

**AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER  
PRESIDENT OLUSEGUN OBASANJO'S ADMINISTRATION,  
1999-2007**

BY

OKE, Christiantus Ifeanyi  
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**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DELTA STATE  
UNIVERSITY, ABRAKA.**

**JUNE, 2017.**  
**DECLARATION**

I, Oke, Christiantus Ifeanyi, declare that this Thesis is an original research work carried out by me in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria.

.....

Oke, Christiantus Ifeanyi

.....

Date

CERTIFICATION

We, the undersigned certify that this thesis was carried out by Oke, Christianus Ifeanyi in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, Delta State University, Abraka.

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Dr. F. A. Sanubi

.....

Date

(Supervisor)

.....

Dr. E.V. Clark

.....

Date

(Supervisor)

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to God Almighty.

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In conclusion, now unto Him who is able to do all things, receive glory, honour, and adoration and thanks forever and ever!!!

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#### ABSTRACT

The study is an appraisal of Nigeria's foreign policy under the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999-2007. It further evaluated the underlying factors that shaped and continued to shape previous foreign policy objectives and the fundamental problems confronting Nigeria's polity prior to Obasanjo's emergence. That is to say, the study embraced the local factors that influenced Nigeria's foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo. It further examined the image crisis that Nigeria suffered and the debt encumbrances the nation was enmeshed in before 1999. Also, the study examined the administration's general economic policy using the vehicle of 'shuttle diplomacy' to drive its foreign policy thrust. It considered the influence of personality on the management of external policy. Moreover, the key achievements of Obasanjo's foreign policy in respect of domestic economic growth, political stability, regional security, and global involvement formed the central theme of this research. This work is basically a descriptive research which employed a historical design and therefore, centered on the examination of historical data about Nigeria's external policy during the democratic reign of President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999-2007. It utilized the history and origin of Nigeria's foreign policy to trace the core principles and tenets of Obasanjo's foreign policy regime. Using qualitative technique of obtaining and analyzing data generated from secondary sources, it brings to light the gradual but definite transformation that occurred in Nigeria's contemporary foreign policy arena such that one could assertively speak of a paradigm shift during the administration under study. The study used the realist theory of politics as its theoretical framework of analysis which allowed the researcher to appreciate the basic and overall interest of nations and statesmen in the practice of world politics and external relations in the contemporary era. It observed that Nigeria was almost a Pariah state without any regards for her and her citizens among the comity of civilized nations. The study showed that previous regimes especially the military juntas were rascally in the execution of national issues, human rights, economic policies and foreign relations, etc, which eventually turned around to make Nigeria reclusive. It recommended that strengthening mutual and multiparty investment relations are crucial for Nigeria to attract more FDI in its new refocused shuttle diplomacy that should be handled by a team of reputable diplomats via foreign missions. It maintained that a re-classification of Nigeria's foreign policy targets has, therefore, become imperative in the contemporary global politics in order to bridge dissonance between foreign policies and expectations. It submitted that the goal-values of her foreign policy ought to be reconstructed to include what Nigerians as individuals intend to gain

specifically from the nation's enduring strategic, economic and political diplomacy. That is to say, Nigerians' welfare and alleviation of mass poverty must be seen as the nation's foreign policy priority, and by implication, Nigerians should be taken as the centre-piece of the Nigeria's foreign policy.

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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the study**

States seek to attain different aspirations and purposes in the course of administering their independent countries. Meanwhile, a number of these aims can be accomplished by the countries on their own, i.e., without resort to any other states, others can only be accomplished with the collaboration and active support of other similar entities beyond their own boundaries. All procedures in form of actions or reactions, dealing with such issues requiring collaboration and dynamic cooperation of others beyond the precincts of a given state for their accomplishment, are within the domain of foreign policy. Thus for Rosenau (1974), foreign policy is solid actions taken by governments or they are determined to take in order either to preserve the desirable facets of the international milieu or to alter its unwanted aspects.

Put differently, because national governments have certain motives to achieve, the day-to-day running of successive administrations are targeted at realizing these certain and well defined targets and intentions in the course of administering their countries. While some of these goals can be attained by the states acting on their own alone, (Nwankwo, 2013) in most cases, they seek the vigorous support and sometimes help of additional states so as to achieve their national objectives. Because of this, a state necessarily has to be in constant interaction with its external environment (Ojo & Sesay, 2002).

Foreign policy could also be defined as an inter-play between a nation and her counterparts in the world in such areas that include the economy, politics, sports, religion, and

tourism, socio-cultural, consulate and immigration issues among others. It borders on communication and interactions among states, and it involves high diplomacy with the singular reason of achieving definite national objectives. It is within this purview of interpretation that Adeniran (1983) advocated that foreign policy should be perceived from the connection of the motives and benefits that underpin states relations. He maintained further that objectives and means of achieving them are the basic ingredients of foreign policy.

As an essentially designed and target-driven activity, foreign policy is purposive. This purpose, as mentioned above is changing or shifting a condition outside the autonomous borders to gain state advantage, usually explained in terms of national interest (Wilkenfeld et al, 1980, Legg & Morrison, 1971). Thus for Beard (1934) foreign policies are not conceived upon abstraction, but are the product of realistic formulations of national interest quantifiable in forms of security and prosperity. Though security and prosperity remain the constant goals which states seek after with their foreign policies, any definition of the concept must also summarize strategies and tactics calculated to reach the goals. In this vein, foreign policy is not just a set of overt goals with regard to the external world across the borders of a given socio-political unit, but also sums up sets of strategies and tactics premeditated to accomplish those aims (Legg & Morrison, 1971).

From the above, national goals together with the approaches for reaching them are the key elements of foreign policy. Consequently, the foreign policy of any state will eventually be assessed by how much of national goals (goals that profit the nation and its people) it achieves. Yet, defining and implementing mechanisms to realize the aims require resources. Disparities in nations' capacity to attain set goals are correlated to disparities in resource accessibility such that



Crab Jr., (1972) would deem national objectives and assets for achieving them- the two most basic components of foreign policy.

Certainly, the interconnection between the objectives and resources is the recurrent subject of statecraft, and in this regard, no two systems or governments even in a particular country are precisely the same. Given the diverse and at most times contradictory variety of demands that each leadership of the Nigerian nation had to process and pursue in their international engagements at various times in history in relation to the state's resources at their disposals, Nigeria's foreign policy during each of the diverse leaderships that have ruled it become unique and typical.

Notwithstanding the reality that different administrations have tried to pursue Nigeria's foreign policy in almost similar objectives, the method and drive of their leadership, agenda setting, mobilization of critical material and other resources have differed with consequent differences in concrete national goal attainments. Thus, one can speak of the foreign policy not just of Nigeria, for instance, but of a specific leader and a particular regime. This study approaches foreign policy of Nigeria from the latter perspective using the Olusegun Obasanjo regime that ushered Nigeria into the democratic Fourth Republic from 1999-2007 as a typical framework.

One is not oblivious of the robust international engagements that interspersed practically all Nigerian leaders' foreign policies, including the short-lived President Yar'Adua. Nigeria's obligation to the course of international peace and security especially in Africa, involvement in non-alignment movement, decolonization of the continent, the forefront position in the fight to eliminate apartheid in Southern Africa, loyalty to the cause of democratization in Africa, etc, were decisive at their various times, and, image enhancing for Nigeria. They all can expediently

be expressed largely within the agenda of Afro-centricism. However, such engagements have barely been entrenched in, or linked to, the nation's local priorities such that *The Guardian* (2011) would consider that a Father Christmas outlook underpins Nigeria's engagement with other countries.

Yet, implicitly taken as a rational self-centered actor, the first and primary concern of any state's foreign policy, including Nigeria, should be with her security and prosperity. In the case of Nigeria, this would entail that even her Afro-centric policies in expressions of which she had elegantly defined her foreign policy in the past years, ought to have been practiced from the viewpoint of the nation's security and prosperity. The failure of such policies over the years to impact domestic priorities of Nigeria is the backdrop of the aggressive nature of Nigeria's foreign policy immediately she returned to democratic and civilian rule in 1999. The reinstatement of civil rule in Nigeria in 1999 enhanced the country's image overseas and permitted her to assume a more active and illustrious role regionally and on the world stage.

In fact, Alao (2011) noted that since the restoration of democracy in 1999, Nigeria has focused on developing tactical partnerships with established and emerging global powers, to shore up its domestic priorities. It has reinforced old relations and developed new ones, and has endeavoured to maintain its role as a regional and continental power, which addresses domestic needs. As a follow up, Okerafor (2011) commented that Chief Obasanjo's foreign policy goals were effortlessly expressed and identifiable. For instance, his number one concern was to restore or repair where necessary so that Nigeria can regain its position as a key player in the comity of nations. A shattered and bastardized image of gross irresponsibility, inherited through General

Sani Abacha's five years of despotism, had to be fixed. Some of Nigeria's economic partners, especially the prominent ones like the United States, European Union, Commonwealth of Nations, World Bank and the I.M.F had to be brought back.

As the military relinquished power to civilians in 1999, much was expected from the people to take active participation in foreign policy formulation, execution and implementation against the backdrop of over 15 years of unbroken military reign in which successive military juntas dictated the pace and direction of Nigeria's foreign policy. It was essentially so because democracy being a system of government whereby citizens in a state have political investment in form of participation and trust, the people too, under normal democratic setting retain the inalienable right to control decision making in all aspects of their lives including the management of exterior relations and affairs.

It is worthy to note that Nigeria's transition from military rule to democracy is still new after just a little above 15years and before the re-introduction of democratic rule; the confidence of the people in good governance had been sternly traumatized by the strain of military autocracy, reckless and irresponsible leadership. During that era, and principally in the Abacha days, the country was confronted with diplomatic isolation. In response to this, Abacha shut out the country's traditional partners. So, with democratic principles in place, the most immediate task was therefore to repair the damage that the military rule had done to the foreign and external relations of the Nigerian State. Repairing this damage requires enormous time, energy and resources from the masses and the mobilization of the entire citizenry to make inputs in the foreign policy formulation and implementation.

Consequently, this research study intends to critically investigate the foreign policy of Nigeria under the presidency of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo.

## **1.2 Statement of the research problem.**

Nigeria's international image which received international approval in the early days of independence due to her pragmatic foreign policy, leading role in peace keeping operations, decolonization posture and rich natural resources, suddenly became horrified when the military got ingrained in the domestic politics of national governance and implementing various domestic and foreign policies that were very unpopular and anachronistic with the international community. As situations became intolerable in Nigeria due to abuse of human rights and maladministration by the successive military juntas, many Nigerians flee abroad in search of greener pastures and better lives. Expectedly, some Nigerians in Diaspora resorted to dubious and sharp practices in their countries of sojourn. These made Nigeria's image to nose-dive. But things became worst during the inglorious days of General Sani Abacha's rule.

The reign of Gen. Abacha's military putsch was notorious for his very poor human rights records, which peaked with the summary execution of the nine Ogoni minority environmental activists, including Ken Saro Wiwa, in 1995, and the indefinite incarceration without trial of M.K.O. Abiola for declaring himself winner of the 1993 presidential election. World leaders, individuals and the Commonwealth of Nations had mounted an international campaign for clemency for the Ogoni activists (Omotoso, 2004) but without reprieve by Abacha. The outcome of this behavioural outlook against the international community was the unparalleled global outrage on Nigeria and the consequent isolation of the country in the global system notably by the Commonwealth, European Union (EU) and the United states. These Western countries, at the same time, withdrew their ambassadors and High Commissioners from Nigeria (The Editor, 1995). The junta's regime of human rights exploitations included the conviction of some retired and serving soldiers for phantom coups against the administration in

1995 including a former Head of State, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo himself. Indeed, it was under the Abacha's regime that the nation's image reached its lowly ebb and the image of the state as a Pariah became much more obvious. The nation and Nigerians lost esteem and reputation internationally.

Nigeria and Nigerians were in this regard treated with indignity, contempt, impunity and suspicion by other nations and their nationals alike. Similarly, the global community treated Nigeria with little regards in the world system. This challenged the nation's international status even the regime was accused of gross human rights violations and was repeatedly condemned by the U.S.A and other civilised western countries. In response, the Abacha's interregnum decided to cut Nigeria off from the West and indeed, treated all western allies with ignominy. This was the position Nigeria found herself until the emergence of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 as the 11<sup>th</sup> Head of State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Engagements between Nigeria and other states and non-state actors in the global politics since 1999 are being based on democratic principles. The *tit-for-tat* diplomacy of late Gen. Sani Abacha, *de facto* President of Nigeria from 1993 to 1998 had significantly dented the image of Nigeria. There were breaks in relationship with many countries amidst threats of political, socio-cultural and economic sanctions from democratic states. Apart from this, the government was characterized by an inconsistent foreign policy initiation and implementation attitude which made Nigeria a Pariah state and a disdain in the comity of nations.

The reintroduction of democratic rule and the coming of President Olusegun Obasanjo provided fresh challenges of inevitable reforms in an effort to steer out of the reclusive situation that the military led the country into. The efforts of President Olusegun Obasanjo in achieving such a feat in restoring the image of the country provide relevant impetus for scholarly attention.

This study therefore aims at providing a critical appraisal of Obasanjo's foreign policy in pursuing his objectives with emphasis on the usefulness of his 'shuttle diplomacy' strategy in the business of external relations. This appraisal extends to his application of citizen diplomacy as he moved to shift the focus of his foreign policy drive to protect and improve on the fortunes of the citizens anywhere they reside in the globe; his shifting of policy to accommodate China, India and other rising powers; his reintegration of Nigeria into the African Union, the United Nations and other international institutions; his revolution of internal policies that favoured tactical repositioning of the domestic economy; his continued pursuit of debt relief and cancellation from the creditor institutions; his aggressive marketing of Nigeria as a sellable product in the international market with a vision to attracting foreign direct investments and ultimately, his dogged focus in shoring up the poor image of Nigeria and Nigerians he inherited from the previous military governments.

### **1.3 Objectives of the study**

The general objective of this study is to critically assess Nigeria's foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999-2007. The specific objectives of this study are to:

- (i) highlight Nigeria's foreign policy before Obasanjo's presidency.
- (ii) examine the impact of Obasanjo's Shuttle Diplomacy in re-building Nigeria's image as a regional power in Africa;
- (iii) assess the extent to which President Obasanjo was able to address the domestic challenges prevalent in the previous military regimes.
- (iv) assess the volume of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) attracted into Nigeria by the Obasanjo's regime (1999-2007).

### **1.4 Research questions**

The following research questions are adopted in assessing Nigeria's foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo.

- i. What was the nature and character of Nigeria's foreign policy prior to democratic rule in 1999?
- ii. What impact did Obasanjo's Shuttle Diplomacy have in re-building Nigeria's international image?
- iii. To what extent was President Obasanjo's foreign policy framework able to address the domestic challenges prevalent in the Nigerian state in the previous military regimes?
- iv. How relevant were the foreign policy strategies of the Obasanjo's regime (1999-2007) in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Nigeria?

## **1.5 Justification of the study**

This study is justified both on theoretical and practical fronts. Theoretically, the study complements other works done by scholars on Nigeria's foreign policy in general and economic diplomacy in particular; especially those that seek to uncover the relationship between economic diplomacy and the management of international affairs in developing states. Again, the dexterity and deftness with which President Obasanjo laundered Nigeria's scruffy image, brought the nation back from the brink of pariah state, secured debt reliefs from creditor institutions and eventually attracted high volumes of foreign direct investment (FDI), etc, deserve this noble quest for insights into what transpired during that administration.

Practically, the study will be of paramount importance to the initiators and implementers of Nigeria's foreign policy. The issues that are raised and tackled here are cogent enough to

justify a scholarly inquest which will be beneficial to students of international relations in general, and those who are fascinated in the study of foreign policies of nations in particular.

## **1.6 Significance of the study**

In an era of a glowing wind of democracy blowing strongly across the hitherto authoritarian sub-saharan Africa, this study on Nigeria's foreign policy is timely not only as it provides further support for meeting the needs of the developing countries that are joining the trendy era of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which cannot be attained under the atmosphere of tension because MDGs themselves entail enhancing the quality of lives of the people, but also that the drift of global investment especially from China and other external circles is growing.

