3} = \frac{474 \times 160}{995} = 76.22$$

$$\text{Cell 4} = \frac{474 \times 173}{995} = 82.41$$

$$\text{Cell 5} = \frac{474 \times 165}{995} = 78.60$$

$$\text{Cell 6} = \frac{474 \times 160}{995} = 76.22$$

$$\text{Cell 7} = \frac{419 \times 170}{995} = 71.58$$

$$\text{Cell 8} = \frac{419 \times 167}{995} = 70.32$$

$$\text{Cell 9} = \frac{419 \times 160}{995} = 67.37$$

$$\text{Cell 10} = \frac{419 \times 173}{995} = 72.85$$

$$\text{Cell 11} = \frac{419 \times 165}{995} = 69.48$$

$$\text{Cell 12} = \frac{419 \times 160}{995} = 67.38$$

$$\text{Cell 13} = \frac{20 \times 170}{995} = 3.41$$

$$\text{Cell 14} = \frac{20 \times 167}{995} = 3.35$$

$$\text{Cell 15} = \frac{20 \times 160}{995} = 3.22$$

$$\text{Cell 16} = \frac{20 \times 173}{995} = 3.48$$

$$\text{Cell 17} = \frac{20 \times 165}{995} = 3.32$$

$$\text{Cell 18} = \frac{20 \times 160}{995} = 3.22$$

$$\text{Cell 19} = \frac{35 \times 170}{995} = 5.98$$

$$\text{Cell 20} = \frac{35 \times 167}{995} = 5.87$$

$$\text{Cell 21} = \frac{35 \times 160}{995} = 5.63$$

$$\text{Cell 22} = \frac{35 \times 173}{995} = 6.09$$

$$\text{Cell 23} = \frac{35 \times 165}{995} = 5.80$$

$$\text{Cell 24} = \frac{35 \times 160}{995} = 5.63$$

$$\text{Cell 25} = \frac{47 \times 170}{995} = 8.03$$

$$\text{Cell 26} = \frac{47 \times 167}{995} = 7.89$$

$$\text{Cell 27} = \frac{47 \times 160}{995} = 7.56$$

$$\text{Cell 28} = \frac{47 \times 173}{798} = 8.17$$

$$\text{Cell 29} = \frac{47 \times 165}{798} = 7.79$$

$$\text{Cell 30} = \frac{47 \times 160}{798} = 7.56$$

TABLE 4.16: Step 2: Computation of Chi-square (5x6) Contingency Table Formula (x^2)

CELLS	F0	Fe	(F0 – Fe)	(F0 – F e) ²	$\frac{(F0 - Fe)^2}{Fe}$
1	89	80.98	8.11	65.8	0.8
2	79	79.55	-0.55	0.3	0.0
3	70		-6.22	38.7	0.5
4	80	82.41	-2.41	5.8	0.1
5	77	78.60	-1.6	2.6	0.0
6	79		2.78	7.7	0.1
7	61	81.58	-20.58	421.9	5.2
8	65		-5.32	28.3	0.4
9	61		11.63	135.3	2.7

10	79	72.85	6.15	37.8	0.5
11	81	69.48	11.52	132.7	1.9
12	72	67.38	4.62	21.3	0.3
13	2		-1.41	2.0	0.6
14	1	3.35	-2.35	5.5	1.7
15	9	3.22	5.78	33.4	10.4
16	5	3.48	1.52	2.3	0.7
17	1	3.32	-2.32	5.4	1.6
18	3		-0.22	0.1	0.0
19	11	5.98	5.02	25.2	4.2
20	8		6.13	35.6	19.0
21	6		0.37	0.1	0.0
22	4		-2.09	4.4	0.7
23	4		-1.8	3.2	0.6
24	2		-3.63	13.2	2.3
25	7		-1.03	1.1	0.1
26	14		11.11	123.4	42.7
27	14		6.44	41.5	5.5

28	5		-3.17	10.1	1.2
29	2	7.79	-5.79	33.5	4.3
30	4		-3.56	12.7	1.7
Total	995				109.9

Source, FieldWork:2017

Degree of Freedom (Df) = (r-1) (c-1) = (No of Rows - 1) x (No of columns - 1)
 (6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)

Df = 5 x 4 =20

Step 3: Research Decision at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated value of $X^2 = 109.9$

Critical x^2 value = 31.4

Df = 20

Alpha= 0.05

Step 4: Research Result/Interpretation and Decision.

The calculated value of X^2 of 109.9 is higher than that of the critical X^2 value of 31.41 at an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a significant relationship between the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state and electoral violence in Oyo State, Nigeria.

Hypothesis II

Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

To test this hypothesis, responses to question number 19 in the questionnaire were presented below and analysed with Chi-square(X^2) statistical technique and interpreted.

TABLE 4.17: Observed Frequencies (FO) (5X6) Contingency Table

Responses	Civil Society organization (A)	Coalition of political parties (B)	Civil/public servant (C)	Youth organizations (D)	Women groups (E)	Traditional/community leaders (F)	Row Total	%
Strongly agree	80	74	72	89	75	81	471	47.3%
Agree	70	70	59	70	83	70	422	44.2%
Undecided	1	4	4	1	5	3	18	1.8%
Strongly disagree	9	8	6	4	14	7	48	4.7%
Disagree	7	14	4	5	2	4	36	3.0%
Total	167	170	145	169	179	165	995	100

Source: Field work.2017

Step 1: Calculation of Expected Frequencies (Fe)

$$(x^2) = \sum \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e}$$

Expected Frequency = $\frac{\text{Row Total} \times \text{Column Total}}{\text{Grand Total}}$

Let: 1-30 Represent Row Total

While, A-F Represents Column Total

$$\text{Cell 1} = \frac{471 \times 167}{995} = 79.05$$

$$\text{Cell 2} = \frac{471 \times 170}{995} = 80.47$$

$$\text{Cell 3} = \frac{471 \times 145}{995} = 68.64$$

$$\text{Cell 4} = \frac{471 \times 169}{995} = 79.99$$

$$\text{Cell 5} = \frac{471 \times 179}{995} = 87.73$$

$$\text{Cell 6} = \frac{471 \times 165}{995} = 78.12$$

$$\text{Cell 7} = \frac{422 \times 167}{995} = 70.82$$

$$\text{Cell 8} = \frac{422 \times 170}{995} = 72.10$$

$$\text{Cell 9} = \frac{422 \times 145}{995} = 61.49$$

$$\text{Cell 10} = \frac{422 \times 169}{995} = 71.68$$

$$\text{Cell 11} = \frac{422 \times 179}{995} = 83.55$$

$$\text{Cell 12} = \frac{422 \times 165}{995} = 69.97$$

$$\text{Cell 13} = \frac{18 \times 167}{995} = 3.02$$

$$\text{Cell 14} = \frac{18 \times 170}{995} = 3.07$$

$$\text{Cell 15} = \frac{18 \times 145}{995} = 2.62$$

$$\text{Cell 16} = \frac{18 \times 169}{995} = 3.06$$

$$\text{Cell 17} = \frac{18 \times 179}{995} = 3.24$$

$$\text{Cell 18} = \frac{18 \times 165}{995} = 2.98$$

$$\text{Cell 19} = \frac{48 \times 167}{995} = 8.05$$

$$\text{Cell 20} = \frac{48 \times 170}{995} = 8.20$$

$$\text{Cell 21} = \frac{48 \times 145}{995} = 6.99$$

$$\text{Cell 22} = \frac{48 \times 169}{995} = 8.15$$

$$\text{Cell 23} = \frac{48 \times 179}{995} = 8.63$$

$$\text{Cell 24} = \frac{48 \times 165}{995} = 7.96$$

$$\text{Cell 25} = \frac{36 \times 167}{995} = 6.04$$

$$\text{Cell 26} = \frac{36 \times 170}{995} = 6.15$$

$$\text{Cell 27} = \frac{36 \times 145}{995} = 5.25$$

$$\text{Cell 28} = \frac{36 \times 169}{995} = 6.11$$

$$\text{Cell 29} = \frac{36 \times 179}{955} = 6.47$$

$$\text{Cell 30} = \frac{36 \times 165}{995} = 5.97$$

TABLE 4.18: Step 2: Computation of Chi-square (5x6) Contingency Table Formula (χ^2)

CELLS	F0	Fe	(F0 – Fe)	(F0 – F e) ²	$\frac{0 - Fe)^2}{Fe}$
1	80	79.05	0.95	0.9	0.0
2	74	80.47	-6.47	41.9	0.5
3	72		3.36	11.3	0.2
4	89	79.99	9.01	81.2	1.0

5	75	87.73	-12.73	162.1	1.8
6	81		2.88	8.3	0.1
7	70	60.82	9.18	84.3	1.4
8	70		-2.82	8.0	0.1
9	59		17.51	306.6	7.4
10	70	61.68	8.32	69.2	1.1
11	83	73.55	9.45	89.3	1.2
12	70	61.97	8.21	67.4	1.1
13	1		-2.02	4.1	1.4
14	4	3.07	0.93	0.9	0.3
15	4	2.62	1.37	1.9	0.7
16	1	3.06	-2.06	4.2	1.4
17	5	3.24	1.76	3.1	0.9
18	3		0.02	0.0	0.0
19	9	1.05	7.95	63.2	60.2
20	8		6.8	46.2	38.5
21	6		-0.99	2.0	0.1
22	4		-4.15	17.2	2.1
23	14		11.38	129.5	49.4

24	7		-0.96	0.9	0.1
25	7		4.96	24.6	12.1
26	14		11.85	140.4	65.3
27	4		1.75	3.1	0.6
28	5		-1.11	1.2	0.2
29	2	6.74	-4.74	22.5	3.3
30	4		-1.97	3.9	0.7
Total	995				253.3

Source, FieldWork:2017

Degree of Freedom (Df) = (r-1) (c-1) = (No of Rows - 1) x (No of columns - 1)
(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)

Df = 5 x 4 =20

Step 3: Research Decision at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated value of $X^2 = 253.3$

Critical x^2 value = 31.41

Df = 20

Alpha= 0.05

Step 4: Research Result/Interpretation and Decision.

The calculated value of X^2 of 253.3 is higher than that of the critical X^2 value of 31.41 at an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic as shown in Oyo State.

Hypotheses III

Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

To test this hypothesis, responses to question number 20 in the questionnaire were presented below and analysed with Chi-square(X^2) statistical technique and interpreted.

TABLE 4.19: Observed Frequencies (FO) (5X6) Contingency Table

Responses	Civil Society organization (A)	Coalition of political parties (B)	Civil/public servant (C)	Youth organizations (D)	Women groups (E)	Traditional/community leaders (F)	Row Total	%
Strongly agree	65	94	82	90	73	71	475	47.3%
Agree	95	50	49	69	85	70	418	44.2%
Undecided	-	-	2	3	3	3	11	1.8%
Strongly disagree	9	8	6	6	10	7	46	4.7%
Disagree	10	12	4	5	6	8	45	3.0%
Total	179	164	143	173	177	159	995	100

Source: Field work.2017

Step 1: Calculation of Expected Frequencies (Fe)

$$(x^2) = \sum \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e}$$

$$\text{Expected Frequency } e = \frac{\text{Row Total} \times \text{Column Total}}{\text{Grand Total}}$$