In spite of the enormous body of literature available on Nigeria's foreign policy, a study such as this that focuses on the administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and his role on Nigeria's international image have not been methodically explored. For instance, Adeola and Ogunnoiki (2015) did a study but focused on how the fourth republic ushering the transition from military despotism to civilian rule in 1999, was able to pave the way for democratic dispensation with the leadership endeavouring to steer the nation's foreign policy in conformity with democratic ethos. In their work, they submitted that it was expedient for the Obasanjo's regime to embark on economic growth, social infrastructure and development and also face the challenges of confronting ethnic militia and rebellious groups among other issues. They argued that the central theme of their paper was to interrogate whether there was a synergy between domestic and foreign policies or contradictions under the period in question. In another study, by Wapmuk and Agbalajobi (2012) the issue of debt burden was addressed. Their paper argues that the economic diplomacy of the Obasanjo administration cemented way for Nigeria to negotiate



for debt relief from her creditors. The paper concluded by noting that the vision, focus and resolve of President Olusegun Obasanjo were influential to change the circumstances, which debt weight had forced on Nigeria, by pursuing a diplomatic enterprise that led to the achievement of debt relief. Yet in another study, the issue of Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission and foreign direct investment was addressed by Babatunde, Oyeniran, David and Ibrahim (2013). In this paper, the authors contended that the persuasion of the Commission in attracting FDI to the country has not been significant over the period of Chief Obasanjo's presidency. They attributed the reason for the poor inflow of foreign direct investment to lack of autonomy for this Commission and absence of stability in government policies that has led to the neglect of this Commission over time.

Thus, it becomes clear that not much research has been done on the Obasanjo's administration focusing on his influence in laundering Nigeria's traumatized image, addressing the local issues prevalent in the country before his emergence and his use of shuttle diplomacy in re-branding Nigeria and thereby; attracting the measure of foreign direct investments he brought to the economy. This is certainly, one of the gaps this study has filled. This study therefore becomes significant in making valuable contributions to the body of knowledge as it examines the performance, achievements and pitfalls of the Obasanjo's administration and the refurbishment of Nigeria's image. Consequently, this study provides some measure of academic support to the bold attempt made by the democratic government during the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo to rebuild the shattered image of Nigeria in the comity of nations by addressing the issues of corruption, debt, foreign direct investment and political tensions in the country.

This research work will help in supplying data on the domestic dynamics that predisposed Nigeria's foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007. Furthermore, the study is of dominant benefits to foreign policy formulators and the would-be diplomats, for it further outlines the chronological and historical development of Nigeria foreign policy since 1960.

It is expected also that this study will be a reliable instrument to scholars especially, diplomats in form of ambassadors, high commissioners and attaches of foreign ministries. Also, historians, political scientists, economists and international relations specialists will find this research highly invaluable in their research on the subject matter of foreign policy in Nigeria.

### **1.7 Scope of the study**

This study centres on Nigeria's foreign policy under the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007. That was the interlude when the military handed power over to the civilians having been at the helm of political affairs for over fifteen (15) years. It looks at the influence of personality on the management of external policy. Other areas which this study embraces include the local factors that influenced Nigeria's foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo. Moreover, the key achievements of Obasanjo's foreign policy in respect of domestic economic growth, political stability, regional security, and international involvement as well as the challenges that the administration faced are covered in this research. Although 1999 to 2007 was the period of study, adequate mention was made in periods starting from 1960 when Nigeria gained her independence. The study also looked beyond 2007 by taking a superficial look at how Nigeria's foreign policy had fared since after 2007.

### **1.8 Limitations of the study**

This study, even from its inception can be said to be faced imminently with various challenges and constraints. For instance, factors bordering on economic, social and health concerns posed as major impediments to the researcher. Personal security issues seriously influenced the researcher's movement. In addition, this researcher's efforts to have a personal interview with Chief Obasanjo on his perspectives and challenges of Nigeria's foreign policy under his tenure proved abortive. Several appointments were cancelled at the very last minutes by his aides and assistants who claimed that the former Head of State was either busy and could no longer entertain visitors or that he had travelled out of town for important national assignment. But we had to rely on his official statements, speeches, conducts, actions and inactions toward external relations as captured in newspapers, diplomatic correspondences and official gazettes.

This work is carried out during the period when the federal government is facing a ferocious attack from the dreaded Boko Haram insurgents. This has made most government institutions and agencies to suspect every unfamiliar face and to be reluctant in giving any information personally or offer those from official policy documents to the researcher voluntarily or by any other means.

Again, safety and medical issues posed a daunting task to this study. The critical data gathering period of this research is coincided with the period of the explosion of the hydra-headed monster called the Ebola Virus in the early 2015. This killer disease even forced some local and foreign agencies to review their operations including the categories of visitors to entertain. This researcher was turned back at the gates of various government establishments and diplomatic missions as a result of the fear of Ebola disease. For example, at the embassies of the

United States of America and Germany located at Walter Carrington Street, Victoria Island, the researcher was denied entry due to safety issues reasons.

However, to overcome these challenges the researcher was compelled to buy disinfectants, hand sanitizers and washed his hands with detergents and water at every offices visited irrespective of the short distances covered in other to avoid contacts with infected persons. We also relied on the available information from the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Lagos, National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in Kuru and relevant libraries. Again, the internet has remained a veritable instrument in this research. The pool of information available in both off and online sources and a careful sifting of the materials were done, for which the researcher takes total responsibility for their final usage and expressed opinions.

## **1.9 Operational definition of terms**

Some of the key terms used in this study are defined operationally in the context of their usage here;

**Democracy:** Though, a hugely contested concept, which does not have any universally accepted definition due to ideological, cultural and historical conceptualizations underpinning it, but in this study, democracy is viewed as a method of government in which the citizens apply the governing power either directly or indirectly through representatives occasionally chosen or elected by them. This means that a state is said to practice democracy if it puts in place structures that allow for expression and, in the long run, the supremacy of the popular will on basic questions of social direction and policy. By every standard, democracy is a political arrangement in which the qualified citizens in the state participate actively in determining the mind of the people that govern them and also in influencing the output of the policy of government. Within

this context, the idea carries the import that the basic tenets of democracy are firmly rooted on the will of the majority of the people rather than on the elite or the few.

From the above, one can see that democracy is a type of government discernible from other kinds of government. One way of distinguishing it is the degree of people's participation, especially in the discharge of their civic duties such as taking part in political campaigns, balloting in elections, holding leaders accountable, etc. Therefore, without peoples' participation there would be no democracy. It can also be differentiated in terms of the elaborate institutions available for its operations. These are the political parties, legislature, executive and judicial arms and its subscription to the famous principle of separation of powers and also the harmonized relationship among the democratic institutions in the best interest of the electorate who have transferred their sovereign authority to the institutions of government.

**Democratisation:** this term is used here as the process of political change that has occurred in Nigeria since May 1999 as "democratization." It denotes something ongoing and, as used here, implies a move away from authoritarian rule. It reflects political scientists' evaluation that changes in government, while importantly, do not always amount to the level of full-blown democracy but a work in progress. This view is hinged on the assessment that the demand for democracy in Nigeria is still "unresolved." While it is correct that democracies are, by definition, a continuous process, a journey as against a final destination—some democracies seem to be far away from their destinations than others. A transmission of power from one soldier to a former soldier, in an economy rocked by official corruption and crushing austerity measures, does not reflect a true democratisation process.

An instance where democracy is examined with dictatorial performances can as well be seen as undemocratic. Democratization involves processes in which democratic government is

established, confirmed and conformed to internationally acclaimed standards. Furthermore, in a democratisation process, there is usually a balanced institutional development with each institution performing the role specially allocated to it. Some of these institutions are the judiciary, military, electoral bodies, legislature and executive among others.

**National Interest:** In this study, national interest is viewed as a composite declaration derived from those identified core values, principles or standards that any nation most highly prizes. The core principles may be liberty, freedom, security, among others. Interests are typically articulated in terms of physical continued existence, economic well-being, and political sovereignty of the nation. National interest is used here to offer justification for the reasons behind Nigeria's engagements with other countries. A nation's foreign policy is motivated by a set of values and goals that the state intends to accomplish in the course of her relation with other countries. That is why national interest is seen as the entirety or collective interest of groups in a given state. National interest is seen as set of goals, a nation or country strives for in the world, as regard its domestic needs and priorities. Therefore, these strategic interests of a country are within the ambits of national interests, with focus on military and economic requirements.

National interest can also be seen as the ongoing ends for which a nation acts, with political actors and includes moral, religious and other altruistic considerations. National interest predominates the actualization of foreign policy initiatives by any civilized state in relating with others; and it is fundamentally understood that national interest has an answer to why states act in the way they act. Nigeria's national interest is a key concept in its foreign policy decision making in the global arena.

**Shuttle Diplomacy:** The term denotes a diplomatic intermediary making a bout of travels back and forth among countries in an effort to obtain a given foreign policy goal from targeted

external actors. Shuttle diplomacy could be regarded as negotiations carried by a state intermediary who travels between different locations. It can further be seen as international negotiations conducted by a mediator who regularly travels back and forth between the bargaining parties. In shuttle diplomacy, the negotiator travels stretched distances to meet with the parties involved, “the strategy of meeting with world leaders separately is often used even when they are within the same vicinity, in so-called ‘proximity talks’.” For the purpose of this study, it means the immediate step the Nigerian government under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo took in dealing with image problem and international isolation in the hunt for foreign investment from 1999 when the nascent democratic rule took off following the transfer of power from military to civilians.

In his determination to regain Nigeria’s fading glory and re-integrate her to the civilized world, he engaged in an adroit shuttle diplomacy across the key capitals of the world. President Obasanjo needed to prove to the global community that it would not be sufficient to return power to civilians without also seeking to address some critical and inherent socio economic problems challenging the country. He believed that it was necessary for a one-to-one discussion with relevant world leaders on debt relief, economic assistance, regional security, foreign direct investment, repatriation of stashed funds, and improved international collaboration among others. Without doubt, foreign trips explain in part the extent to which the world community was happy with Nigeria between 1999 and 2003. Shuttle diplomacy and official trips constitute an expression or an instrument for measuring the cordiality of a relationship, also an instrument for promoting the said relationship.

**Foreign Policy:** Foreign policy means the right to deal and conduct foreign relations of a particular state with foreign powers. It can also be seen as an attempt made by a country to foster

co-operation among the countries of the world and maintain cordial relations with all other nations of the world, to oppose all forms of aggression, racial discrimination, formulate and project her basic priorities abroad and to uphold the rule of law and fundamental human rights at all times. In formulating its policy for the conduct of foreign affairs, Nigeria recognises that its primary duty is to safeguard and promote the interests of the Federation and her citizens.

In this relative sense, it is used here to depict a set of actions and inactions behind Nigeria's interaction with other states. It is the totality of the declared intentions of a state; it symbolizes a set of principles or courses of action that governments or states adopt that help to define their relationships with the rest of the world.



## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

#### 2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

##### 2.1.1 The concept of Foreign Policy.

Foreign policy is the category of actions a government takes which deals with defense, security, global politics and international economic relations. It falls under the category of action wherein a nation deals with other states, non-governmental organizations, international institutions, and definite individuals. Thus, Frankel (1978) conceives foreign policy as:

...a range of actions, as well as a set of principles influencing these actions, taken with reference to external situations and factors...the totality of thoughts, activities and principles on international affairs embarked upon by decision-makers with the purpose of achieving long-range goals and short-term objectives.

Foreign policy comprises of two essential elements: national *goals* to be attained and the *means* for attaining them. To Pham (2007), the relationship between national objectives and the resources for achieving them is the recurrent subject of statecraft. In its ingredients, the foreign policy of all states, big and small, is the same. In short, the determining of foreign policy is a dynamic and fluidly courses that involve the interface between a state's interior and exterior environments. The one propels the other.

To Northedge (1968), foreign policy is the use of political influence to persuade other states to exercise their law-making power in a way desired by the states concerned: it is a form of

interdependence between forces emanating outside the state's borders and those working inside them. Simply put, foreign policy in this sense is "a product of interaction between domestic and outside forces". In the words of Holsti (1977), it forms the activities of a country in the direction of the outside environment and the circumstances generally domestic under which these activities are formulated. However, Rizwan (2009) views foreign policy as the ways in which the federal governments of independent nations communicate with one another and to their external environments so as to accomplish a variety of aims or objectives. Thus, it embodies an amalgam of values or track of actions that governments of states adopt that help to define their relationship with the other parts of the world. Foreign policy therefore is a product of internal environment and external circumstances. Its main focus is the demeanours, activities together with the behaviours of a particular state in the direction of other states and the aims, objectives and goals of state. The atmospheres within which foreign policy takes places are both local and international. The external milieu involves all the contingencies of the global system that impinge on and influence the ambitions and intentions of states. The domestic milieu of foreign policy in the opinion of Odubanjo, (2001) (as cited in Wanjohi, 2011) refers to the features, factors and forces peculiar to the state where foreign policy is being formulated or it emanates from.

These factors include the physical location of the state, its peculiarity, natural and human resources, the nature and character of the political system, class or the authenticity of leadership and the system of the communication among groups in the society. Accordingly, Ambe-Uva & Adegboyega, (2007), believe that the domestic environment determines the role a nation plays in the world system. This is because domestic configurations of foreign policy to a certain degree decide the amount of social effects which can be devoted to foreign policy (Kissinger, 1966).

Consequently, these entail that foreign policy indicates relationship of the local and foreign rudiments that affect the objectives of the country whether positively or negatively.

Rosenau's (1967) concept of foreign policy centres on the behavior of the state. In his analysis, he was swift to point out that foreign policy has been largely historical, but believes that states' behaviours at the global level are being influenced by domestic structures. In his submission, he sees foreign policy as historical, either trying to explain the external attitudes of a specific country at a specific moment of time or to identifying the patterns which mark its external behaviour over a particular period of time. This demonstrates how domestic contents of foreign policy shaped the direction and character of a country's external relation.

According to Garner (1995), the essential focal point of foreign policy is on the purposes, declarations and actions of actors a state aimed at towards the outside world and the feedback of other actors to these declarations, statements and actions. For Garner, a defining factor of foreign policy is its focus on both the global and domestic spheres and the consequent need to move between individual states. Foreign policy is therefore analyzed from a diversity of perspectives. It may entail the analysis of a variety of issues such as the state, non-state units and sub-state bodies; a variety of levels, which may include the individual-level, state-level and the macro (systemic)-level; different milieus such as the local and international and other variables, including discourses, strategies, policies and actions. Also, equally important in the dynamics of foreign policy is the psychological factor or the images of the decision makers.

From the foregoing, even though, scholars differ on definition of foreign policy, they all concur that it is has to do with the conduct and behaviour of a nation vis-a-vis other states. According to Modelski (1962), foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the attitudes and actions of other states and for adjusting their own actions to the

global environment. Therefore, foreign policy might account for the ways in which states try to change, and succeed in changing, the behaviours of other states. Consequently, the objective of foreign policy is not simply to change but also to modify the attitude of other states by guaranteeing continuity of their positive actions.

Jinadu (2005) in his discussion of foreign policy is of the view that, foreign policy, as a term historically dates back to the evolution of the contemporary state system and of international law during the 18th century when it became fashionable to be used to characterize and systematize the official conduct of international affairs or foreign affairs, by and among sovereign states, in contrast to the conduct of their home or domestic affairs. In other words, foreign policy, like every other public policy can be viewed as the official conduct of public affairs by the state in its international relations. Worthy of note here, is the fact that foreign policy in this context can be referred to as the entirety of a country's official actions and dealings with other countries carried out not exclusively by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, but also by other ministries and quasi-ministerial departments such as Defence, Information, Education, Transport, Communication and Finance.

However, the fact still remains that whatever external policies that are emanating from other ministries have to be executed under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being the official channel of all foreign policy issues. Orugbani (2004) views foreign policy as a stable set of activities towards the international environment, an implicit or explicit plan about a state's interaction with the outside world, a mindful image of what is or ought to be the nation's priority in the world, or some universal guiding principle or attitude determining or influencing decisions on specific issues. What this means is that foreign policy is a field of linked but separate actions and concerns in which policy is originated in an incoherent style mainly in reaction to immediate

pressures and events in a number of distinct structures and issue areas. This implies that despite an existing policy posture of a nation, she can due to prevailing circumstances of both internal and outside pressure; take a policy position as a reaction to such a development. This is essentially due to the precarious nature of international relations which changes with the vicissitudes of time. This is the very reason why some countries can at different times be friends or enemies or valued allies within a relatively short or extended period of time. It comprises many elements, diplomatic, military, trade, economic, social, cultural, educational, sporting, among others, and it varies in form and focus according to circumstances.

In general terms, foreign policy is viewed as a draft for the realization of a cause of action of a country towards other countries. It explains the interaction between one country with others or actors in the global system. These states and actors involved are governed by ethical norms, referred to as international law and diplomacy. This study views foreign policy as the actions of a state toward the outside environment and circumstances more often than not domestic under which those actions of the state are formulated. Accordingly, the foreign policy of a state is determined by her peculiar domestic realities. It can also be an avenue for exploring a state's objectives toward others. These domestic structures or contexts such as the elements of power, the nature and character of the political system, political leadership, historical experience and personal ego, outcome of states, behaviour of statesmen or motive of states. In other words, foreign policy, like every other public policy can be viewed as the official conduct of public affairs by the state in its international relations.

To this end, Nwaozichi (2003) posits that that is the more reason why some countries can at different times be friends or enemies or valued allies within a relatively short or long period of time. This is because the overall objective of all nations in their foreign policy is to

project and protect their national interest. It is imperative to emphasize here that to achieve the objectives of this thesis, and going by the various definitions of the concept above, foreign policy is essentially a set of goals and course of actions a nation wishes to pursue or pursues in respect to the dictates or interactions of the domestic and external setting as perceived by the decision makers. Furthermore, it could equally be seen as a goal of a state being pursued in her interest in international interactions. It is by nature the international objectives of states. In other words, they are export oriented policies. They go through formulation, evaluation and execution. It is both an act executed and a process. It is therefore, a link between one state and another. Foreign policy has a source and some purpose or specific targets. Foreign policy is pursued in the national interest. It is expected to be used to secure those things which are alleged to be in the interest of the nation.

### **2.1.2 Fundamental objectives and directive principles of State policy: Nigeria's foreign policy in a dynamic world.**

Nigeria's basic values of foreign policy have been rather constant since they were first enunciated soon after independence in October 1960. Yet the specific interests, priorities and emphases of Nigeria's foreign policy have persistently remained unchanged and steadily continue to develop in the context of the local and global environment. Ashiru (2013) pointed out the under-listed as the major basics that have affected Nigeria's foreign policy:

- a. The end of the cold war and the appearance of the United States as a dominant super-power;

- b. The surfacing of manifold centres of power, particularly at regional levels, including tough regional economic groupings such as the EU and ECOWAS, as states coalesce around similar issues and interests;
- c. The reformation of the African Union (AU) with fresh ideological orientations for inter-state interactions and engagements in Africa, including the abandonment of long-standing tenets of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, non-recognition of undemocratic change of government among other normative principles embedded in the AU Constitutive Act;
- d. The increase of constitutional forces and the downfall of despots in a number of states in North Africa and the Middle East;
- e. The significance of economic matters in the conduct of foreign policies, with focus on the advantage and the growing demands of the public; and
- f. fresh issues such as worldwide terrorism, piracy, oil theft, unlawful bunkering, increase of small arms and light weapons, trans-border crimes, irregular migration, environmental change, hindered multilateral trade negotiations, among others.

With the victorious execution of the decolonisation programme and the appearance of a post-apartheid geopolitical environment in Africa, it became essential to evaluate and re-direct the aims and goals of Nigeria's foreign policy. The result of this exercise led to the apparent enunciation of Nigeria's fundamental objectives and directive principles of foreign policy, as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, which are: (a) the enhancement and defense of the national interest; (b) the promotion of African integration and maintenance for African unity; (c) the promotion of international collaboration for the strengthening of universal peace and mutual

respect among all nations and abolition of discrimination in all of its ramifications; (d) respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the quest for the settlement of international disagreements by negotiation, arbitration, pacification, mediation and adjudication; and; (e) the promotion of a just world economic order (The 1999 Constitution, Chapter II, Section 19). It is on the background of the above elementary objective aims and principles that we shall assess the foreign policy of President Obasanjo's administration to ascertain the degree to which his administration was able to realize the above set foreign policy goals.

In other words, one can infer from the foregoing that since independence, Nigeria's foreign policy has been guided by certain objectives and principles. These, according to Akindele & Ale (2000), are:

- the protection of the sovereign and territorial integrity of the Nigerian State;
- the promotion of the economic and social well-being of Nigeria;
- the enhancement of Nigeria's image and status in the world at large;
- the promotion of unity as well as the total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Nigeria and Africa;
- the promotion of the rights of black people and others under colonial rule;
- the promotion of international cooperation conducive to the consolidation of world peace and security, mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states;
- redressing the imbalance in the international power structures which has tended to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of developing countries;
- respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all



nations; and

- the promotion of world peace based on the principles of freedom, mutual respect and equality of the world.

According to Akintola (2007):

From 1960 to date, Nigeria has retained a comparatively steady foreign policy bearing in mind the fact that the country had experienced varied forms of government within this period. Beginning from independence, Africa was the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy with emphasis on the emancipation, advancement and unity of Africans both within and outside the continent.

In an earlier effort, Olusanya and Akindele (1986) have identified the following five major principles as influencing and guiding the performance of Nigeria's foreign policy:

- non-alignment (Nigeria's decision not to associate herself with any of the power blocs during the Cold War era)
- the legal equality of all states
- non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states
- strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy such as the UNO, O.A.U., Commonwealth of Nations, etc
- Afrocentricism/Pan-Africanism: Africa as the Centre-Piece or Corner-Stone of Nigeria's foreign policy.

And in pursuit of these objectives, the earlier regimes had identified, as main priorities the preservation of unity, peace and security of Nigeria, principally in the areas of security challenges; job and wealth creation for Nigerians; the encouragement of trade and investments; promoting the wellbeing of Nigerians both those living in Nigeria and overseas and protecting their interests. The others are advancing the profile and image of Nigeria in foreign countries;

improving Nigeria's visibility and representation in international organisations; enhancing Nigeria's leadership responsibility especially in West Africa and Africa in general; among others, Ashiru (2013).

Since the birth of OAU and its successor AU, Nigeria's position in Africa has been very unambiguous and assured. While Africa has been the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy from the beginning, consecutive governments have been able to acclimatize its main beliefs, objectives and priorities to the prevailing circumstances. Owing to the Afro-centric stance of Nigeria's foreign policy, it was to be anticipated that the founding fathers of Nigeria would attach the country's foreign policy thrust on the decolonisation of the African continent and the enrichment of African unity. An imperative element of this posture was Nigeria's pledge to the abolition of apartheid in Southern Africa and the deployment of substantial assets in the different theatres of the emancipation struggle in Southern Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and South Africa. However, the degree to which the Afrocentricism has served Nigeria's interest or benefited her economy and citizens has always remained a subject of controversy. This is because, more often than not, some of the countries in Africa that were helped by Nigeria have not returned the favour done to them. In fact, some of them have turned around to oppose Nigeria at major international fora, hurt and maim her citizens or outrightly sabotaged her economic interests. Hence, the new paradigm shifts of Nigeria's foreign policy from Afro-centric posture to *concentric circle*.

### **2.1.3 An Overview of Nigeria's foreign policy initiatives from 1960-2014**

The foreign policy thrusts of various administrations that had ruled the country from independence till 2014 and the extent to which they implemented the objectives and principles of Nigeria's foreign initiatives are highlighted below.

### **2.1.3.(i) 1960-1966:**

Emerging from imperial rule and basking in the ecstasy of a recently sovereign nation, Nigeria made some definite declarations that had stayed with her till the present, and perhaps, have been accountable for her foreign policy initiatives till date. Nigeria's foreign policy soon after autonomy till the first military putsch was principally pro-British and guided by British interests. In addition, while alleging to be non-aligned as one of her policy objectives, Nigeria was evidently pro-British and pro-West in all ramifications. Thus, when Balewa boldly affirmed that while the government was responsible for its action, but that it would not allow the permeation of communism into Nigeria, he was stating what later became apparent as the British government was constantly tele-guiding Nigeria's nascent administration and actions towards rebuffing the Soviet Union's communist philosophy and even looking for or taking any form of assistance from them. This was made lucid by the Institute of Army Education (1977) which stated thus:

Would it be surprising therefore that when the Soviet Embassy was established in Lagos in 1961, the number of its diplomatic personnel was restricted to ten while no such restraint was placed on the diplomatic missions of West European states or the United States of America. The Soviet Embassy was assigned a miserable number of five diplomatic car plates while Britain and the United States of America were permitted to one hundred each. It can consequently be declared that even the opening of the Soviet Embassy was reluctantly approved: a disguise to the outside world that Nigeria was non-aligned.

Throughout the period 1960-1966, Nigeria's foreign policy was conservative, reactionary, pro-Western under an unsure and nervous government that was totally aligned to the West in every trade and diplomatic relations. This was in total disagreement with the Prime Minister's affirmation on the eve of independence that:

We shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone; so far as is possible, the policy on each occasion will be selected with a proper independent objectivity in Nigeria's national interest. We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. (House of Representatives Debates, 20<sup>th</sup> August 1960, Lagos).

However, to Idang (1973:14), this was not to be as Balewa would scarcely take any key foreign policy resolutions without first conferring with the British government. One outstanding characteristic of the era was that it was predominantly pro-African and pro-Commonwealth in tune with Nigeria's British slant. According to Egbo (2003), "all sectors of the economy were not only controlled by the West, but were entirely dependent on their capitalist orientation for the country's consumptive patterns and developmental efforts". This was the established decision as dictated by Balewa. However, Egbo (2003) maintained that there were plenty of discrepancies and incongruities in Balewa's foreign policy as could be observed from the subsequent actions he took within the period under review:

- severing relations with France over their testing of an atomic bomb in the Sahara desert in 1961 just three months after independence;
- refusal to attend the maiden conference of the Non-aligned Movement in Belgrade;
- prevarication over the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc until December 1961;
- acceptance of the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact until he was forced to abrogate it by students and the opposition;
- refusing to train armed militia for Angolan national fighters waging a war against Portuguese colonialists despite Nigeria's avowed resolve to rid the continent of colonialism.

But given Nigeria's colonial experience and the inherited objective factors of underdevelopment, backwardness and dependence, reinforced by the subjective factors of pro-West ideological orientation values and pro-West worldview, it is obvious that these were bound to inhibit Nigerian foreign policy conduct under Balewa. Thus, as a result of economic dependence as well

as ideological orientation of the elite, Nigeria was destined to pursue a pro-West foreign policy agenda. For instance, under Balewa's government, Nigeria's educational system, its economic relations (aid, trade, investments, technical assistance), its legal system, political system, etc., were all patterned in line with those of the Western powers, especially, Britain. In the words of Mbachu (1998), Nigeria's six (6) Years National Development Plan (1962-1968), was drawn up by Western economists with undue reliance on foreign capital for its implementation. Much of the over 50 percent capital expenditure was to come from external sources largely from the West. The Nigerian government therefore, sought aid in the form of loans, technical assistance, etc., from the West, while rejecting offers of aid and scholarship from the Soviet Union. The foregoing illustrate that while the Africa policy was still integral, there were still a lot of other ambiguities of that government which contradicted its exact kernel of foreign policy.

### **2.1.3.(ii) 1966-1975**

The regime of General Yakubu Gowon, was chaotic as well as fascinating in the Nigerian annals of history as some momentous events occurred between 1966 and 1969 – the Nigerian civil war and the oil boom that “gave Nigeria a fresh momentum to follow her non-aligned posture and position of neutrality in world events” (Egbo, 2003). Thus, the regime of the day was preoccupied with the civil unrest and the behaviours of previous and fresh entrants into the alignment scope of the Nigerian State. For example, confronted with the British earlier indecision at providing weapons to the Nigerian government to commence the hostilities against Biafra, the government had to turn to the Soviet who provided all the arms required for the onslaught. This ostensible preponderance of the USSR in the ideological conflict led Britain to get concerned in the war, so as to wade off the Soviet overwhelmingly communist pressure in

Nigeria. Thus, the era was dedicated to engaging the civil war and maintaining the integrity of the Nigerian nation.

That period was a very pulsating decade of fascinating foreign policy orientation as propaganda was a foremost feature of Nigeria's foreign policy. Just emerging from a depleting civil war, Nigeria learnt a lot of lessons:

- ❖ there was need to have closer cooperation with other African states on matters that promote both political and economic freedom to the continent;
- ❖ that Nigeria need not unnecessarily reject overtures of friendship from the Soviet Union;
- ❖ that Nigeria could differ with Britain on matters it felt strongly about and still preserve her status.

Moreover, this period observed the birth of oil as a very dominant economic asset for Nigeria, and with her budding economy; Nigeria initiated a foreign policy that involved economic expansion into neighbouring African states. This would invariably lead to the founding of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in June 1975 encompassing fifteen West African countries (Institute of Army Education, 1977).

The oil wealth enabled Nigeria to concretize its commitments to the total liberation of Africa and the eradication of racist and minority regimes through large financial material contributions to the liberation movements. The crude oil also enabled Nigeria to extend aid to other African and Caribbean countries. However, besides the increased aids and donations to African liberation groups as well as African countries, there was no marked departure in Gown's foreign policy from that of Balewa. Nigeria's foreign policy was still at best moderate. Nevertheless, the period 1969-1975 was one of 'self-confidence'; an era when Nigerian foreign

policy that was formerly bespoke especially by Balewa (who liked playing to the gallery), now became a low-profile policy deliberately made so for maximum effect and attention by world leaders.

### **2.1.3.(iii)            1975-1979**

This epoch witnessed a proper demonstration of the Africa as centre-piece policy of Nigeria as the military junta of Murtala Mohammed gave a precise, articulate, lucid and unequivocal policy for Africa that was not stained with panic or deference to any coalition or country. In his address to the then OAU in Addis Ababa, he espoused the signs of the direction that Africa was going to take in the new period, and with Nigeria's leadership. In the words of Ezirim, (2010), part of Murtala's speech read thus:

Africa has come of age; it is no longer in the orbit of any continental power. It should no more receive instructions from any country however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar...

This boldness exhibited by the Nigerian leader has been suggested as maybe one of the numerous grounds offered for his premature removal from the political landscape. There is an issue of conspiracy by the West that could not accommodate a revolutionary leader, a staunch crusader of Africa and a soldier who was ready to do all it took to wrest Africa from the wrenches of the capitalist West that had continued to master-mind the destiny of the continent many years after the proclamation of independence. Mohammed did not help matters with his vigorous hurly-burly and infighting with the United States on the Angolan crisis between UNITA and MPLA, where Nigeria recognized and supported the MPLA government as against the American backing of the UNITA.

The short-lived regime of Murtala Mohammed did not in any way disrupt Nigeria's foreign policy as his successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo, vowed to and maintained the same inclination. He was enthusiastically devoted to the African spirit and was bold to take actions

independent of Western influence. Obasanjo in his first appearance as military Head of State, to his credit, did a lot in terms of pushing Nigeria to the front-burner in international affairs by telling Britain and America some home truths (for instance, Shell BP was nationalized in answer to British domination of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and the regime vigorously pushed for decolonization of Africa) despite the closeness, though without antagonizing them; and he went beyond that to the Soviet/Communist bloc to cultivate friendships that have endured till date. Although the domestic policies did not materialize into visible developmental progress, Nigeria's foreign policy under Mohammed/Obasanjo regimes in the 1976-79 period was applauded as it received wide acceptability and respect in the global community.

#### **2.1.3.(iv) 1979-1983**

Besides making the normal remarks on sustaining the Afrocentric foreign policy of Nigeria, there was not much to be said about the foreign policy of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. According to Egbo (2003), he tried to keep up with the previously recognized policy of his predecessor but could not because of cycle of tribulations that confronted him and which he was not well prepared to withstand. It was to his credit, though, that he spearheaded Africa's pledge to peaceful resolution of inter-state disputes like the Somalia/Ethiopia; Morocco/Polisario Movement over Western Sahara; and the Hissene Habre/Guokoni Weddeye conflicts in Chad. However, there was no major concern that the administration tackled and the dreary approach to issues made it impossible for Nigeria to impose her will on the continent as it had already started doing. Rather, the government was known to have generated bad blood and resentment towards Nigeria by some contiguous states in the African continent with the expulsion of unregistered foreigners especially from Ghana. Moreover, it was during this time that the corruption and



kleptocracy in government made way for the descending twisting in the Nigerian economy. As concisely observed by Egbo (2003):

To any casual onlooker, the steam had gone out of Nigeria's foreign policy. The energy and enthusiasm which had typified Nigeria's foreign policy in the preceding five years was ultimately replaced with a lack of forthrightness and excessive caution in approaching issues. The regime lacked explicit focus and basic structure, failed into unresponsive conceptualization and incoherent policy vacuum. The innovativeness and boldness of the last two regimes was lost. Shagari's foreign policy became a flash-back to the conservatism and legalism of the Balewa period, such that while plenty of noises were made for good measure, the reality was one of ineptitude and weakness borne out of indifference, confusion and political foot-dragging.

Nevertheless, the Shagari's government maintained the philosophy of non interference; for instance, the administration opposed foreign intrusion in Chad except under the auspices of the O.A.U. According to Mbachu (1998), it frowned at Libyan, Egyptian, Sudanese, French and the U.S. involvement in Chad on the side of Hussien Habre against Guokoni Weddeye. In fact, Nigeria gave as a condition for her attendance of the 1982 O.A.U. Summit in Tripoli, Libya's cooperation with the O.A.U., particularly with respect to withdrawals of its troops from Chad. And truly, Shagari declined to be present at the May 12, 1982 Summit in Tripoli as Libya did not comply.

However, in the face of deteriorating economic situation at home, the government could no longer count on the support of the citizenry for its foreign policy objectives. Thus, the extent to which Nigeria could play a dominant role in world politics generally and in the African liberation struggle was circumscribed by its peripheral location in the world capitalist system and its deepening internal crises. Furthermore, the high level of corruption among the top officials of the government has alienated the masses to such a degree that the regime could no longer count on their support. In spite of the oil wealth, Nigeria was still underdeveloped and reliant on the Western world which exposed it to pressure from external forces. In fact, its dependence and

reliance on the import of both capital and consumer goods made the country vulnerable to pressures, manipulations and penetrations from external powers.