Let: 1-30 Represent Row Total

While: A-F Represents Column Total

$$\text{Cell 1} = \frac{475 \times 179}{995} = 85.45$$

$$\text{Cell 2} = \frac{475 \times 164}{995} = 78.29$$

$$\text{Cell 3} = \frac{475 \times 143}{995} = 68.27$$

$$\text{Cell 4} = \frac{475 \times 173}{995} = 82.58$$

$$\text{Cell 5} = \frac{475 \times 177}{995} = 84.49$$

$$\text{Cell 6} = \frac{475 \times 159}{995} = 75.90$$

$$\text{Cell 7} = \frac{418 \times 179}{995} = 75.19$$

$$\text{Cell 8} = \frac{418 \times 164}{995} = 68.89$$

$$\text{Cell 9} = \frac{418 \times 143}{995} = 60.07$$

$$\text{Cell 10} = \frac{418 \times 173}{995} = 72.68$$

$$\text{Cell 11} = \frac{418 \times 177}{995} = 74.36$$

$$\text{Cell 12} = \frac{418 \times 159}{995} = 66.79$$

$$\text{Cell 13} = \frac{11 \times 179}{995} = 1.97$$

$$\text{Cell 14} = \frac{11 \times 164}{995} = 1.81$$

$$\text{Cell 15} = \frac{11 \times 143}{995} = 1.58$$

$$\text{Cell 16} = \frac{11 \times 173}{995} = 1.91$$

$$\text{Cell 17} = \frac{11 \times 177}{995} = 1.96$$

$$\text{Cell 18} = \frac{11 \times 159}{995} = 1.76$$

$$\text{Cell 19} = \frac{46 \times 179}{995} = 8.27$$

$$\text{Cell 20} = \frac{46 \times 164}{995} = 7.58$$

$$\text{Cell 21} = \frac{46 \times 143}{995} = 6.61$$

$$\text{Cell 22} = \frac{46 \times 173}{995} = 7.99$$

$$\text{Cell 23} = \frac{46 \times 177}{995} = 8.18$$

$$\text{Cell 24} = \frac{46 \times 159}{995} = 7.35$$

$$\text{Cell 25} = \frac{45 \times 179}{995} = 8.09$$

$$\text{Cell 26} = \frac{45 \times 164}{995} = 7.42$$

$$\text{Cell 27} = \frac{45 \times 143}{995} = 6.47$$

$$\text{Cell 28} = \frac{45 \times 173}{995} = 7.82$$

$$\text{Cell 29} = \frac{45 \times 177}{955} = 8.0$$

$$\text{Cell 30} = \frac{45 \times 159}{995} = 7.19$$

TABLE 4.20: Step 2: Computation of Chi-square (5x6) Contingency Table Formula (χ^2)

CELLS	F0	Fe	(F0 – Fe)	(F0 – Fe) ²	$\frac{(F0 - Fe)^2}{Fe}$
1	65	85.45	-20.45	418.2	4.9
2	94	78.29	15.71	246.8	3.2
3	82		13.73	188.5	2.8
4	90	82.58	7.42	55.1	0.7
5	93	84.99	8.01	64.2	0.8
6	71		-4.5	20.3	0.3
7	95	75.19	19.81	392.4	5.2
8	50		-18.89	356.8	5.2
9	49		-11.67	136.2	2.2
10	69	72.66	-3.66	13.4	0.8
11	85	74.36	10.64	113.2	1.5
12	70	66.79	3.21	10.3	0.0
13	-		-1.98	3.9	1.9
14	-	-1.81	-1.81	3.3	1.8
15	2	1.58	0.42	0.2	0.1
16	3	1.91	1.09	1.2	0.6
17	3	1.96	1.04	1.1	0.6
18	3		1.24	1.5	0.9

19	9	8.27	0.73	0.5	0.1
20	8		1.39	1.9	0.3
21	6		-1.99	3.9	0.5
22	6		-2.18	4.8	0.6
23	10		7.65	58.5	24.9
24	7		-1.09	1.2	0.5
25	10		2.58	6.7	0.9
26	12		5.53	30.6	4.7
27	4		-3.82	14.6	1.9
28	5		-3.0	9.0	1.1
29	6	8.0	-2.0	4.0	0.5
30	8		0.81	0.7	0.1
Total	995				69.4

Source, FieldWork:2017

Degree of Freedom (Df) = (r-1) (c-1) = (No of Rows - 1) x (No of columns - 1)

(6-1)(5-1) = (5) (4)

Df = 5 x 4 = 20

Step 3: Research Decision at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated value of $X^2 = 69.4$

Critical value of $X^2 = 31.41$

Df = 20

Alpha = 0.05

Step 4: Research Result/Interpretation and Decision.

The calculated value of X^2 of 69.4 is higher than that of the critical value of X^2 of 31.41 at an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic as demonstrated in Oyo State.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

Introduction

The primary objective of this thesis was to examine the impact of electoral violence on democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. In doing this, three hypotheses were raised and tested. These hypotheses were tested each for each state used for the study.

Hypothesis 1: There is no Significant Relationship between Electoral Violence and the Nature and dynamics of the Nigerian State.

The result of this hypothesis tested showed that there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state. This position was supported by works of numerous scholars and researchers. Jega (2003), contends that the crisis of the electoral system in Nigeria will be better understood if situated within the context of the nature of the political economy of the Nigerian state. The Nigerian state plays a dominant role in the national economy in the face of the underdevelopment of private capitalist enterprise. This throws up the state as a primary instrument of accumulation. As a facilitator of the capitalist development process, the Nigerian state is a major owner of the means of production. Resulting from the expanded oil revenues of the early 1970s, the state effectively dominated all aspects of the national political economy (Jega, 2000:30). This has made the state not only the biggest spender of resources but also the largest employer of labour. Adding to this assertion, Joseph (1991:56), opined that the expansion of petroleum production and the resultant increased revenues heightened the centrality of the state as the locus of the struggle for resources for personal advancement and group security. In this situation, access to the state becomes a platform and sources for primitive accumulation of wealth, Ake (2003:23)

equally captures the immensity and the ubiquity of state power under this situation when he observes that the state is everywhere and its power appears boundless. There is hardly any aspect of life in which the state does not exercise power and control. This makes the capture of state power singularly important, hence politicians and public office seekers use every available means to get state power with a view to controlling its resources for themselves and their cronies, ethnic groupings and friends. This selfish attribute of Nigerian elites and politicians have continued to heighten tension and upsurge of violence at every election.

The dynamics of the Nigerian state also encourage clientele relationships in Nigerian politics. Huntington, (2007:378) contends that this exists where the state controls opportunities for commerce and a wide range of jobs in the academics, administrative and legal fields. Within this context, politics means more than competition for political power but assumes the character of a desperate struggle for positions in the bureaucracy or for access to those who have influence over government decisions. (Leeds, 2001:353) Arising from the profitability of state power for primitive accumulation, due to the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state, the struggle for state power has been reduced to warfare by factions of the governing elite. In this struggle, commitment to public service and ethics of governance becomes secondary. Egwu, (2005) Thus, political power does not only represent the license to wealth, it is also the means to security and the only guarantor of general well-being. In the words of Ake, (2001:7), it is within this context of the dominant role of the state in the political economy that one can explain the desperation of Nigeria's governing elite for state power as evident in the brazen manipulation of the electoral process, many times with impunity and its resultant violence manifested at every level of government in the Nigerian state.

This dominant character and dynamics of the Nigerian state continue to endure even in the face of the prevailing hegemony of the free market regime, which preaches minimalist state intervention and privileges. Put differently, the gradual transformation of Nigeria into a market economy with the attendant disengagement of the state from social provisioning and cutback in public expenditures have not significantly reduced the struggle for the control of the economy of the Nigerian state among the governing elite.