This attitude created the chance for the military to come back into the political scene with the coup d'état of December 31, 1984.

### **2.1.3.(v) 1983-1985**

The General Mohammadu Buhari regime made it explicitly apparent that his concern was not foreign policy but to repair the badly torn economy of Nigeria and put her back on the pedestal of moral decency. However, as no political system can function effectively without a foreign policy goal, his foreign policy main concern was to have more peace in Africa beginning with her neighbours as seen in what it conceptualized as the 'concentric circle'. As succinctly espoused by Gambari (1989):

The blueprint of concentric circle may be visible in our approach and reaction to foreign policy matters within the African continent and in the world at large. At the epicenter of these circles are the national economic and security interests of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which are *intrinsically* tied up with the security, stability and the economic and social benefits of our surrounding neighbours. One of our main concerns is to put on a more beneficial footing relation with our neighbours with whom we cherish the same goals of regional stability and peace.

It was during this era that the Quadripartite Agreements involving Nigeria and her three neighbours to the West (Benin, Ghana and Togo) were sealed. But then, the regime showed contradiction by indefinitely closing down Nigeria's boundaries as a measure against smuggling and money laundering in her much-vaunted fight against corruption. Another diplomatic *faux pas* committed by the regime was the attempt to forcefully bring back late Alhaji Umaru Dikko to Nigeria from Britain in a crate. This act caused a severe breach in the diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Britain. Moreover, the highhandedness and unbending and obstinate

tenacity of the regime in some of its actions brought about his overthrow; Buhari was accused of running a two-man show of himself and late Gen. Tunde Idiagbon, his deputy.

Consequently, it will be safe to assert that General Buhari's regime was so much preoccupied with the super-structural aspects of Nigerian problems such as indiscipline, corruption, etc., than with foreign policy. Even at that, the regime like the other military juntas did not take any serious steps to confront the dependent nature of Nigeria's economy and its control by foreign companies. Thus, given Nigeria's dependence, the Buhari regime like his predecessors, continued to pursue a cautious foreign policy position with regard to certain African and inter-continental issues so as not to provoke Western powers into retaliatory measures.

### **2.1.3. (vi) 1985-1993**

According to Adeniran (2008), General Ibrahim Babangida saw foreign policy as an "issue-based pursuit reflecting a package of objectives and goals tied to the nation's security and the well-being of Nigerians generally". Adeniran continued by saying that Babangida did not only do it by bringing the best personnel on board viz: Bolaji Akinyemi, Ike Nwachukwu, Rilwanu Lukman, but also gave them the essential latitude to implement their strategies towards achieving the said goals. Thus, the numerous foreign policy matters such as the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme, the Concert of Medium Powers proposal and Economic Diplomacy as foreign policy thrusts, and which were widely acclaimed, had the footprints of many clever persons that IBB infused into his government. Also, under his headship of ECOWAS (1986-1988), the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Citizens actually took effect.

This could be said to be the shining point of his leadership in terms of Nigeria's Africa policy, as he not only upturned Buhari's ill-thought out shutting of borders to punish smaller

neighbouring countries, he practically took over ECOWAS, making Nigeria the burden-bearer of the sub-regional association. As plainly explained by Shagaya (2003):

Nigeria not only supplied the largest size of the material and logistic support for ECOMOG operations but also the biggest chunk of the personnel. Besides the initial Commander who was a Ghanaian, all successive Commanders were from the Nigerian military. That today Liberia is a unified country owes much to the foresight and sacrifice of Nigeria ... the Babangida regime gave ECOWAS institutional significance by not only offering land for the building of the ECOWAS Secretariat but also donating 4.5 million dollars towards its construction.

Babangida also went outside the continental stage by taking courageous moves such as restoring relations with Israel that had been severed since October 1973 over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the *Yomkippur* War. Thus, to Ofoegbu (1990), in all, Babangida's regime was credited with some achievements such as:

- (a). the revival of Nigeria's active obligation to ECOWAS by exiting border closures and reinstating free movement within ECOWAS countries;
- (b). Nigeria's active intervention in inter-African affairs and crises, particularly in West Africa, in the boundary conflicts between Mali and Burkina Faso and in the strained relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia;
- (c). the establishment and funding of Nigeria's Technical Aids Corps (TAC) which supplies exceedingly skilled Nigerian professionals at little or no costs to needy African states;
- (d). the establishment of the Lagos Forum of Medium Powers; and
- (e). the use of Nigeria's foreign policy to maintain and encourage Nigeria's domestic economic policy.

Moreover, it was during this era that Nigeria got the most representation in the international arena through the United Nations. Also under this period, Obasanjo was chosen as one of the three foundation members of the International Eminent Personalities with the mandate

to mediate in the South African political fiasco by the Commonwealth; that in 1989, Nigeria's permanent representative to the United Nations, Joe Garba, was elected President of the General Assembly in its 44th session; and also in 1990, that Emeka Anyaoku was chosen as the first Nigerian to be Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations.

But despite all the above nominal successes, Babangida's regime is not taken to be the best time for Nigeria's foreign policy because according to Egbo (2003), "rhetoric, bareness, inaction, policy tumble and indecisiveness were to blot the second stanza of his tenure". As is already well noted, Nigeria became a recluse nation after Babangida voided what is debatably the freest and fairest election ever held in Nigeria in 1993.

### **2.1.3. (vii) 1993-1998**

Given that Abacha came to power by force unnecessarily and at a period the world was gradually tilting towards liberal democracy, and given the opposition to such obvious palace coup on the Interim National Government of Chief Ernest Shonekan, most countries generally became hostile to Nigeria and the State gradually became a pariah amongst the comity of nations. Thus, to Akintola (2007), foreign policy under this period was "reactive and isolationist". For him, there was a need to redesign a fresh foreign policy thrust for the country as the conventional position had become more or less messy in his estimation. Thus, Abacha composed a 50-member committee of every other interest group apart from career diplomats, intellectuals and specialists in the field of international relations and foreign policy. This purposeful act demonstrated his hand early enough that he did not want anything but to direct what should happen without an option to what had been the practice. Moreover, the regime was so barefaced in disrespect of diplomatic customs and illustrated noticeable contempt for flair in relations with the diplomatic corps of other countries that left them stunned. The situation was

not aided by such dishonorable actions of the military under Abacha as the gratuitous and inexcusable murder of the Ogoni activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and his kinsmen regardless of enormous protests and appeals from the international community.

In the words of Akintola, (2007), such traditional allies as Britain, United States, France, Germany, Canada and South Africa and many others temporarily withdrew diplomatic representations and support for Nigeria; and “in reaction to the seclusion from the West and its allies, Abacha resorted to Asia. This in addition, estranged Nigeria from leading powers of the world as Asia did not essentially do much for the foreign policy goals of Nigeria. This was the situation Nigeria found herself till Abacha died suddenly on 8th June 1998.

### **2.1.3. (viii) 1998-1999**

Abacha’s abrupt death left Nigeria in the reel of global isolationism, and thus the subsequent regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar knew better than to try any kind of perpetuation of himself in power. He hurriedly put on track the roadmap for transition to democracy, freed roughly all political prisoners and in general “embarked on a foreign policy of rejuvenation and made efforts to refurbish Nigeria’s image, in particular on the human rights front” (Akintola, 2007). Thus, his eleven-month regime could correctly be said to be an interregnum between military dominance of Nigerian politics with its weird kind of foreign policy, and a democratic setting.

Although he had to struggle with the challenges of conflict conditions in the African sub-region, he decided to follow the path of nonviolent enforcement in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. According to Badmus & Ogunmola (2003), his case was such that the domestic environment more or less dictated his foreign policy – he was more interested in salvaging Nigeria’s image overseas and getting ready for a democratic change to civil rule, nationwide

reconciliation, reverence for the rule of law, and human rights of citizens. Thus, under his time, and given that it was short-lived, the Abubakar regime witnessed such modest achievements in the global community as the re-admission of Nigeria into the Commonwealth of Nations, the enhancement in interactions with the European Union, Canada and the United States of America that had disengaged diplomatic relations with Nigeria, and peaceful leadership of ECOWAS.

### **2.1.3. (ix) 1999-2007**

Nigeria's foreign policy shortly after the successful transition to democratic governance was characterised more by shuttle diplomacy beyond Africa embarked upon by President Obasanjo in order to triumph over a world that had ignored Nigeria and would rather not have anything to do with her. To this end, during his swearing-in ceremony, he said:

We shall follow a vibrant foreign policy to encourage friendly relations with all states and will carry on to engage in a positive role in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and other global institutions. We shall continue to respect existing treaties between Nigeria and other countries. It is our determination to reinstate Nigeria completely to her earlier prestigious position in the comity of nations.

Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy, in the opinion of Agbu (2001):

extends far beyond the concern for the welfare of the African continent... the debt burden, for instance, is not a restricted African dilemma ... many countries in Asia, the Caribbean and South America face comparable problems, hence the need for the harmonization of efforts.

This was corroborated by the former External Affairs Minister, Sule Lamido's remarks that while it may seem inappropriate to jettison Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy, the cardinal issue in contemporary international relations, which is economics, makes that prevailing doctrine inappropriate (Lamido, quoted in Agbu, 2001). Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy in this period, entrenched in sustenance of democratic standards, the principle of self-rule,

fundamental human rights, rule of law, was bound to strengthen and institutionalize the traditions of good governance and democratic codes at the domestic level.

At the African level, Nigeria did not budge away from her traditional Afrocentric stance.

According to Obasanjo (2005);

I suppose that Africa should continue to be the centerpiece of our foreign policy. This renewed determination of African leaders, our intensification of regional economic groupings, the reformation of the OAU into the AU, and an improved worldwide disposition towards Africa, the AU and the AU's programme, NEPAD, etc, are pointers that we are indeed in a new Africa. The Africa that should be united, integrated, free of wars and aggression, particularly in the modern global system where there is no constant conflicting ideological divide.

Thus, Nigeria shaped institutions that would assist in further bringing the country into better recognition in Africa, in that way, making for peace and development in the continent. This was done through the creation of such important offices as the constitutional stipulation for the encouragement of African incorporation and sustenance for African unity – demonstrated through the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa; and preservation of peace and security in the West African sub-region – shown by Nigeria's leadership role in the formation of ECOMOG, and her membership of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. Again, Adeniran (2008), maintained that Nigeria played a leading responsibility in the “conceptualization of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and shifted its focus from conflicts to economic development”. But Sanubi (2012) had questioned the continued relevance of the principle of Africa being the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy and confronts its continuance against a new inside-out theoretical frame. To him, Nigerian policy formulators should put the economic diplomacy at the front position of its foreign policy to reflect the internal realities of the Nigerian developmental challenges rather than window-dressing them in a frivolous, yet luxurious, big-brother African-centered foreign policy.



Consequently, the shuttle diplomacy of the Obasanjo government ensured that some sort of economic development came the way of Nigeria, although it is arguable whether the President's globe-trotting produced as much foreign investments as he convinced Nigerians believe. However, the fact was that a greater proportion of Nigeria's foreign debts were drastically abridged through complete cancellation and rescheduling, foreign investments started coming into Nigeria and jobs were generated and people began to feel the outcome of good foreign interactions with other countries in the global system. This much, Adeniran (2008) noted:

Under Obasanjo, Nigerian foreign policy was made to focus on attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with the federal government's establishment of a one-stop-investment agency (Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, NIPC) and the initiative of persuading Nigerians in the Diaspora to become concerned in national development.

Nevertheless, this was propagated through a half-hearted foreign policy that was concentrated on the domestic policy of fundamental values of transparency, probity, good governance, and the safeguarding of basic human rights. In addition, for the fact that Obasanjo was inclined to eclipse his external affairs ministers, the achievement recorded in foreign policy under his era was overshadowed by his attempt to stay put in office through various means which eventually did not succeed and which made him stripped some of the respect the international community had for him at the inauguration of his government in 1999.

### **2.1.3. (x) 2007-2011**

The administration of the late Umaru Musa Yar'Adua situated its foreign policy plank on what authorities regarded as "citizen diplomacy". According to Abba (2009):

At the inception of this administration, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, the Minister of External Affairs, declared that the Yar'Adua administration will champion what he referred to as **Citizens Diplomacy**. Although every diplomatic action must essentially be focused on the defense of the welfare and wellbeing of the citizens of the country, this administration tried to put citizens as its focal point, at least at a conceptual framework. That concept is yet to be appropriately expressed, its effect is yet to be felt and the end result is yet to be noticed.

The scathing criticisms that have trailed the introduction and enunciation of that foreign policy proposal have been so much so that analysts did not take that government seriously in terms of foreign policy as the government appeared to thrive on diplomatic gaffes. The degree of non-articulation and opacity of that recently fangled preposterous foreign policy that was excitedly flaunted as the brain behind Nigeria's policy was viewed in the fact that it was a normal consular responsibility owed Nigerians and not policy any serious government should make noise with.

Over the time of three years while the administration of President Yar'Adua took over the helm of governance in Nigeria from Obasanjo, it became very obvious that the issue of foreign policy was not topmost in the regime's plan. Much as it was not clear what the policy thrust was, the much-flaunted 'citizens diplomacy' was not even apparent what it was destined to accomplish as the advocate of it, Ojo Maduekwe, the Foreign Affairs Minister, could not completely clarify what he meant by that which is recognized to be a duty – that when a country does not treat another country's nationals right, they could also get the same ill-treatment for their own citizens. This means that that government did not have any foreign policy push apart from the usual Africa-centredness that does not make a great deal of meaning any longer owing to the reality that the dedication to the African continent is now in jeopardy for a country that cannot maintain its economy or expand nor sustain its infrastructure. A State where citizens are not availed the essential social amenities with all the wealth that is amassed from the crude oil the nation is blessed with cannot be serious about its citizens whether in Nigeria or outside the shores of Nigeria. A country where virtually all the segments of the economy are inchoate may not enforce its will on other nations to take care of its citizens when they are aware that Nigeria cannot really do anything, and its leadership did not have the will to react even if provoked as in

the instance of Boko Haram rebellion. This sluggishness on the part of the President and his foreign policy advisors made Nigeria a bystander in a rapidly moving world.

In addition, Abba (2009) affirmed that:

Nigeria's voice is not heard in foremost global fora: Nigeria has instigated nothing impressive in the last two years at the dynamic international environment and, besides bilateral accords which are scarcely followed up; Nigeria has benefited nothing from diplomatic activities under this government. This is not what is expected of the anchor nation of the Black world... In the immediate sub-region of ECOWAS whose institutions Nigeria is hosting and substantially funding, Nigerians are not even engaged as drivers. For instance, in the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice only 7 percent of the personnel are Nigerians, and it is based here in Abuja... no Nigerian has been selected in the AU commission for the last six years. A country that has the biggest populace in Africa is not represented in the African Union Commission. Burkina Faso conquered Nigeria in 2007! In fact, what kind of citizen diplomacy is it when the citizens have no representation?

The problem of representation in international affairs was also giving scholars and the Nigerian populace problems to comprehend how a government declined to attend global events that other regimes fought to guarantee they were on board. It was on record that President Yar'Adua neglected numerous chances to address the United Nations General Assembly, but instead sent his external affairs minister, who lacked finesse and diplomatese and most often did not have the capacity to address certain key issues, and ended up either saying the wrong things or committing diplomatic *faux pas* much to the discomfiture of the Nigerian citizens. In the most recent example that left Nigerians stunned, President Yar'Adua decided to honour an invitation to open a University of Technology in Saudi Arabia when the General Assembly was scheduled to meet, and he, was eventually received by a mere Governor of a small State and not the King who had allegedly requested him to come. As noted by Onyechere (2009):

The apparently diplomatic unresponsiveness of President Umaru Yar'Adua's administration make threats to the modest advantage the country earned under his predecessor just as the international community is reinventing prejudices against Nigerians, while production firms change base to neighbouring countries in droves.

The diplomatic *faux pas* perpetrated by both the President and his External Affairs Minister were sufficient to deserve unkind commentaries from analysts and scholars. On the ostensible non-recognition of Kosovo at a gathering in Egypt earlier in the year, Okulaja (2009) quoted Akin as follows:

A President is as good as his adviser and the present Nigerian foreign policy is indistinct, quite honestly, whether we are referring to Darfur, Kosovo or Honduras. There is a scarcity of ideas in the Presidency, and I fret about how much of the state of affairs he knows in Kosovo for him to just make such a declaration. If he was advised on this at all, then he was misguided. A leader just doesn't make a statement; you must be sure about the implications of a policy.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the Yar'Adua government had no foreign policy direction. There appeared to be no blueprint of what the government projected to attain while relating to other nations. Whatever it called its foreign policy did not seem to have any direction and could not yield any positive fruits in terms of achieving good objectives for Nigeria. As noted by Ezirim (2008),

Foreign policy is not just a matter of sounding tough; it has to be seen to be in action. Citizens' diplomacy would become a significant foreign policy when Nigerians in Nigeria are regarded as they are worth; when government does its job the way it is supposed to, and when the people are made to feel the benefit of good governance.