To further buttress the findings of this thesis, Okolie (2005:434) asserted that the linkage between the state and electoral violence in Nigeria cannot be clearly understood outside the context of the nature and character of the Nigerian state. In his words Social science literature is replete with several strands of thoughts and explanations on the persisting and deepening incidences of electoral fraud and violence in Nigeria's body politics. However, these explanations appear to melt in the boiling pot of the character and parasitic nature of the Nigerian state. In Nigeria, state power and position have largely been used as instrument of personal, sectional, class or primordial interest. Ibrahim, (2000: 47) similarly noted that the Nigerian state has a patrimonial character where the distinction between the public and private domains is blurred and power which has become a major source of wealth is personalized.

As largely unproductive and parasitic group, the dominant class in Nigeria relies essentially on the acquisition of state power for survival and reproduction. Thus, the state in Nigeria, as in Marxist analysis has remained a veritable and potent instrument for the domination, deprivation, suppression and alienation of the many by the very few who control state power. Its post colonial character of an overdeveloped superstructure in comparison with its economic base has ensured as Miliband, (in Okolie, 2005: 435) notes, that the state is the source of economic power as well as an instrument of it. This inevitably results in a high premium placed on political power; making politics a zero sum game. Indeed, the spate and degree of electoral violence in Nigeria's electoral process is largely a product of a low level of autonomy of the Nigerian state – a situation which makes it possible for the political leadership to use the instruments of the state to commit acts of criminality and unmitigated electoral fraud resulting in the imposition of unpopular and unelected candidates on the people (Okolie, 2005: 436).

In supporting the result of this hypothesis, Etanibi (2011), opined that electoral violence in Nigeria is primarily due to the perception of politics and political office as investment and as an avenue for acquisition of extraordinary wealth through corruption, which otherwise not possible through any form of legitimate vocation and enterprise. As a result of this perception and reality, Nigeria politicians turn electioneering and elections into warfare in which violence and other forms of primordial sentiments and prejudices

are employed. It is against this background that former President Obasanjo Obasanjo perhaps counselled his party members to see the 2007 election as a do or die affair (Etanibi 2011:67).

The nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state seem to have made politics, the shortest cut to wealth and influence. Olaopa (2009) asserted that Politics means money and money means politics. In his words, Once politicians recognise or know the probability of having power, the party (and the individual members) naturally uses the same government to stay in power. The leadership becomes a self recruiting oligarchy and no self recruiting oligarchy has been known to tolerate oppositions to itself. In this situation, violence becomes an instrument for seeking power. In Nigeria, politicians and parties rigged elections in most blatant fashion - violence, corruption, arson, and brigandage are always employed in the mad desire to win and retain power both in the region and at the centre. Even the Political Bureau (1987) seems to agree with the findings of this study. The bureau as far back as 1987 noted that the nature of Nigeria democracy and its predicament is as a result of political violence right from 1960.

Omolulu (2007) added that the normlessness of the Nigerian state has given birth to political gladiators who constantly manipulated the people and political process to advance their selfish agenda. The Political gladiators vie for power and control over the vast spoil of office. The so-called godfathers cultivate and nurture personal militias (thugs) to secure their positions by promoting local arms race in their states and regions. Indeed, in the opinion of Omodia (2009), the character and dynamics of the Nigerian state encourage clientele politics in which the state controls opportunities for commerce and a wide range of jobs. The resultant impact of this is that politics means more than competition for political power but assumes the character of a desperate struggle, by the political class that is often reduced to warfare by factions of the governing elites. Commitment to public service and ethics of good governance become secondary. Thus, political (state) power not only represents licence for wealth, it also means security and guarantor of general well-being of those who have access to power and their kinsmen (Egwu, 2005).

Hypothesis 2: There is no Significant Relationship Between Electoral Violence And Democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

The result of this hypothesis showed clearly that there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, as shown in the results from Delta and Oyo states. This position was supported by the works of many scholars. Kurfi (2003) for instance noted that electoral violence has negatively impacted on the quest for deepening democratic rule in Nigeria. In the history of elections in Nigeria, only elections organized by the colonial master and the military that were minimally marred by violence. As for the military-supervised polls, Kurfi (2003:9) has perceptively observed that the absence of acute electoral violence could not be attributed to the internalization of a culture of tolerance but rather it was a consequence of the recognition of the threat of military retribution for possible breakdown of law and order as well as the possible extension of the transition programme. This position was also supported copiously by Anifowose (2002). He noted that election-based violence imperiled Nigeria's first democratic experiment with violence in Tivland and Yorubaland as the two significant cases. According to Anifowose, the violence in Tivland was a reaction to political intimidation and harassment of the opposition politicians by the ruling Northern Peoples Congress (NPC).

Egwu, (2007) also added his opinion to buttress the findings of this thesis by giving another historical account. In his words, electoral violence rear its head again during Nigeria's second attempt at constitutional rule between 1979 and 1983. The second election of Nigeria's Second Republic, which was organized by the Shehu Shagari civilian administration, was massively manipulated in favour of the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN). In a spontaneous reaction to the official results released by the election management body, Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), mayhem was unleashed on the two Southwest states of Oyo and Ondo. The violence was organized in protest against perceived manipulation of the governorship polls in the two states, widely acclaimed as electoral strongholds of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), in favour of the candidates of NPN, which controlled the centre. In addition to the heavy human and material losses suffered by political opponents, the headquarters of FEDECO

in Oyo and Ondo states were torched. With the collapse of the Second Republic in December 1983, four years after inauguration, Nigeria was again prone to prolonged years of military rule.

Democratic rule was restored in 1999 following the conclusion of the 1998/99 transition elections. Akume (2006) noted that if the transition elections that ushered in the Fourth Republic were not characterized by political violence and serious contestation of election results, the same can not be said of the 2003 general elections. The first to be organized by a civilian regime since the rebirth of democratic governance in 1999. The period following the 2003 polls was marked by organized violence, as well as by attempts at actual assassinations of political opponents and rivals. The elections themselves failed to meet basic international standards, though Nigeria passed the second election test through the 2003 polls. There was consensus among stakeholders of the Nigerian democratic project that the elections lack all known ingredients of democracy. For instance, Akume(2006) contends that the elections were characterized by large scale malpractices including rigging at all levels while General Muhammadu Buhari, who contested the 2003 presidential polls on the platform of All Nigerian Peoples Party(ANPP), described the election as a dark period in our history (Buhari,2006). The 2007 elections, in a profound manner, deepened electoral crisis in Nigeria. This is underscored by the huge size of election petitions that greeted the elections. Indeed, the elections will go down in history as the one that attracted the highest number of post-election litigations in Nigeria. Official results of the elections were contested at the three levels of governance: local, state and federal. Several results declared by Nigeria election management body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), were reversed by the election tribunals and the courts while the disputes that arose from the presidential election got settled in December 2008, nineteen months after the formal conclusion of the election. All these indicated that democracy has been and still operating under stress, unable to meet demands of the people of the Nigerian state.

Jega (2007: 249) added his opinion in support of the findings of this thesis by noting that elections in Nigeria have historically been conflict ridden. The campaigns preceding every elections are invariably marked by pettiness, intolerance, and violence.

There are many reported incidences of intra-party, as well as, inter-party, violence, conflicts, including abductions and assassinations. The elections and their outcome have not been free nor fair. Jega (2007). They have always been characterized by violations of the process, corrupt conduct by officials, rigging of results and so on. Again, various scholarly studies on electoral violence, indicate that incidences of election violence were pervasive during party primaries, and that some candidates were busy scheming to ensure favourable outcome for themselves, by hook or by crook, in future elections.

Usman,(2000), did not also differ in his opinion, as he argued that, Political violence over elections has been the phenomenon occurrence in Nigeria's democratic environment. He demonstrated that electoral violence of the forties and fifties had actually transformed political tension and crises and consequently wrecked all attempts by Nigerians to build and sustain democratic governance. Violence associated with elections have continued to rise perilously with new forms and dimensions introduced and old ones modified. The failure of stable democratic governance in Nigeria may not be unconnected with the nature, form, character, direction and dynamics of the Nigerian state and its system of economy. The pattern of the struggle for political power or democracy without its appropriate sustenance has produced the problem of democratic politics and practice in Nigeria today. He concluded that the problem of electoral violence generated from electoral process poses serious challenges and dilemmas to the democratization process in the country. To him, issues central to economic underdevelopment and weak institutional structures, political instability, legitimacy arising from electoral process and other ethnic, religious and sectional conflicts are all rooted and occasioned within the dynamic problem of democracy and governance. The question is: do democracy and democratic system have any relevant reflections in the economic, social and cultural lives of Nigerians and their struggles for liberation and freedom?

Ibeanu (2007) in lending his support to the findings of this thesis noted that with the nature, type and dimension of electoral delinquency in Nigeria, democratization process, over time and space, had been marked by eruption of political violence occasioned by elections. These types of violence particularly between 1999 and 2011

have plunged the country into a phenomenal and deep-seated crisis unparalleled since the era of the Nigerian civil war. Apart from violence emerging from the privatization of group violence, the system has also been transformed into state violence with the transformation of the ruling party militias to hold on to power by hook or by crook. The variety of tactics the incumbent regime (party) uses to manipulate the electoral process, right from the primaries, as well as the breaking up of the opposition are some of the political and democratic anathema experienced in our present democratic system. These have continued to weaken democratic institutions in the country.

Animashaun, (2008) in his view noted that in the five decades of Nigeria's existence as a sovereign nation, it has not fared satisfactorily in democratic politics or experiment with most of the years being in military rather than civilian and democratic system. When Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999, we noted the rush by the military for competitive elections. These turned out to be a big political gimmick for the country with the imposition of a former military dictator as president (Olusegun Obasanjo). The negative consequences this has had on democratic politics and democratization process are retrogressive and dangerous. During this period, human rights were openly abused, social and ethnic cleavages were intensified with unprecedented electoral violence and other forms of fraud. State corruption becomes a norm which destroyed the confidence and democratic euphoria Nigerians had been expecting, since the beginning of the 1999 transition programme that ushered in the Fourth Republic.

Since political contests in Nigeria represent what may be seen as means for primitive accumulation of wealth with other new and old inherited built-up relationships, it must be realized that it is only through elections that power is used and abused to reengineer rewards and punishments within and outside the ruling party with the flagrant use of the fraudulent activities and theft of state funds. Thus, elections are now preceded by a process of political and constitutional engineering under the pretext of establishing the requisite institutions and structures for democratic rule. Seldom have elections been a process whereby contending forces negotiate for the political viability of an even playing field. Incumbents have been preoccupied with the need to organize electoral system in

their favour as the surest way to maintain their stranglehold on political power (Debrah, 2005:127) .

Amuta, (2008) in support of the findings of this thesis noted that the problems of Nigeria's democratic politics with regard to the nature, dimension and violence that always characterize and accompany electoral process have fundamentally stifled the quest for democracy. Since electoral violence is a bane of democratic politics in Nigeria, elections conducted over time have significantly failed to produce legitimacy because election results, in one way or the other, have been juggled or inflated or annulled. All these have brought about political instability through challenging of election results in the courts of law and tribunals or protests or boycotts on grounds that the elections were rigged and other forms of malpractices employed to achieve victory.

The 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 general elections in Nigeria witnessed several dimensions of electoral violence. All these elections questioned the credibility of the democratic process and invariably posed serious challenges for democratic practice in the country. This is so because for an election to be legitimate, credible and democratic, it must provide and ensure fairness in competition and must guarantee basic freedom for equal contest with equitable distribution of resources among contestants. Democratic politics in Nigeria, particularly between 1999 and 2011, have retrogressed to autocracy due mainly to the elimination of all potential competitors, state sponsored assassinations and turning election contests into a matter of life and death(Nwolise, 2011).

The above assertion was supported by Human Rights Watch (2012), when the organization noted that since the return of Nigeria to civil rule in 1999, there have been politically motivated assassinations and other election related killings. All these have jeopardized Nigeria democratic project. A large number of Nigerians have lost their lives, many others displaced with properties worth billions of naira destroyed. These forces have turned the political climate into hostility, instability and uncertainty. Intra and inter party struggles have generated into party indiscipline, lawlessness with patron-client relationships dictating who stands or wins at any given elective position. The resultant effect of these fierce struggles have continued to pose serious challenges to the survival of democracy in the country.