### **2.1.3. (xi) 2011-2015**

In his capacity as the acting President, Jonathan embarked on a number of diplomatic shuttles, as part of a deliberate attempt to restore confidence in the world that Nigeria was well and secure despite the internal political disputes especially with the challenges of succession it was going through. Nigeria literally returned to the global arena. One of the shuttles took him to the USA where he conferred with his American counterpart. The delisting of Nigeria from the discriminatory rule of the Department of Homeland Security on special searching of travellers on international flights to the United States that specifically targeted Nigerians (consequent upon the

Christmas day attempted bombing of a US airline by a Nigerian) was the effect of the re-invigorated diplomatic contact.

According to Nwankwo (2013), shortly after his re-election as the president of Nigeria, Jonathan directed a reappraisal of Nigeria's foreign policy, "to reflect current realities". According to him, after 50 years of autonomy, it is high time Nigeria reviewed the country's foreign policy, in line with contemporary realities and international developments. In his maiden address to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Foreign Affairs, earlier setup by Yar'Adua, he hinted the direction of the review, namely, foreign policy with focus on Nigeria's local priorities. The President clearly noted that although the country had played a principal and pivotal role in the emancipation of the African continent from colonialism, racial discrimination and reintegration in the past, there was need to focus on emerging priorities and challenges, such as provision of jobs, economic advancement, poverty eradication and security, which, he said, were uppermost on the nation's national agenda. According to Jonathan (2011),

In the era of globalization; at a time of grave challenges to national and international security such as we face from terrorism and transnational criminal networks; at a time of massive poverty and youth restiveness in our country, we have no choice but to adjust and adapt the way we conduct foreign policy. As we respond to the forces of globalization, our diplomacy must be put at the service of our domestic priorities.

In other words, putting diplomacy at the service of domestic needs was the driving phrase. Accordingly, for him, Nigeria's diplomacy must initiate and dynamically promote the country as a milieu where commerce and industry could thrive. Thus foreign policy came rightly to be perceived as the externalization of domestic priorities and the aspirations of citizens. It therefore stands to reason that if Yar'Adua anchored his government's policy on "Citizen Diplomacy" as encapsulated in the "seven point agenda", Jonathan's plank of foreign policy was resting on what he called the "transformation agenda" which in essence entails all the elements of the Seven

Point Agenda. It is such domestic priorities that have continued to propel Nigeria's actions and reactions on the international arena.

Under the current regime, Nwankwo (2013) has identified a paradigm shift in Nigeria's foreign policy. According to him, over the years, Nigeria had merely made sacrifices without returns. In the current dispensation, Nigeria's foreign policy while upholding Nigeria's leadership in Africa, strives to guarantee that such role supports and benefits domestic programmes. This means that focusing on Nigeria's domestic priorities has not meant the desertion of African issues. In fact, in partnership with the African Union, Nigeria continues to lead the process for democratic governance and socio-economic developments in the continent. The major spotlight of this initiative is to see that at least within the continent there are true democracies where people vote or choose their own leaders. This shift in policy focus, in the mind of the President, is very much compatible with Nigeria's economic diplomacy. In his word Jonathan, (2011),

Economic diplomacy is entirely compatible with democracy promotion, for at least two reasons. First, molding a virile economy will assist us build a strong, steady, wealthy and peaceful nation, where democracy will burgeon and business will flourish, and where citizens can live and pursue their aspirations with dignity under the protection of the law. Second, it is in State's interest to support the culture of democracy across Africa, since it is the most assured way to guarantee peace, fairness and happiness in the continent.

On the achievements of the Jonathan's foreign policy thrust, his foreign affairs minister contended that in their desire to encourage and promote the influx of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the nation, Nigeria has entered into bilateral treaties with some countries in trade, technological cooperation, ICT, education, culture/tourism sectors, etc, (Ashiru, 2013). Continuing, he said: the Bi-National Commission with the US, Germany, Canada and South Africa continue to expand the benefits that the present government has achieved in trade and investment, energy, security, agriculture, good governance, health and education sectors. Our

interactions with other emerging economies and huge markets such as China have equally been robust. Apart from the participation of China in the growth of infrastructure and construction, the country has been approved a soft loan of \$500 million for the construction of a light rail in Abuja and its environs. A 50-bed capacity hospital, provided by China is at present under construction in Abuja. Therefore, according to UN World Investment reports for 2012, the FDI inflows to Nigeria peaked at \$8.9 billion, far higher than in previous years.

However, it has been observed that diversifying the economy which currently is driven by oil – a depleting resource – is critical to sustaining the “Vision of Transformation Agenda”. In this regard, Okere (2012) posited that there have been more words than action as, comparatively, there has been not much investment in the non-oil sector. Yet, Nigeria is abundantly gifted with precious raw materials that could support various areas of manufacturing begging for exploitation. In other words, the present administration has not been able to use her refocused foreign policy to draw sufficient foreign direct investment into the country for industrialization and employment generation.

#### **2.1.4 Image building and the position of image in international relations**

The image of a country is an idea and the value-judgments of a target audience on a specific country or nation. Beliefs, thoughts, feelings and impressions shape the individual’s ideas and by the light of it, image is the collection of meanings and interpretations that are formed in minds by which, opinions are formed, heard, told and remembered. This explanation shows that image is formed by many factors, and behaviours of the individuals are affected by objects. In the words of Zimako (2009), national image both at home and overseas is an ethical issue; it may seem elusive but the profits and returns accruing from a fine image cannot be

possibly quantified. The perception of a country by members of the worldwide community, how a country tracks its interactions with others and especially, the dealings of its citizens at home and in a foreign country coalesce to establish the country's image. Thus, image building is an indispensable attribute of a nation's foreign policy.

Holsti (1996), in addition explained this point when he posited that image is an individual's perception of an object, fact or circumstance in terms of good or bad as well as the connotation attributed to, or inferred there from. Adeniyi, (2012) contends that if we extrapolate from that, we can conclude that image-building must necessarily constitute a fundamental element of a nation's foreign policy, suggesting that the way a country is perceived, particularly in this 21<sup>st</sup> Century, is a function of her national image. Accordingly, image-building forms an indispensable aspect in the strategy for foreign policy initiation and implementation, in any country, when well articulated, foreign policy initiatives help generate and strengthen favourable images of a nation to the outside world (Alimi, 2005). Consequently, the image a country endeavours to generate and project, via its foreign policy, should kowtow its national interests, and the image prospects of other members of the global community. Hence, Federal Ministry of Information (2012) stresses that a nation's effort to have a significant impact, and therefore sway, the world around it will be directed by her foreign policy goals and national interests and how efficiently such outlook is convey or communicated to the world. In other words, foreign policy aims and national interests must be clinically wrapped up and projected to accomplish their aspirations. Indeed, the image issue is a design of perception. There is however no commonly recognized systematic standard for perception as it is pervasively prejudiced. To the extent that human societies are complex, perception is a complex phenomenon



According to Tunca (2010), a country's image is defined 'as the total of all descriptive, inferential and informational values one has about a specific country'. After a perception process, image of persons of a particular country in the memory of others are shaped. Personal judgments on many things like school subjects, individuals, behaviours toward others and objects, etc, become the main component of perception process on cultures, environments, political structures, history and other factors, etc.

A positive image ( i.e. good behaviour, respect of sovereignty, free from all social vices by its citizens, promotion of good governance and maintaining friendly relations with other countries) is important to all countries (Tunca, 2010). If the image is positive, other countries expound everything they live with the positive image, but if the image of the country is negative; even if they are not true, the country as a whole stands at a risk of being profiled. World perception of that country has a great damage to the international relations of the country.

In the globalising world of today, an image can help to lift up a nation and this is exactly why many nations are very protective of their images. "Image" is also used as an instrument of international relations in promoting a country's national interest as a whole. In diplomatic functions or international relations of a country, the desired ways in which a nation-state is accepted by other members of the international community, is reflected through the good image projected by the country. The image of a nation might as well be the destiny of a nation. A country's 'disfigured' image in the global village may become an insignia of dishonest, dishonour and disrespect; this is outright humiliation of the nation and its people. Once the image of a nation is stained it becomes a strenuous if not a herculean task to overturn the tendency. For a country with image problem it is never too late to commence to make the affirmative moves in the comprehensive transformation of its image (Tunca, 2010)

A country that is liked by others is perceived to have a good image. But a country that is disliked or disapproved of is seen to have a bad image. The terms "good image" and "bad image" as used in international relations, rarely reveal anything about the relative amounts of fact or fiction of an image of a particular country. This is often used to convey what a country appears to be in the comity of nations. A good image of a nation means a lot to the entire world; it forms one of the basic functions of diplomacy of the 21st century by leaders or statesmen (Tunca, 2010).

Image has a huge effect on any country. Human nature, combating corruption and promoting human development, commitment to international norms and values, good governance, social corporate responsibilities from the private sectors, social and cultural richness, economic structure and stability, democracy and human rights, international relations of the country, technical developments, globalisation of business, history of the country, responsibilities to the environment and tourism, form some of the pointers of a good image of a country.

When a country is said to have a bad image, it simply has a negative perception from members of the international community. This development is linked to the failure of the state to address certain fundamental issues that pose threats to the existing political system. Failure on the side of the state to address these inequalities (social, economic and political), i.e. bad governance, impunity and disrespect for the rule of law, human rights violation, environmental issues, unchecked corruption both in private and public institutions, inability to address rural-urban drift, lack of basic social services and breakdown of infrastructural facilities and the insincerity of the government to live up to expectation, form part of the precursors of image crisis (Tunca, 2010). The perception of a country in international politics is the perception of its

populace, and the perception of its people is also in part a function of the political leaders' actions and character. Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy for some time now has been abhorrently incapacitated and undermined by incompetence, corruption, favoritism, leadership shortfall and poor democratic credentials, which have negatively affected the international reputation of the nation (Achebe, 1983; Nwoke, 2014).

### **2.1.5 Personality and foreign policy: the nexus of leadership personalities, foreign policy and effects on Nigeria's international image.**

Personality is one critical factor in the realm of foreign policy initiation and execution. It is often thought that the personality of a leader (national ruler) also reflects in the nature and character of the nation's foreign policy. For instance, a nation that has a strong, determined and purposeful leadership will experience rich and robust policy design and implementation. On the other hand, if the national leader is feeble, weak and inconsistent, it will also reflect in the policy outcomes of incoherence, disjointedness and abandonment. Likewise, foreign policy is one dominant profile through which the president of any country is easily assessed and judged. That is why most national leaders (statesmen) prefer to personally head or supervise their foreign affairs ministries much more than they do to other domestic ministries.

Consequently, Smith (2012) maintains that the impact of personality on decision-making in the sphere of foreign policy analysis is controversial. There is similarly the dispute that the use of personality as an index for examining and understanding of foreign policy behaviour leads to fallacy. Conversely, Hogan and Kaiser (2005) and Echono (2012), advanced the controversy that personality would influence the quality of leadership decision making and effectiveness which will in turn bring about development. They submitted that the qualities of good leaders comprise

excellent decision making skill, vision, charisma and competence. Closely related to this bearing is that of DeCremer & VanKnippenberg (2002), which stated that leadership charisma has a positive impact on cooperation which can bring about development. Rourke (2008) added that the objectives, capabilities and idiosyncrasies of individuals are vital to the intentions, abilities as well as strategies of the state. To Jensen (1982), personality will only impact foreign policy decisions, if the leader displays a high level of interest in international affairs and possesses high decisional latitude.

It would appear here that effective foreign and domestic policy aimed at all round transformation can be influenced by the personality make up and decision making style of the leader. The argument here firstly is that personality influences leadership style, quality and effectiveness which have positive implications for both initiation and implementation of viable foreign policy. It is necessary to emphasize that the state without the authority and structure of political decision makers remains a geographical expression that cannot make laws by/for itself except by the individuals or groups at the helm of affairs at various levels. Secondly, efficient foreign policy has a huge relativity with personality. The personalities of key individual actors play crucial roles in the determination of a country's foreign policy. An understanding of their traits makes the analysis of the underlying principle behind their goals and drives easier to comprehend. Therefore, to understand the attitude and decisions of the state, the psychology or personal idiosyncrasy of decision makers must be studied or evaluated. Thirdly, the domestic environment provides the backbone for the pursuit of foreign policy in the international system. Through their foreign policies, countries endeavour to persuade others to behavior in a manner which is in tandem with their own needs and ends which are a reflection of their own domestic policies and plans. Persuasions, negotiations and strategies are primarily in proportion to its

national power born from the domestic elements like its peculiarity, natural and human resources, the nature and character of the political system, quality of leadership and the nature of the communication among groups in the society. These elements can be enhanced via national transformation agendas of leaders and the leadership styles invariably backed by their personality.

It is noticeable that domestic experiences also determine its disposition towards the external environment and foreign policy. Internal contingencies also determine the esteem a country earns in the international community and internal problems could also strangle foreign policy. Therefore, in the view of Gambari, (2004), the formulation and execution of the nation's foreign policy must be situated in its domestic political and socio economic environments on the one side and the external milieu on the other hand. They constitute the main dynamics and determinants of foreign policy initiation and output. For instance, from the current predicaments of the Nigerian state, it is obvious that Nigeria is under the siege of backwardness and developmental stagnation that hold her hostage. Until they are addressed, the objectives of her external policy cannot be fully realized. Just as the Nigerian Civil War frustrated Nigeria's efforts to achieve a more prominent regional leadership role, so also do issues like environmental challenges, insecurity, leadership ineptitude, poverty, infrastructural decadence, corruption, religious and ethnic crisis, weak state institutions and injustice frustrate obtaining a prominent regional leadership role, frustrate her foreign policy as well as her international image today. This is because, these domestic issues left unattended to, are making her dedication to the peace and stability of other countries questionable and as well as crippling her potency.

The Nigerian state has had, since her independence in 1960 foreign affairs machinery which has lingered under the exclusive control of the ruling central authority. Nigeria constituted

Africa the cornerstone of her foreign policy and has performed key leadership responsibilities in African politics since then. According to Fawole (2003), Alhaji Tafawa Balewa being the first prime minister enunciated the basic doctrines that underpin Nigeria's external relations. Nigeria's foreign policy goals are promoting and protecting Nigeria's national interest, promoting African cooperation and encourage African unity, promoting international cooperation for the strengthening of world peace and mutual respect amongst all countries and also eliminating discrimination of all sorts. It also added the reverence for international law and treaty obligations, the peaceful resolution of international conflicts via negotiation, mediation, pacification, adjudication and arbitration and also promotes a just and fair world economic order (Fawole, 2003).

The behavioural dispositions of the different heads of state Nigeria have rubbed off on her foreign policy, and domestic politics as well as her international image. However, her foreign policy has practiced continuity more than changes. For instance, to Abegunrin (2003), leaders like Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, General Yakubu Gowon, General Murtala Mohammed, General Olusegun Obasanjo, General Abdusalami, in the process of the execution of Nigeria's foreign policy have displayed attitudes like discipline, passion and patriotism, conservatism and firmness which have earned positive recommendations for her. While Osuntokun (2012), Kawu (2011), Aluko (1976), maintain that a few of Nigeria's previous leaders implemented some anti-Western policies that would have reduced their popularity and acceptance among western states. However, they were able to drive Nigeria towards progress, unity, national transformation and positive global image. This is not to say that their administrations were void of weaknesses.

Leaders like General Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon were very strict in their rule. They were rigid, harsh and uncompromising in their drive towards national transformation

and by extension, to the outside world. They were preoccupied with the agenda “War Against Indiscipline” (WAI) which was to put Nigerians back on the pedestal of moral decency and reawaken them to social norms after identifying indiscipline and corruption as challenges Nigeria was encumbered with. They ensured nationalism, patriotism and loyalty to national symbols, involvement in environmental sanitation, and public demureness like queuing and better work ethics amongst citizens. Despite their passion and drive for change, the regime was characterized with excesses like the violation of human rights and rigidity in their approach to national interest. Their draconian decrees especially as it was applied to the press did not portend well with Nigeria’s international image.

Musa Yar Adua was an altruistic leader. He displayed firmness, commitment, sense of probity, sensitivity to the feelings of Nigerian masses and respect for their rights. His sense of integrity was displayed when he made the declaration of his asset public amongst other evidences. He was peace-loving in his approach to solving problems. For instance, he used dialogue to settle the militancy issues over resource control in the Niger Delta (Ndagi, 2012; Alli, 2011). He was concerned about the domestic wellbeing of Nigerians as he pursued his foreign policy agenda. However, Tega (2013) believes that there are various opinions to the personality of President Goodluck Jonathan. Some score him low with respect to strong personality while others see him as dynamic and charismatic. For most Nigerians he is weak, without charisma to lead and even referred to him as a kindergarten president. His actions do not address cogent and eminent needs of the Nigeria state especially as regards the state of the domestic environment of her foreign policy (Echono, 2012). The increasing state of insecurity, corruption and religious fundamentalism has not received matching response from his administration.

On the other hand, scholars like Okpokpo (1999) Sesay & Ukeje (1997), Mahmud (2001), argued that ambitious, self-centered and dictatorial leaders like General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha soiled the positive image Nigeria had built in the past by their actions. They were dictators, ruthless and violated human rights. These attracted international criticisms and sanctions, severed relationships and earned pariah state status. By 1999, Nigeria's public image had shattered and the duty of rebuilding was hectic. Consequently, the choice of competent leaders to rebuild her image was therefore necessary under a democratic set up.

### **2.1.6 The contexts of Nigeria's foreign policy under President Obasanjo's fourth republic**

This section of this research will examine the political and economic circumstances in Nigeria and foreign policy trend under the Olusegun Obasanjo's government from 1999 to 2007. This is with the view to establishing the premises of Nigeria's foreign policy during the period as well as the external policy guidelines and actions under the administration. The political and socio-economic circumstances in Nigeria in the time before democratic administration in 1999 desecrated Nigeria; and the nation took on a Pariah status among civilized states in the globe. Incidents such as fraud, indecent management of public fund, annulment of June 1993 elections, hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni activists in November 1995, detention of members of opposition groups and state-sponsored killing squads, among others, elicited strong international reaction and sanctions. These included Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth Nations, slamming of a travel ban on high officials of the regime, cancellation of military contacts and ban on sale of arms to the country by the western countries (Alao, 2011).



Continuing, Alao (2011) maintained that the US had also imposed a travel ban and sanctions on the Abacha regime for hanging the Ogoni activists in 1995. These activists and their leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa were summarily executed because their relentless campaign against social injustice and contamination of their communities was at variance with the interest of oil multinational institutions and the federal government. The US sanction on the Abacha junta won the admiration of civil society activists in the country, but brought the regime in clear confrontation to the US government. However, the poise of Nigerian civil society groups in the US suffered when Moshood Abiola, the winner of the voided June 1993 election, died after a meeting with US officials under circumstances many in Nigeria considered doubtful (Alao: 2011).

On the economy, Ofose (2014) has blamed the economic woes of the country on the administrations of President Shehu Shagari (1979- 1983) and retired General Mohammed Buhari (1983-1985) while apparently exonerating the Ibrahim Babangida's eight years of administering the country's economy from any misconduct. To Ofose (2014), Nigeria's image attained its lowest ebb during the years of Abacha's misrule. General Abacha's poor and disastrous political decision-making during his leadership between 1993 and 1998, contributed to the worst negative image that Nigeria has ever had. By 1995, Abacha's regime perpetrated its greatest and gravest blunder. After summary trial, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were executed. International condemnation soon followed. Many countries, decided to intentionally stay away from interaction with Nigeria. Nigeria lost all respect and consideration in global politics, and the severity of the Ogoni activists' execution led to several countries withdrawing their ambassadors and heads of mission and some closed down their diplomatic missions in Nigeria.

However, this position (Ofose, 2014), has neglected the consequence of corruption and Nigeria's low image in world politics under the Babangida administration. In modern history, one can argue that Nigeria's economic crisis rightly began with the Babangida administration, and got worse when his regime introduced policies such as Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and other anti-socio-economic policies which impoverished the ordinary citizens, led to capital flight and resulted to brain-drain. However, it is important to observe that Nigeria had frequently appeared at the top of the world's most corrupt nations prior to Obasanjo's emergence. To this end, Enweremadu enthused:

Between 1999 and 2003, Nigeria occupied either the 1st or the 2nd in Transparency International's survey of the most corrupt countries of the world .... This became not only embarrassment to the Nigerian officials travelling overseas, especially President Olusegun Obasanjo who was himself one of the founding members of Transparency International. Again, corruption had become an ... obstacle to the government's much desired goal of reconciling Nigeria with the international community, after many years of diplomatic isolation, of securing debt forgiveness and much needed foreign investments. (Enweremadu, 2010).

Still on the situation before President Obasanjo came onboard, Enweremadu argued that other factors included negative international publicity against Nigeria with regard to increasing concern about lack of good governance and its consequences in developing countries; threat by the international community to impose sanctions against Nigeria if Obasanjo did not put on ground sufficient measures against corruption and other types of financial crimes. Indeed, Nigeria was promised a possible debt write-off if adequate measures were instituted to improve human rights, reduce corruption and widen the space for political participation.

Consequently, President Obasanjo inaugurated a number of anti corruption institutions of which the most outstanding were the Independent Corrupt Practice Practices and

Other Relation Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), reforms of the police and the judiciary. Others included: a spirited international campaign to redeem the shabby image of the country, and the repatriation of slush funds abroad allegedly looted by public officials; and, in some cases in complicity with the multinationals (Coker, M. A., Ugwu, D. U. & Adams, J. A. 2012).

### **2.1.7 The profile of President Olusegun Obasanjo**

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired General in the Nigerian Army and two times head of the Nigerian state (1976-1979 and 1999-2007), was born in Owu, present day Ogun State, South West, Nigeria on March 5, 1937. Like Chief Abiola, he attended Baptist High School Abeokuta. He started his professional life in the military where he was enlisted in 1958 and climbed to the position of a General. According to Alade (2000), he featured prominently in the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) during which he commanded the federal troops that seized Owerri and brought the war to an end, when the Biafran secessionists voluntarily surrendered to the federal troops. He held several positions in the military high command.

Chief Obasanjo was second-in-command as Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, to the late Nigerian Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed. This was the basis upon which he succeeded the latter as Head of State. As the head of state, some of his ideas were formed during Nigeria's years of civil unrest with fellow African countries giving implicit support to the break-away Biafrans with untold security repercussions to Nigeria. These countries like Benin, Togo, Tanzania and South Africa were lending support to Biafra, exposed him to issues on international affairs. Despite being a military head of state, he demonstrated his mastery of world politics in his uncompromising nature in the implementation of foreign policy of dismantling

colonial rule and apartheid in Africa; he left a landmark of an active foreign policy that is still being celebrated even today. As Head of State, President Obasanjo kept the chain of command established by his predecessor, continued with the reform programmes that were meant to advance the quality of public service, and above all, kept the promise to return Nigeria to civilian rule in 1979, which he did on 1st October 1979.

Kolawole (2005) believed that he became one of the greatest military rulers in Africa, who voluntarily relinquished power to civilian democracy. In retirement, he monitored governance and made public statements whenever he considered things were going wrong. He remains a vociferous supporter of democratic dispensation in the developing and emerging world and a strong critic of the military into politics in Africa. Sometimes he criticised African military institutions for destroying democratic structures, and it was in this sense, that he and his old-time friend and deputy, General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, were arrested, tried and imprisoned for allegedly participating in a coup d'état by General Abacha regime. As a retired army general and former head of state, he served impressively and creditably in several international bodies and assignments, attended countless conferences, delivered papers on a vast arrays of issues bordering on leadership and development. From 1979-1990s, as a private citizen, Chief Obasanjo was seen by his admirers in and outside Nigeria especially from the West, as an astute crusader against corruption, a torch bearer of genuine economic, political and social reformer in the developing world, and a campaigner of debt relief and reinstatement of democratic structures in Africa. To this end, Alade (2000) argued that President Obasanjo, through his writing and editing of a number of books and scholarly publications, his sitting at global fora with great leaders and other men and women of international repute and in this process; has built a larger-than-life image as a world statesman.

His freedom from jail came after the abrupt demise of General Abacha in June 8th 1998. Shortly after his release from jail, he was persuaded to participate in the 1999 general election by prominent Nigerians who saw his candidature as a true reflection of national unity and genuine reconciliation of Nigeria to the rest of the world. According to Alade (2000), the coming of President Olusegun Obasanjo was long overdue, considering his opinions on how good governance in Africa could be achieved to meet the required or desire targets. His ambition to run in Nigerian presidential election in 1999 will see his ideas of good governance coming to reality. He was sponsored to contest the 1999 transitional elections to civilian rule under the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), which he won and got inaugurated as President of Nigeria on May 29th 1999.

### **2.1.8 Olusegun Obasanjo's leadership style and his foreign policy**

Prior to his becoming a democratic leader of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo had carved for himself the niche of a reputable world class statesman, with towering image and international standing. As president of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic, these qualities were uneasily beatable by ministers of foreign affairs. According to Gusau (2001), while giving his inaugural speech as the president, Obasanjo outlined the massive tasks he needed to accomplish. The task of the administration included restoring the nation's dignity, revitalizing the political institutions, reinvigorating the economy through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic integration, combating crime and corruption, debt reduction, cooperation with the Far East and strengthening the rule of law.

To Fawole (2004), he adopted a personalist-style towards foreign policy since he was already a statesman of global prestige and driven by achieving results. To that end, Nuhu-Koko (2008) contended that between 1999 and 2007, Obasanjo performed the functions of the

executive president, commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Nigeria simultaneously with the duties of the Ministers of Petroleum and Energy Resources and External Affairs. Within the first three years as president, he had travelled to about 90 countries of the world on diplomatic assignments. Put differently, his legendary penchant for rebuilding Nigeria's image and improving her foreign policy made him actively involved in running of the country's foreign affairs which in the long run had had positive effects on Nigeria's image in the international system Ekpu (2003); Olutomiwa (2013).

Although he broke the protocol of procedures in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but it can be excusable if his passion for change, success and development is understood. This inclination empowered him to take decisions and tackle problems promptly. From 1999 to 2007, Odubanjo (2001) asserted that he had rebuilt Nigeria's international image with strategies such as repackaging of the image, debt cancellation and relief, foreign direct investment as well as strengthening the domestic environment of her foreign policy. Other strategies include the use of shuttle diplomacy, conflict management in Africa, the formation of New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), re-christened OAU to African Union (AU), hosted international events like Commonwealth and all African Games (Hassan, 2006). According to Kaplan (2006), he pursued a very extensive regional integration. Adebajo & Landsberg (2003) illuminated this with the explanation that he presented himself as a peacekeeper and had strong affection for economic integration and international institutions.

The fact that he himself represented his country as the foreign affairs minister instead of sending someone else gave a sense of seriousness to the issues of national transformation, economic revival and international prestige that he was all out to address. Taking responsibility to do things himself rather than delegating them earned him speedy accomplishment as already

mentioned. For instance, the energy sector was/is a major sector of the Nigerian economy that needed to be controlled by a firm, no nonsense person. Corruption was unbridled and the infrastructural decadence in the sector was huge. It might be believed that these were the major reasons for not appointing a petroleum minister. President Obasanjo had to be in charge of the sector as a strategy of reviving it. This resulted in some policy reforms for national transformation.

Aiyetan (2005), said that domestically, he also tried to address issues like corruption. He did this through the use of the anti corruption bill, Independent Corrupt Practice and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) created in 2002. National Agency for Food and Drug (NAFDAC) was also created to address and correct Nigeria's image of being a dumping ground of fake drug. Some prominent individuals like Diepreye Alameiyeseigha, former Bayelsa State governor and Professor Fabian Osuji, former Minister of Education, and others that ran afoul of the laws were apprehended.

In addition to these, he also put in place some modalities to promote foreign direct investments and reintegrate Nigeria into the global economy. He invested in restoring infrastructure like roads, telecommunications, energy amongst others that would all work together to form an enabling environment for the proper business running by the prospective investors. In the aspect of ensuring that Nigeria is safe for the investors to invest in, he took practical steps in ensuring that security of lives and property was enhanced. Adeniji (2005) added that policies of reviving bilateral joint commissions with nations that were identified as exporters of capital; Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement were signed.

According to Ajayi (2004), these actions were able to earn Nigeria a better image in the international system. As a result of the efforts directed towards national development and positive image building, sanctions imposed on Nigeria prior to the Fourth Republic were removed. She earned the position of the 6th most corrupt country in the world as against the former rating of 2nd. Paris Club granted Nigeria debt relief in 2005 as a reward of the efforts at reducing corruption. More so, she attracted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Multinational Corporations (MNCs) like Chevron and Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN) brought in capital to Nigeria.

However, there have been diverse reactions about Obasanjo's personality and his foreign policy style. Contrary to the positive opinions about his leadership, there are also negative opinions. For example, the personalistic tendencies have been associated to authoritarian tendencies (Abati, 2006). Dictatorial dispositions of the military were noticeable characteristics of his rule having been in the force for some time. The syndrome manifested as oppressive behaviours which are anti democratic and against the ethics of the rule of law. He had several face offs with the federal parliament when his excesses on local and overseas policies could not be checkmated by the Assembly. He rarely listened to the advice of experts even on military issues. Adinoyi-Ojo (1997) as cited in Ekpu, 2003, described Obasanjo as a man full of contradictions. He states that:

He is at times considerate and systematic but can also be obstinately indifferent with the finer points of validity and modesty of virtue. He is plain and unassuming but very sensitive about trivial. He says he is intolerant of "thoughtlessness and uninformed criticisms" but General Obasanjo has frequently responded forcefully to attacks on his actions. This sort of approach leaves people with the notion that Obasanjo is a flawless leader. He has been identified to hang up the telephone on a caller, or to send away impolitely or physically chase away persons with whom he disagrees. He has a soldier's roughness, severity and tyrannical impulse... One of the most astonishing things about Obasanjo is the effortlessness with which he moves back and forth from one extreme to the other. He could exude uncommon warmth and compassion in one short moment only to exhibit soon after an awful cruelty and callousness particularly if he feels he is being taken for a fool.



Despite his weaknesses, his personality as displayed in his foreign policy pursuit is being applauded in various quarters and the dynamism of his leadership style emulated. He was able to facilitate investment drive to Africa and mentored attainment towards social progress, poverty alleviation, the anti-corruption crusade, reforms and transformation, development and growth, democracy as well as democratic governance, agriculture and food security. He was nominated by the Commonwealth as a co-chairman of the Eminent Persons Group, EPG (Ekpu, 2003) and Special Envoy on Great Lakes region to assist the Governments of the sub region to address the challenges to peace and security. President Olusegun Obasanjo remains an enigma of sorts in international affairs that can be learnt from.

### **2.1.9 President Obasanjo's administration and his application of the principle of concentric circle in Nigeria's foreign policy.**

Undoubtedly, the post-cold war international politics that portrayed President Obasanjo's ascendance to power in May, 1999 needed a new approach to Nigeria's foreign policy. To be sure, the international security surroundings had changed considerably for Nigeria at this period, with the appearance of multivariate level of threats to the task of nation building. This era was characterized essentially with the connection of domestic issues with international relations and the gradual erosion of the concept of absolutist sovereignty (Ayam, 2004; Dokubo, 2010; Alao, 2011).

As a matter of fact, the 'concentric rings' of Nigeria's foreign policy main concerns which demoted the international societies to the fourth level, demonstrating that national, sub-regional, and regional concerns should herald the international agenda was fast losing its relevance (Magbadelo, 2007). Alao captures it concisely:

This latest period of foreign policy varied from the previous era in Nigeria's diplomacy, in which it had always prioritized sub-regional and continental interest. The comparative firmness along these borders allowed the country to

strike a better equilibrium between exterior policies and domestic interests. This was particularly significant since many Nigerians understood that the country had little to demonstrate for the openhandedness and sacrifices it had made in regional and continental diplomacy. Many also felt that Nigeria should substitute its previous practice of tackling major powers in the pursuit of an African-centred agenda with a new practice that better suited Nigeria's national interests (Alao, 2011).

Akinterinwa (2004) argued that, with the surfacing of President Obasanjo in 1999, there was a paradigm shift from an African-centered, to a global-focused, foreign policy. In his opinion, Nigeria's foreign policy still maintained fundamentally Africa-focused at the political stage while it was global-centered at the economic level. The poor situation of the Nigerian economy which Obasanjo inherited coupled with political instability at the time, required fresh strategies and tactics, and indeed, impelled the need to focus more consideration on extra-African actors, without inevitably implying any form of disregard of Africa. Thus, Nigeria emphasized the economic factor to the disadvantage of political considerations. This spectacular change was further explained by President Obasanjo, that Nigeria's foreign policy interests broaden:

beyond our concern for the wellbeing of our continent. The debt burden is not an exclusively African predicament. Many countries in Asia, the Caribbean and South America are facing similar problems with it. It is imperative therefore that the countries of these regions harmonize their efforts in their search for a fairer deal from the industrialized nations of the world and this requires of us a more global approach to world affairs than was previously the case (cited in Akinterinwa, 2004).