From the above analyses, it is evident that democracy in Nigeria is under threat. Many of Nigeria's elected leaders obtained their positions by demonstrating abilities to use corruption and political violence to prevail in sham elections. These forces have denied millions of Nigerians any real voice in selecting their political leaders. Under such situations, it is very difficult for democracy to thrive.

Hypothesis III: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

The result from the third hypothesis also showed that there is a strong relationship between increasing electoral violence and democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, as demonstrated from the results gotten from Delta and Oyo State. The result is strongly supported by works of researchers such as (Salimano 2004, Aurel, 2005). They all contended that there exist a correlation between increasing electoral violence and successful democratization. Aurel (2005), for example, observed that violence is the greatest threat to democracy in developing countries. Snyder (2000), contends that the problems of Nigeria's democratic politics with regard to the nature, dimension and violence that always characterize and accompany electoral process have fundamentally stifled the quest for democracy. Since electoral violence is a bane of democratic politics in Nigeria, elections conducted over time have significantly failed to produce legitimacy because as election results, in one way or the other, have been juggled or inflated or annulled. All these have brought about political instability through challenging of election results in the court of law or protests or boycotts on grounds that the elections were rigged and other forms of malpractices employed.

Nwolise, (2011) added that democratic politics in Nigeria, particularly between 1999 and 2011, with regard to the development of electoral issues indicate that democratization process has retrogressed to autocracy partly due to the elimination of all potential competitors, state sponsored assassinations and turning election contests as a matter of life and death. He noted that since the return of Nigeria to civil rule in 1999, there have been politically motivated assassinations and other election related killings. All these have jeopardized Nigeria democratic project. A large number of Nigerians have lost their lives, many others displaced with properties worth billions of naira destroyed. These have turned the political climate into hostility, instability and uncertainty. Intra

and inter party conflicts directly and indirectly related to power struggles have generated into party indiscipline, lawlessness with patron-client relationships dictating who stands or wins any given elective position. The consequence of this has been fierce struggles and violence which have continued to pose serious challenges to the survival of democracy in the country.

The scenario described above made Ijim-Agbo (2007) to contend that the dilemma in the Nigerian democratic politics are numerous and complex. Whereas competition is a driving force in any democratic elections, Nigerians have mastered the ways and manners to manipulate and jettison it to their advantage. These, more often than not, generate into a spectre of controversies and blackmails leading to political acrimony, rancour and inevitability of violence, before, during and after any election. This no doubt constitutes an important component of the problematic of Nigerian democratic politics. To further highlights the impact of electoral violence on democracy Hoglund (2006), contends that electoral violence have had some dire consequences in Africa's new democracies. First, there are security implications for the continent in general, and affected countries in particular. Some notable security implications include the collapse of public order, the emergence of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the flow of refugees, and further militarisation of the state and society. Apart from the security challenges, Hoglund (2006) also asserted that electoral violence also accounts for a deep-seated legitimacy crisis across the country. In Nigeria, the constitutionality of the governments is being seriously challenged, not only by opposition forces, but also by the people. Some of the famous ways of protests include peaceful and violent ones – peaceful demonstration and litigations in electoral courts, and violent outbreaks resulting in killings, arson, looting, destruction of properties and the resultant imposition of curfew, and the militarisation of the state and society. These serve as potent sources of diverting government attention away from governance and towards consolidating its illegal/contested capture of power and managing the resulting conflicts. In Nigeria, it is not surprising to see that months after elections, there are still ongoing judicial proceedings or violent protests challenging the legitimacy of the government. This situation often hampers effective political competition and participation. Since might became right, as in the Hobbesian view of nature, only those with adequate

coercive power became main players. As such, the democratisation process is gradually facilitating the de-institutionalisation of the people to become mere clients, onlookers and/or consumers, instead of acting as the primary stakeholders of democracy. The attendant culture of political apathy represents a major threat to democratic consolidation.

In all, the persistent trends in electoral violence in Nigeria no doubt undermines democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Mainwarring and Scubly (2011) noted that electoral violence have undoubtedly weakened the political structures and institutions in Nigeria. In their words, It is important to note that democracy anywhere is sustained when built on virile and stable political structures and institutions. For instance, a strong and stable electoral system is a vital factor for an evolving democracy like that of Nigeria. Mainwarring and Scubly (2011), argued further that developing democracies like Nigeria needed a credible electoral system because according to them, a credible electoral system enhance and promote the positive attributes essential for democracy to thrive. Strong and stable political structures and institutions also help to establish in a democratic society, the fundamental rules and constraints that help to shape interactions in the body polity.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The biggest threat to any organized society is insecurity. Violence breeds insecurity while insecurity creates numerous other social ills which include ethnic clashes, communal disturbances, illegal arms trafficking, terrorism, secret cults, ethnic militias, electoral violence and other forms of disputes. One common trend in electoral violence in Nigeria is that it assumes higher sophistication with time. In today's politics in Nigeria, many actors on the political scene no longer see performance as a yardstick for determining who gets an elective position, rather, violence and other unorthodox means are employed. This definitely runs counter to any conceivable democratic principle. This thesis is thus seen as one in the series of the researches conducted to examine electoral violence and its impact on democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. To do this research, questions and hypotheses were outlined and empirically tested statistically to examine the impact of electoral violence on democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

5.2 Summary of Findings

On the bases of the analyses of the responses to questions derived from the hypotheses, the study demonstrated significant relationships in the three hypotheses tested. These were also portrayed in the data presented and analyzed in the various distribution tables, bar charts, pie charts and the chi-square analysis.

- i. For instance, the first hypothesis seek to examine if there is any significant relationship or not between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state. The results showed that there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state. This position was supported by a critical analysis of the responses to questions raised and tested through the Chi-square statistical tool. The calculated Chi-square value of 55.7 (Delta Sate) and 109.9 (for Oyo State) was greater than the critical table value of 31.41 at 0.05 alpha level of significance. The implication of this is that respondents from both states confirmed that there is a significant relationship

between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state. In other words, the study established the fact that the dynamic nature and character of the Nigerian state resulting from its dominant role in the economy as a measure of last resort to public office holders for wealth accumulation necessitated electoral violence in the country.