Additionally, Adeniji (2003) explained this shift in Nigeria's foreign policy thrust from the original 'cornerstone' and 'centre-piece' trajectory that had informed it since independence. He submitted that Nigeria's foreign policy route had to lead to where there are development funds and technical aid, especially in view of the weakness in intra-African collaboration, predicaments and conflict in Africa, as well as Africa's incapacity to bail Nigeria out of her economic depression. He submitted that Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy was geo-

culturally-and proximity factor-induced, while the global setting was issue-and economic reality-compelled (Adeniji, 2003). Again Alao puts it this way:

A number of major trends are clearly discernible in Nigeria's foreign policy since 1999. Perhaps the most important of these is the desire to establish and maintain friendships with countries that have historically shaped global diplomacy, while cultivating deep alliances with emerging powers featured in recent global economic developments. Nigeria has also sought to align its diplomacy with domestic developments, especially as these relate to the consolidation of its new democracy.... Consequently, the country's diplomacy from 1999 to 2011 has been a cautious balance of devotion to traditional obligations towards West Africa and African concerns, and the desire to ensure that external relations, especially with global powers, also assist in domestic concerns (Alao, 2011).

In reality, the rational clarification for the change in Nigeria's foreign policy in 1999 can be situated within the vigorous and apparently appealing sway of globalization, which continued to intrude on state borders and by implication redefining the scope of sovereignty. In real meaning, the principle of free enterprise and democratization had been promoted to the highest principles of global relations by the major actors in the world system (Ayam, 2004; Okolie, 2010).

The pertinent point in Obasanjo's administration's basic shift of Nigeria's foreign policy thrust in a globalizing international milieu is that Nigeria and more prominently, the Nigerian citizen, stood to profit from globalization as thrust of Nigeria's foreign policy. Put differently, the 'concentric circles' principle that had guided Nigeria's foreign policy from 1980s was inadequate and ought to be re-conceptualized to echo the current realities by making its epicentral concern the Nigerian person. In the light of this, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji believes that, "concentricism, as a foreign policy compass, has to be made constructive and beneficial", and that "the centre of a productive and favourable foreign policy should, first of all, be the Nigerian people". In the final analysis, anything 'Nigerian' should in reality be the focal point (Akinterinwa, 2004). In Ambassador Adeniji's words:

The Nigerian has not actually been made the major hub of our policy. Prominence is fixed on law but not on the man himself... the law cannot be more significant than the man who made it and defending and protecting a nation whose people are valueless is at best also worthless. In the same vein, Africa as keystone or centre-piece of our foreign policy is also pointless without the Nigerians. Foreign policy achievements in which the Nigerians are not immediate recipients are not probably going to impact on, or enjoy the backing of, the people.... Productive and valuable concentricism consequently, blocks this gap in foreign policy thrust... (Adeniji, 2004).

It is significant to note that the proponent of 'concentricism' (predicated largely on geo-political prioritization and operationalization of Nigeria's foreign policy) as Nigeria's foreign policy thrust in the 1980s, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, had contemplated this trend of foreign policy on the basis of what he conceived to be the inconsistency or unevenness between Nigeria's foreign policy and the peoples' immediate desires. He averred that:

Nigeria's foreign policy has never been directly related to the needs of the masses of the people; rather it is formulated, articulated and implemented in highly elitist circles. Hence, the country's foreign policy relations have reflected the needs and aspirations of national super elite of business, bureaucratic, military and traditional ruling group... (cited in Akinterinwa, 2004).

In essence, productive and advantageous foreign policy initiatives of the Obasanjo administration was projected to tackle and redress the apparent shortages intrinsic in concentricism: which was the fact that "concentricism was not at all an objective but a means; it was more or less a foreign policy tactic that had not been fully taken advantage of; and as a means to an end, concentricism had to have focus" (Akinterinwa, 2004).

Consequently, Obasanjo's foreign policy was mainly fashioned by the above philosophy, which shaped his diplomatic approaches to issues in regional and international politics. He nonetheless, set out in achieving this lofty principle using a number of approaches. The most discernible was his purposeful decision to personally embark on shuttle political diplomacy,

earning him the title of the most travelled Nigerian Head of State (Zabadi, 2004; Saliu, 2006a; *The Punch* Editorial 2007:14; Okolie, 2010).

#### **2.1.10 Foreign direct investment (FDI) and Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy.**

Proponents of foreign investment contend that the interchange of investment flows profits both the home nation (the nation where the investment originates) and the recipient country (the destination of the investment). Critics of FDI point that transnational companies are able to exert enormous influence over smaller and feeble and weaker economies and can drive out much domestic competition and may as well temper with their sovereignty. However, the third group campaigns for states to inculcate the notion of only beneficial FDI inflow. Thus, Otepola (2002) effort hinges on the rising significance of foreign direct investment in Nigeria as a veritable source of financing for development and expansion, especially since the debt crisis of the 1980s. Ogunkola (2008) evaluated the degree, direction and forecasts of FDI in Nigeria. They affirmed that although the FDI regime in Nigeria was in general rising, some grave deficits abound. These inadequacies are principally in the areas of the corporate setting and institutional ambiguity, as well as the rule of law. Dagash (1998) contended that in the light of the low FDI inflow, one of the key reasons for low inflows of FDI into Nigeria can be credited to the negative image often depicted of the country in the media.

Nwabuzor and Anyamele (2000) reviewed the inflow of foreign direct investment into ten (10) African countries during the period of 1970 to 2000. It was realized that, on a per capita basis, there was an advanced inflow of foreign direct investment into those countries that permit better relative economic freedom and those that have a legal environment that guarantees property rights. Ayanwale (2007) examined the scientific correlation between non-extractive FDI and business expansion in Nigeria and investigated the determinants of FDI into the Nigerian

economy as market size, availability of infrastructures and steady macroeconomic policy. Asiedu (2001) proposes that the determinants of FDI in one region might not be identical for other regions. In similar front, the variants of FDI in countries inside a region may be diverse from one country to another and from one epoch to another. Olaitan & others (2008) observed the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria during 1970-2006. According to them, co-integration systems exposed that the major determinants of FDI are size of the market, real exchange rate and political factor thereby validating theoretical expectations. Although, no revelation of shuttle diplomacy as marketing strategy was made as a contributory factor influencing FDI inflow into Nigeria, this thesis is intended to bridge this gap by examining the role of Obasanjo's shuttling for foreign investors and the support or opposition his administration faced by reason of democracy.

Henry Kissinger formulated the concept of "shuttle diplomacy". The concept is the activity of an external party in helping as a mediator between (or among) actors in a conflict, without direct actor-to-actor contact. Originally, the practice involves consecutive travels by the mediator or intermediary, from the working place of one principal, to another principal. It entails diplomatic consultations performed by an official intermediary who travels frequently between the nations or parties involved. It is the dialogue between two or more countries, in which someone shuttles between the different countries, talking to the governments involved, carrying messages, and suggesting ways of resolving the problems

In the Nigerian circumstance, one immediate step the Nigerian administration took in dealing with image problem and international isolation in the hunt for foreign investment from 1999 was the kicking off of a 'shuttle diplomacy' by Obasanjo to restore confidence in the international community, to communicate the message of 'new Nigeria' loud and clear in

foremost countries around the world (Suleiman, n.d.). This was due largely to his credentials as an international state man. In 168 weeks in office as President, Obasanjo had travelled more than 103 times to foreign lands (Ezeife, 2002). On the average, that is approximately two weeks of every month of his Presidency. Ambassador Osagie (2007) noted that shuttle diplomacy was deployed to allow Nigeria reintegrate into the international system after being so isolated. He noted that the Obasanjo government has recorded great achievement for Nigeria in view of her readmission into the world community. Adeniji (2004) posited that factors that brought about the role of economic factors in foreign policy led to the era of economic diplomacy, where foreign policy determinants are used to improve national economic advancement. And foreign direct investment inflow to Nigeria is one of the bases of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy.

Akinterinwa (2004) viewed shuttle diplomacy to be a foreign policy instrument to enhance national objectives and perceived the shuttle diplomacy of Obasanjo as necessary and an outward display of the recognition of the country by the global community. Zabadi (2004) emphasized the place of foreign tours or shuttle diplomacy in fashioning room for integration into the international community and becoming active in multilateral institutions which is the underlying principle behind the frequent journeys by the Nigerian officials thus creating the incentives for foreign investment inflow. Saliu (2007) argued that shuttle diplomacy was employed as an instrument through which Nigeria is positively portrayed, and in a way attracting foreign investors. He maintained therefore: "the resort to frequent traveling by the president was all that was needed to re-package Nigeria for external consumption".

In contrasting views, the opponents of such diplomatic movement argue that his recurrent foreign visits depict a very gloomy image of a leader who gives more concentration to foreign issues at the cost of local ones. According to Ezeife (2002) the Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy in

search of foreign investments was just a suitable chance for politicians to relocate their slush funds overseas as well as garner travel allowances in the process. This view was informed by the bogus entourage and regularity of such oversea trips. Accordingly, David-West (in Ezeife, 2002) appropriately affirmed that catching the attention of foreign investment is not determined by shuttle diplomacy of Obasanjo but depends on how Nigerians and Nigeria conduct themselves. If the name Nigeria remains synonymous with fraud there is no chance that any person would be lured to invest in Nigeria.

### **2.1.11 The Obasanjo administration and the management of Nigeria's debt**

Prior to 1999, Nigeria was enmeshed with serious debt over-hang from both creditor nations and institutions mostly in Europe. On the assumption of office, President Obasanjo met a gigantic debt profile accumulated from years of corruption and self enrichment of the previous military cum political class, foreign debt which as at 1997 was \$27.008 billion making Nigeria the premier indebted country in Africa (CBN, 2002). Chief Olusegun Obasanjo did not only come face-to-face with the reality of the country's financial weight and the problem of overhauling it, which was denying the Nigerian economy of growth and development, he also enlisted the adroitness of the then Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in soliciting for the cancellation of Nigeria's liability to the Paris Club. Mansur (2006) argued that when the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo came onboard in 1999, the management of Nigeria's debt, both external and internal, assumed a severe challenge to the nascent democratic administration.

The management of international debt was spread across five agencies located in the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). This created a variety of problems in terms of responsibilities, thus making it difficult to establish the claim of



creditors due to contradictory figures from the various bodies; complicated and incompetent debt service arrangements; and absence of rational and well defined debt plan for the country. However, in reaction to this problem, the Debt Management Office (DMO) was created in 2000, with the primary objective of maintaining reliable database of the nation's loans and to propose and execute a plan for the efficient management of the nation's external and domestic loans and obligations at sustainable levels that would enhance economic development and growth.

The government also established several institutions to boost its image and to fight against corruption. These included the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the Due Process Office, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI). The government adopted an economic reform programme known as the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) at the federal level which was complemented by individual State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (SEEDS). The objectives of NEEDS were addressed in four core sectors of reforms namely, macroeconomic, structural, public sector and institutional and governance reforms (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). Through the reforms, the Nigerian administration had hoped that the global community will support its efforts to revamp and develop the economy and reduce poverty by significantly reducing Nigeria's debt.

Before 1999, past administrations had tried diverse models to the management of Nigeria's debt; however some of the previous regimes had favoured the approach of debt rescheduling. Through this arrangement, Nigeria was able to achieve debt rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club in 1986, 1989 and 1991. The approach of debt rescheduling did not assist Nigeria much because it only led to the deferment of the payment period with resultant penalties. In the words of Mansur (2006), the Obasanjo administration also succeeded in

reaching rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club, after paying about US\$7 billion between 1999 and 2004. The DMO played a critical role in the re-negotiation of interest rate regime of Paris Club debt from an average of 10-13 percent to 5.3-6 percent per annum. Despite the efforts of the government, the debt service of US\$1.8 billion in 2004 alone was more than six times the central government recurrent budget on education (Alli, 2006).

Even before the Obasanjo administration was inaugurated in 1999, the President had visited the World Bank to discuss how Nigeria could get debt relief (Okojo-Iweala, 2005). On assumption of office, in May 1999, President Oluesegun Obasanjo declared that the achievement of debt reduction would be an important element in his economic relations and foreign policy. To win the support of the creditors, President Obasanjo made servicing of Nigeria's debts more regular and substantial payments were made. However, this did not help to endear the country to the creditor nations, as most of them felt that Nigeria's debt was sustainable due to her huge oil revenue. The argument of the creditor nations was that with prudent management of resources, Nigeria could afford to pay. For instance the French Ambassador to Nigeria had declared Nigeria's debt was sustainable- 'if you compare the size of Nigeria and the debt and the country's GDP, then the debt is sustainable' (The Guardian, March 14, 2005).

**Table 2.1 below shows Nigeria's Paris Club Debt stock by creditor nations as at December, 2004.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Initial Total Amount of Loan Granted</b>	<b>Outstanding as at 31-12-04</b>	<b>% as Compared to Initial Amount</b>
UK	4,707.17	8,000.32	169.96
France	2,132.81	6,249.61	293.02
Germany	2,226.59	5,288.66	237.52
Japan	3,927.24	4,4447.47	113.26
Italy	1,026.86	1,975.94	113.26
Netherlands	438.45	1,707.98	389.55
USA	641.97	984.49	153.40
Belgium	694.52	608.19	87.57
Denmark	246.80	571.75	231.67
Austria	342.83	521.38	152.08
Spain	185.29	249.541	134.38
Switzerland	151.55	201.01	132.64
Russia	67.50	36.97	54.77
Finland	3.98	3.99	100.25
Sub-total	16,793.38	30,847.80	183.69

All figures in million US\$

**Source:** DMO: December 2007:31

The above did not deter President Olusegun Obasanjo, who had since 1999, began to use international platforms such as the G8, AU, Commonwealth, and UN to promote his campaign for debt relief for Nigeria. The President also held numerous parleys with Western leaders on the debt issue. The United Kingdom was initially opposed to any debt forgiveness for Nigeria. However, the ascension into power of Tony Blair made a difference. According to Ogaba (2006), through the efforts of the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who called for 100 percent debt cancellation for poorest African countries, Nigeria's position was further strengthened.

Through the Blair Commission, Britain, Nigeria's largest creditor, helped Nigeria's campaign when Blair became the Chairman of the G8 in 2004 and that of the EU in 2005. Thus working in conjunction with the National Assembly, advocacy groups abroad and within the country, the Obasanjo administration was able to accomplish debt relief for Nigeria. Though several pledges were made by the creditor nations to either reschedule the payment or cancel Nigeria's debts the biggest achievement of Obasanjo debt relief diplomacy was the October 2005 debt deal which led to exit of Nigeria from the Paris Club as Africa's largest debtor. In his address to the nation on June 30th, 2005, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared that: This debt relief offered to us, I am satisfied and proud to say, is the express outcome of our unrelenting and determined effort during the past six years. The total relief package amounted to an \$18 billion debt write off, with Nigerians to pay off the balance of approximately \$12.4 billion to the creditors over a period of six months.

The rundown of the deal was aptly captured by Okonjo Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako (2007):

As part of a tough but ultimately successful debt negotiation process with the Paris Club, Nigeria paid its outstanding amount of \$6.4 billion, received a debt write-off of \$16 billion on the balance debt stock (under Naples terms), and bought its outstanding \$8 billion debt under a buyback agreement at 25 percent discount for \$6 billion. The entire debt relief package summed up to \$18 billion, or a 60 percent write-off in return for a \$12.4 billion payment of arrears and buyback. The exercise which involved the buyback was unparalleled in the Paris Club for a low-income country and was the second largest debt relief operation in the club's 50-year history. It brought an \$18 billion debt drop on Nigeria's \$30 billion Paris Club debt, an overall decrease of 60 percent and a 76 percent reduction of the non-arrears portion of the debt stock; it was also the first time the Paris Club had permitted a discounted buyback of a portion of debt stock.

The debt relief was unique in many ways: first, it was the first of such exit for an African country and the second largest Paris Club debt deal ever after Iraq; second, it was granted without formal IMF programme in place; third, it was structured to enable Nigeria to secure a complete and permanent exit from the Paris Club of creditors. Instead, the IMF introduced a Policy Support

Instrument (PSI) to back Nigeria's economic reform programme, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS).

**Table 2.2: Nigeria's Paris Club Debt Stock as at December, 2007**

Country	Total Amount of Loan Granted	Outstanding at 31-12-07	% as Compared to Original Amount
UK	4,707.17	0.00	0%
France	2,132.81	0.00	0%
Germany	2,226.98	0.00	0%
Japan	3,927.24	0.00	0%
Italy	1,026.86	0.00	0%
Netherlands	438.45	0.00	0%
USA	641.97	0.00	0%
Belgium	694.52	0.00	0%
Denmark	246.80	0.00	0%
Austria	342.83	0.00	0%
Spain	185.29	0.00	0%
Switzerland	151.55	0.00	0%
Russia	67.50	0.00	0%
Finland	3.98	0.00	0%
Sub-total	16,793.38	0.00	0%

All figures in million US\$

Source: DMO: December 2007

It is relevant to note that even after the Paris Club debt cancellation; Nigeria still owed quite some money to the non-Paris Club Members. These non-Paris Club creditors accounted for about almost 24.74% of Nigeria's external debt stock. The Obasanjo's administration was committed to ensuring that the nation was free from all forms of debts and encumbrances but where not possible, to reduce the incidence of debt overhang to a more manageable profile.