- ii. The second hypothesis tested also indicated that there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The calculated Chi-square value of 47.2 (for Delta State) and 253.3 (for Oyo State) was greater than the critical table value of 31.41 at 0.05 alpha level. In other words, electoral violence negates the tenets of democracy in Nigeria. The implication of this is that the country has not been able to create the enabling environment for investors to come in. The insecurity that emerged from the post 2011 general elections equally gave rise to the increasing upsurge of terrorist activities in the North Eastern part of the country by the Boko Haram sect, which today has created unfavourable atmosphere for democratic institutions to thrive.
- iii. The third hypothesis was raised to determine whether or not there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and successful democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The results showed that there is a significant relationship between electoral violence and successful democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The Chi-square analysis showed that the Calculated χ^2 value of 44.5 (for Delta State) and 69.4 (for Oyo State) is greater than the Critical χ^2 value of 31.41 at an alpha of 0.05. In other words, the study have also shown that the democratization process of all institutions of governance has been hampered by electoral violence since the inception of the Fourth Republic.
- iv. In the course of the study, some observations that also lend credence to the results of the hypotheses were made, and these were used to enrich the statistical analysis. Some of these observations include the fact that the party in power has continuously adulterated, through its strategies in maintaining the status quo, the electoral processes and procedures with what is called "consensus candidates" to perfect a deregulated or controlled elections which, more often than not, lead into violence and question the credibility of our democracy. The study also observed

an increasing trend in the sophistication of electoral violence in Nigeria. For example, in terms of the instruments and strategies, political assassinations of opponents have become the other of the day. The study observed that a new dimension to electoral violence has come to feature prominently as a product of aggravated provocations, extension of deep-seated and age long conflicts between individuals, groups, families and communities.

- i. Ethno-political cleavages were also observed to have remained one of the salient determinants of political and electoral violence in election related issues. Since electoral contest is characterized by competition, the Nigerian factor of continuous harassment, threats and intimidation of the opposition parties or 'enemies' within the ruling party, perhaps gives everybody an open ended licence to display physical and brute force to either protect or safeguard one's areas of political control. The ruling party often devices strategies to weaken opposition in order to exert absolute monopoly over electoral outcomes and loyalty. Formal and informal practices are also used like bribing the leadership of the opposition, or generate split within the opposition until members defect to the ruling party or even through the deceptive strategy of the government of national unity where opposition members take ministerial slots and other lucrative appointments.
- ii. Democratic politics guarantees intra-party democracy and provides for the selection of candidates for all the elective positions. This provides for standards and some measurement of fairness to gauge the consistency and reliability of the elective principles. Conventionally, the selection of party candidates to stand for elections on the platform of political parties at local, State or federal levels, is naturally to be contested for by all the prospective candidates at primary elections by delegates constitutionally chosen. The Nigerian experience as observed negates all known democratic principles. This act has had a very serious impact on democratic politics and exact negative consequences on the democratic system. Those who resist democratic procedures have continued to use violence against the party, thereby undermining democracy.
- iii. Another important aspect of the electoral process is the political party campaigns. This process is expected to articulate party manifestoes and market candidates to

voters. This is a period when the electorate should assess parties' programmes of actions and of course ideologies. These are expected to be conducted at peaceful rallies. Again, advertisement of programmes and candidates are to buttress issues of great concern without any rancour or violence. In Nigeria, since times past, political campaign processes have been marked with unfair practices which often involve the use of state own media by the ruling party to the disadvantage of the opposition party. This situation often generate rancour that sometimes snowball into violence during or after elections. Thus, the use of physical violence, intimidation and coercion to influence the outcome of elections is perhaps the most blatant perversion of the electoral process which has remained the feature of all elections in Nigeria.

- iv. A further observation made in the course of this thesis is that there seems to be a norm in Nigeria election that a candidate must have a gang of 'area boys' whom he pays to support him and attack his opponents. He must therefore demonstrate the superiority and monopoly of violence to scare the opponents' gangs and at the same time terrorize all persons during the electioneering campaigns/period and on election days. Agents stationed during the counting of votes are all part of the candidates' thugs who are to display all form of physical violence in order to make their candidates be declared the winner by hook or crook. This norm was visible in both Delta and Oyo States that were the focal point of the study. Thus, non-adherence to the rule of the game for competitive democratic elections has been seen as one of the major factors for electoral violence, that often arise through hate speeches, actions and other unorthodox democratic practices.
- v. A further finding of the thesis was that majority of the 'area boys' are usually made up of unemployed youths who see the period of elections as avenues for temporary jobs, and the hope of being members of the core group who may be on the pay rolls of their masters after victory.
- vi. In addition to the above findings, it was established that, unlike other African countries like Kenya and Mozambique that have been experiencing post-election violence, election violence is more intense during the election day in Nigeria,

except in the 2011 general elections when Nigeria witnessed post-election violence.

- vii. The study further discovered that election violence was more intense at the local and state levels than at the Federal levels because of the closeness of the candidates to the electorate.

5.3 Conclusion

In many respects, democratic consolidation process in the Nigerian situation is quite unique, particularly in examining the nature of the relationships between theory and practice. The contradictions in the society have demonstrated much of the substantive issues of the kind of democracy being practised. Persistent and endemic electoral violence in Nigeria over time have remained a log in the wheels of democratic politics and invariably portends ills for democracy. As elections held did not follow the rules of the game, there were no doubt fraught with fraud and endangered with excessive corruption as well as all forms of violence to property and humanity. The study concluded without any iota of doubt that democracy in Nigeria will continue to be a mirage in the face of undemocratic political culture, ethnic cleavages, weak political and democratic institutions and the investment mentality that is often attached to political processes in Nigeria. Evidently, politics has turned out to be a business venture where one acquires wealth and affluence supersonically. The crisis of democracy, its dilemma and challenges in Nigeria have indicated very fundamental socio-economic policy implications as reflected in the electoral process. Since the outcomes of elections are often known in advance, the electoral process in Nigeria is therefore a fraudulent exercise in futility. Thus electoral violence is, no doubt, a failure of the democratic practice, and a threat to sustainable democracy in Nigeria.

5.4 Recommendations

From the above findings and conclusion, the following recommendations were made:

First, given the nature of the structural underdevelopment in Nigeria, the exploitative nature of leadership and the extreme level of poverty among Nigerians, there is the need to mobilize human and natural resources to promote the economy in all forms, like genuine participation, politics of social equality, and electioneering campaigns.

There is also the need to combine forces and ideas especially between the legislature and judiciary to curb the executive excesses in its manipulative and maneuvering tactics. The courts have occasionally made some differences especially in the landmark judgments in Anambra, Edo, Ondo and Ekiti, Governorship election cases. The inability of the country to conduct free, fair, credible and acceptable elections will ultimately lead to the demise of the political and democratic system. Therefore, for democratic politics in Nigeria to be void of violence and enjoy both domestic and international legitimacy, the value orientations of the political elite must be transformed so that elections are not regarded as means to an end and end to everything.

Every level of government in the country, the local, state and federal level should embark on massive creation of job opportunities for the teeming youths. This is due to the fact that, one fact that stood out in the course of this thesis was the problem of mass unemployment of youths in the country. The statistics of unemployment in the country had shown that the unemployment trend is rising geometrically and this create a ready market for the recruitment of youths as thugs for rigging during elections in the country.

Nigeria's democracy must be mass oriented and founded on the configurations and circumstances of the Nigerian masses. Elite based democracy as currently the case will continue to fail in all respects. This is because elites are extremely individualistic and this individualism is a primary causal factor for the type of democracy Nigeria practices. Mass based democracy will provide access to basic resources needed to energize mass and active participation with zero-level violence in seeking for power. This will provide certain checks and balances which will prevent personalization and individualization of power, money politics and above all corrupt practices. However, this does not remove the possibility of a mass based democracy creating its set of new elites that may dominate the politics and behave like the old elites.

In addition to the suggestions already made, there is the need to de-emphasize the State as a measure of last resort. Public officers should be seen to serve the people who elected them to power and not the other way round. Major economic heights in the country should be private sector driven so as to reduce the competition for public offices. Furthermore, politicians should be least paid in the country so as to discourage them from offices and at the same time make such offices less attractive among others.

5.5 Contributions to Knowledge

The study has contributed to knowledge in the following ways:

- i. The study established the fact that persistent electoral violence at post-independence Nigeria have been largely responsible for the country's inability to sustain democracy in the Fourth Republic.
- ii. The consequence of electoral violence has impacted negatively on the country's practice of democracy.
- iii. There is a significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state in the Fourth Republic.
- iv. The study provides a peaceful process of political succession in Nigeria through elections.

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APPENDIX I

Department of Political Science,
Delta State University,
Abraka, Nigeria.

Dear Respondents,

I am a student of the Department of Political Science, Delta State University Abraka, undertaking a Survey research on Electoral Violence and its impact on Democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. A study of Delta and Oyo States.

This questionnaire is designed to solicit for your genuine opinions on questions on electoral violence and its impact on democracy in Nigeria. Your name may not be required as it is strictly for academic purpose. Your responses will be treated with strict confidence. Please tick from the boxes provided, your choice of answer. Thank you.

Agah Benjamin

**QUESTIONNAIRE ON ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN
NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: A STUDY OF DELTA AND OYO STATES**

SECTION A

Socio-Demographic Data

1. Sex: Male ☐ Female ☐
2. Age: 18 – 30 ☐ 31 – 45 ☐ 45 – above ☐
3. Educational background/qualifications
 - (a) Primary school learning certificate ☐
 - (b) NECO, WASC ☐
 - (c) OND/NCE ☐
 - (d) HND/B.Sc, B.Ed. ☐
 - (e) M.Sc/M.A/M.Ed/Ph.D. ☐
 - (f) Other Professions ☐
4. Nationality.....
5. Religion: Islamic ☐ Christianity ☐ African Traditional Religion ☐
6. State of Residence of respondent. Delta () Oyo ()

SECTION B: General Questions on Nigeria Elections and Politics

1. Did you vote in the elections of 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011
Yes ☐ ☐
2. If Yes, State your reasons for voting.
3. If No, State same.
4. Have you witnessed electoral violence since the inception of the Fourth Republic 1999-2011
Yes ☐ No ☐
5. If yes, in which of the elections 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 do you observed this trend
a) 1999 ☐ b) 2003 ☐ c) 2007 ☐ d) 2011. ☐ all of the them ☐
6. Do you see the political parties in the Fourth Republic representing the peoples' interests as manifested in the parties' manifestoes. Yes ☐ No ☐
7. What factor do you consider to play major role in membership recruitment of party members.
a) Money ☐ b) The personality of the person ☐ c) Educational qualifications
d) His contributions to his community in the past ☐
8. How are political parties funded in Nigeria's Fourth Republic
a) Members' contributions ☐
b) Subsidy from the three tiers of government ☐
c) Voluntary donations from members of the public ☐
9. Did the source of political party funding play any role in the choice of candidates for elective post in the Fourth Republic
a) Yes ☐ No ☐
10. Do you see reflection of past political party activities in the organizations and management of political parties in the Fourth Republic. a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐
11. If yes, does such trait has any impact in the functioning of party activities in the Fourth Republic. a) Yes ☐ No ☐
12. If yes, State such impact.
13. Do politicians in the Fourth Republic, service oriented towards the people who voted them into power. a) Yes ☐ No ☐

14. Do primordial interests play any role in the appointment of public officials after successful elections in the Fourth Republic. a) Yes ☐ b) ☐
15. In this Fourth Republic has ethnicity any role to play in the voting pattern and choice of candidate for election. a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐
16. At what level of elections in the Fourth Republic do we have intense electoral violence.
- a) Local government level ☐ b) Governorship level ☐
- c) Presidential level ☐ d) Houses of Assemblies ☐
17. Do you see electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic a result of a breakdown of national values
- a) Yes b) No ☐ ☐

SECTION C: Hypotheses Testing Questions

Likert Scale						
S/n	Questions	Responses				
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Strongly disagree	Disagree
		SA	A	UN	SD	D
18.	The nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state as the main controller of the economy is a major source of election violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.					
19.	Electoral violence is a major impediment to democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic					
20	The increasing electoral violence between 1999 – 2011 has negative impact in the democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic					
21	The control of Nigerian godfathers over their godsons, in the affairs, of governance, is a major cause of					

	increasing electoral violence in Nigeria politics in the Fourth Republic.					
22.	Electoral violence in Nigeria since the first republic up till date has signaled the non-emergence of nationally accepted political leadership in the country.					
23.	The appointment of the independent electoral commission's members, is a source of electoral violence in Nigeria politics in the Fourth Republic					
24.	Poverty and unemployment of youths, is a major source of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic					
25.	Unabated corruption is a major factor in electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.					