**Table 2.3 shows Nigeria's External Debt Stock to Non-Paris Club Creditors as at 2005**

Categories	Amount (\$)
Multilateral debts	2.70 billion
Bilateral debts	121.04 million

London club debts	1.44 billion
Promissory Notes	580.49 million

**Source:** Okonjo-Iweala 2006:2

**Table 2.4: Nigeria's External Debt Stock to Non-Paris Club Creditors as at 2007**

<b>Categories</b>	<b>Amount (\$)</b>
Multilateral debts	3.080 billion
Bilateral debts	2.144 million
London club debts	NIL
Promissory Notes	NIL

**Source:** DMO 2007

According to Debt Management Office, all these debts approximated to \$5 billion were more manageable because a large piece of them was owed to multilateral institutions, and were secured under concessionary arrangement with little or no interest rate, with 10 years moratorium and about thirty (30) years payment period. By September 2006, the Obasanjo government disclosed that the country was making plans to exit the London Club debt by January 2007. It stated that Nigeria was making progress in her negotiation with the London Club. The DMO further noted that Nigeria's London Club debt of \$2.1 billion was made up of oil warrants of \$ 300 million and promissory note of \$515 million. The paper was optimistic that the same way Nigeria exited the Paris Club; she would also exit the London Club in the no-too-distant future, specifically in January 2007.

To exit from the debts, according to DMO, Nigeria had to repurchase and restructure. They had to repurchase by government making budgetary provisions for the purchase of par bonds and promissory notes, using embedded call-option to redeem par bonds and promissory notes, and raising additional resources to retire oil warrants after verification process. Whereas to restructure, Nigeria was required to launch two benchmark bond issues of five and ten years maturity respectively for a total amount of US\$1.5 billion, use the proceeds of these issues to

redeem par bonds and promissory notes using their embedded call-options and balance of proceeds contributed toward the retirement of oil warrants given completion of verification process.

The repurchasing option was eventually implemented and following results paved way for the exit of both the London and promissory notes debts. The outstanding par bonds (US\$1.5 billion) were prepaid in November 2006, promissory notes amounting to US\$500 million were discharged in March 2007, and oil warrants which were a three phase process of redeeming through cash tender offer launched in February 2007 was completed. The final exit from these debts has given the country freedom from external debt burden, what is left are the multilateral loans (World Bank, ADB etc) which are sustainable with 0.75 percent commitment charge and a payback period of over 40 years and a 10 – years moratorium ( DMO, 2007).

The Paris Club debt deal was not without its criticisms. As stipulated in the deal, Nigeria paid US\$12.4 billion to Paris Club as part of the buy-back agreement. According to Alsop and Rogger (2008), however, this did not go well with some stakeholders who disagreed on the prudence of such a deal. Criticisms were primarily from media, some members of the federal parliament and some Nigerians. There were accusations that the payment had not been an efficient use of resources and that state resources should not have been utilized for payment of doubtful debts, but should instead have been used for the provision of critical infrastructure or such other development related expenditure. For instance, Professor Sam Aluko argued that Nigeria gained nothing from the debt relief. In his assessment: “If you pay \$12 billion in one year, which the Federal Government has paid, there is virtually little or no gain because if you put that \$12 billion in a bank at about 10 per cent rate of interest you get \$1.2 billion in a year. In effect, we gained virtually nothing (from the debt deal). So, over the next 10 years if we

(Nigerians) invested that \$12 billion, we would have got about \$24 billion. So, the white man is very clever. He does not lose in either way. We may feel that we gained momentarily but in the long run, we gained virtually nothing” (The Comet Newspaper, July 8, 2006).

Professor Jeffery Sachs also agreed with Aluko when he stated that the Paris Club deal did not meet Nigeria's debt sustainability needs because poverty in Nigeria was too prevalent for creditors to demand \$12.119 billion debt repayment at once (AFRODAD, 2007). For members of the economic management team, such critics hardly took into cognizance the difficulty of obtaining such a deal. As argued by Mansur (2006), “we had to fight tooth and nail to get this deal. It was not really given to us on a platter of ‘gold as some people may believe, but really it involved a very big fight and sometimes we came out of this fight with blood, sweat and tears.” Some raised concerns on the usage of the proceeds from the deal.

The Obasanjo administration responded accordingly to these concerns by setting up tracking mechanisms to watch the debt relief funds. One of the major tracking mechanisms that was set up for monitoring the use of debt relief was the virtual poverty fund (VPF) also called Oversight of Public Expenditure in NEEDS (OPEN). This mechanism was used alongside the budget to report on the nature of debt relief expenditures. A VPF is a coding scheme within an existing budget categorization arrangement that facilitates the tracking of poverty-reducing spending. Such a system does not include the setting up of distinct institutional arrangements, but relatively generates a set of budget codes that labels a portion of government expenditures as poverty-reducing, funded by debt relief, or both. An automated accounting system is then required to report the relevant aggregates.

The DMO has illustrated that the effect of the debt deal with the Paris Club made Nigeria's foreign debt stock sustainable (Mansur, 2006). For instance, in terms of standard debt



sustainability ratios, the net present value (NPV) of external debt stock as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 51.4 per cent in 2004 to 4.8 per cent in 2006. The net present value (NPV) of debt to government revenue also fell from 41.2 percent to 16.1 percent over the same period. Also, the present value of debt to exports fell from 15.9 per cent to just 15.7 per cent. Debt service as a proportion of government revenue fell from 20.1 percent to 8.7 percent; debt service as a proportion of government exports fell from 7.4 percent to 2.1 percent (Mansur, 2006).

The reduction in Nigeria's debt stock, and the corresponding reduction in foreign debt servicing, freed up critical resources needed for sustainable development. Government was able to save US\$1 billion a year- with US\$750 million in savings for the Federal Government, and a sum total of US\$250 million to the state governments. The savings, which was referred to as 'debt relief funds', was channeled into critical sectors and projects such as provision of 4000km of rural roads, 166 new primary health centres across the country, 400,000 insecticide-treated bed nets, a million doses of anti-malarial medicines, and training of 145,000 teachers amongst others. In the Budgets of 2007 and 2008, additional expenditure of US\$750 million on poverty reducing programmes and projects ensured increased spending on core social infrastructure. Attention of the government was also turned to provision of safety nets for the people. The National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) received the sum of US\$75 million to fund Nigeria's first comprehensive social safety net scheme. A further US\$150 million was put aside to increase the resources available for basic services at the local government level.

The managing of the debt relief was designed such that a conditional grants scheme allowed for both federal funding of MDG-related projects at the state level, and through a matching component, leverage some of the US\$250 million of state debt relief towards MDG-

related projects. The flexibility of the virtual poverty fund (VPF) made such innovations in public expenditure management possible. The Presidency argued that the aim of the debt relief was not to provide additional funds to particular sectors only, but rather act as “an entry point for improvements in the way government worked at all tiers that would reinforce and introduce initiatives ... and then scale up the successes to the wider budget envelope” (The Presidency of Nigeria, 2007).

## **2.2 Theoretical framework (Realist Theory of Foreign Policy (Realpolitik))**

There are many theories that could suitably fit into this work as framework of analysis. Some of them include Realist Theory (Realpolitik), Democratic Peace Theory, Bargaining Theory, Decision Making Theory, etc. However, realist theory (*realpolitik*) is preferred here as the theoretical framework of analysis for this research, not because it is superior to other theories but because it is the most appropriate to our work.

**Realist Theory:** The theory rests on the theoretical assumption that nations in their international engagements act for their own benefit and not for the benefit of others unless both interests happen to agree. This logic of *Realpolitik* which underlies or should underlie realist theory is, key to understanding contemporary Nigeria’s foreign policy engagement under President Olusegun Obasanjo. According to this logic, advancing the specific interest of the state or what Wolfers (1962) referred to as possession goals are immutable aspects of realism. Wolfers used possession goals in contra-distinction to milieu goals which, while connected to states’ interest are basically interested in the wider international environment. It is the pursuance of these goals, especially in Africa that has considerably dictated Nigeria’s foreign policy in the past. However, for any nation to realistically pursue its interest, milieu goals must turn out to be a requisite

towards the fruitful pursuit of possession goal, and, which in this study is defined in terms of domestic needs or priorities. Definitely, Wolfers (1962) recognized this fundamental fact when he noted that “efforts to promote international law or establish international organizations” (and engage in peace keeping operations, give assistance to less privileged nations among others undertaken consistently by Nigeria in the past) “make sense if nations have reasons to concern themselves with things other than their own possession”. Milieu goal will then turn out to be a station towards possession goal.

On the other hand, Akpotor (2011) maintains that realpolitik or realist theory evolved as a reaction against idealism with the emergence of WWII; that the idealists neglected the harsh realities of power politics and human innate compulsion to put their personal welfare ahead of others’ welfare. Early proponents and principal scholars of realist theory like Carr (1939), Niebuh (1947), Kennan (1951), down to Morgenthau (1967), etc, posited that international politics is ruled by objective general principles based on national interest defined as power. Their basic argument at this point is that in the modern world politics, conflict of interest is inevitable among states and since international politics is anarchical, states must be rational in terms of power and preservation of their national interest. And hence the purpose of state is national survival, to acquire power if possible through self help in order to preserve one’s own national interest.

According to Waltz (1979), realism means that the state’s interest provides the spring of action, the necessities of this action emanates from the unfettered competition of states. This calculation according to him was based on these necessities that can determine the policies that best meet a state interest. He further elucidates that victory is the final test of any policy, and success is defined as protecting and strengthening the state.

Morgenthau (1967) defines realism as governed by objective laws that have their foundation in human nature. The major indication that helps realism find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. From Morgenthau's definition of realism, one can rightly attribute that power and interest are variables in content. And universal moral laws cannot be exerted to the actions of states in pursuit of power and safeguarding state interest.

In fact, Morgenthau (1967) identified six principles of (political) realism to include:

*(1) Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.* This means it is likely to expand a theory that replicates these laws and to distinguish between truth and opinion. We can “put ourselves in the position of a statesman” and forecast what he should logically do.

*(2) Interest is defined in terms of power.* This makes politics separate from other spheres of action, such as economics (interest defined in terms of wealth). Since we can presume a definition of interest, we do not have to border ourselves with questions of “motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen.”

*(3) Interest defined as power is an objective category which is generally applicable, but whose meaning can vary.* Morgenthau defines power broadly as “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.” Also, the main focus of the nation state is unpredictable and can change over time. “While the realist in fact believes that interest is the permanent standard by which political action must be evaluated and directed, the contemporary link between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to vanish in the course of history.”

*(4) Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract; the circumstances of time and place must be considered.* The state must consider its continued

existence above all other moral goods. Thus, prudence – “the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions” is the “ultimate virtue in politics.” Actions are judged by their consequences.

*(5) The moral laws that rule the universe are different from the morals of any one nation.*

*(6) The distinction between political realism and other schools is real and profound.* Realism upholds the sovereignty of the political sphere and, while recognizing that diverse facts of human nature (“economic man”, “religious man”, etc.) exist, judges that “political man” – interested only in power – is the proper facet for the study of politics. “Legalistic-moralist” standards are appropriate to other spheres, not to politics.

From the foregoing, one can detect that realism as a paradigm relies on the subsequent assumptions: (a) the international realm is anarchic and consists of independent political units called states; (b) states are the main actors and naturally have power over some offensive military capability or influence which makes them potentially dangerous to each other; (c) states can by no means be certain about the intentions of other states; (d) the fundamental motive driving states is survival or the preservation of sovereignty; (e) states are instrumentally rational and think strategically about how to survive.

In the opinion of Luard, (1992), realism is largely regarded as one of the most powerful theories of international relations in the 20th Century, and has performed a significant role in explaining the behaviour of states and statesmen. Continuing, he maintained that realism is overwhelmingly informed by political tradition that dated back to the ancient Greek, China and England finding safe harbour in Machiavelli, Tsun Zu, and Hobbes philosophies and, more recently the work of Kenneth Waltz, Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, etc.

The central idea of realist theory in international politics is all about struggle for power. The realist views international arena as a competitive ground for power over available resources. The realist scholars believe that nations act only out of self interest (national interest) and also claim that leaders of nations use their powers to advance the interest of their nations with little or no regard for morality or friendship.

The adoption of the realist view became very imperative because of its prominence to foreign policy or international relations and its usefulness in explaining the actions of states as well as statesmen. The justification of this theory is premised on the fact that the goal of the state will be determined by the decision maker with regard to his perception of the international system and how he reacts to it in favour of his country. It was against this backdrop that President Obasanjo embarked on the mission to attract foreign investments, debt cancellation/forgiveness, and restore Nigeria's international image, which has for a very long time been battered by the successive military junta. Chief Obasanjo realised that the international system is characterised with power and stiff competition for scarce resources. As a realist himself, he knew that a state's interest provides the spring of action. He knew that the international system gives no state what it wants rather, states must go all out to acquire power howsoever for survival and preservation of national interest. The administration recognised that the hitherto idealistic attitude of Nigeria's foreign policy based on morality and legalism was obsolete in the modern competitive world order; hence, the little or no gains from the afrocentric inclination of previous regimes. President Obasanjo could be said to be an apostle of realism and power politics and that explained why in all his diplomatic engagements and actions he was preoccupied with the promotion and protection of Nigeria's interest, prestige and visibility.

However suitable this theory is to our study, it did not go without scathing criticisms. For instance, according to Akpotor (2011), critics discovered some contradictions in the usage of the concepts of “power”, “national interest” and “balance of power”. For example, while Hans Morgenthau (1967) believes nations and leaders should think and act in terms of interests defined as power, diplomats are urged to exercise prudence and self-restraint, and recognize the legitimate national interests of other nations. To Akpotor (2011), state relative power balance must take cognizance of political outcomes from other states. Again, another criticism of the theory is in the confusion of what policies serve or constitute the national interests of nations. For instance, how do we differentiate between the interest of an individual leader from the interest of the elite group and that of the nation at large? Again, Waltz (1979) argued that Morgenthau’s perspectives of realism are fundamentally deceptive. To Waltz, Morgenthau’s spotlight on human nature as the basis for power seeking requires strong suppositions. Waltz turns the attention towards institutions as necessitating power-hungry states for security reasons. To him, the concept of power is generally amorphous and does not differentiate between resources that give states power (economic, military) and the tendency of one state exerting power over another.

Nevertheless, no matter the shortcomings of the theory, it is still very relevant in the interactions that characterize divergent state interplays, relationships and (inter)dependence as it interrogates the foreign policy initiatives of Nigeria under Obasanjo. The theory assists us to probe the extent Obasanjo’s foreign policy contributed to the welfare of the Nigerian State and people as to hope for the realization of the dreams embodied in his shuttle diplomacy as a means of restoring the Nigerian pride among the comity of nations and attracting foreign direct investments.

## **Appraisal of literature**

The study presented a review of literature focusing on the conceptualization of foreign policy as defined by various scholars at different times. The work discovered that although the concept of foreign policy has been as old as modern states, yet there is still no uniformity in definition or generally acceptable meaning of the phenomenon. The work further examined the various foreign policy initiatives of different regimes and administrations that had ruled Nigeria from independence till date and observed that every government had her own foreign policy orientation depending on the interest of the ruler and the dictates of the time of his tenure.

Although various studies on the tenure of Olusegun Obasanjo had taken place both during and after his term, only a handful examined the relationship between shuttle diplomacy and the volume of foreign direct investments (FDIs) that his government's efforts in the international arena attracted to Nigeria. There are also very little contributions on the impact of his personality on the machinery of foreign policy initiation and implementation. These are some of the gap in knowledge that this work sets out to fill.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHOD**

#### **3.1 Research Design**

This work is basically a descriptive research which employed a historical design and therefore, centered on the examination of historical data about Nigeria's foreign policy under the democratic reign of President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999-2007. This work utilized the history and origin of Nigeria's foreign policy to trace the core principles and tenets of Obasanjo's foreign policy regime. Using qualitative technique of gathering and analyzing data generated from secondary sources, it brings to light the gradual but definite transformation that occurred in Nigeria's contemporary foreign policy arena such that one could assertively speak of a paradigm shift during the regime under study.

To Denzin and Lincoln (2005), qualitative research as a system of inquiry is appropriate in a variety of scholastic disciplines, usually in the social sciences. That means, historical research involves the method of analytically examining and presenting past events to give an explanation of what has occurred previously qualitatively. It is not just a mere accumulation of facts, figures and dates; it is not even a report of past events but it is a flowing dynamic explanation of past events which entails an interpretation of these events in an attempt to recapture the issues, personalities and ideas that predisposed these events.

Through a detailed analysis of historical data of Obasanjo's foreign policy, several facts have been determined. These sacred facts could be used by managers of foreign policy and external affairs with a view to learning from the highpoints of that administration and avoiding the pitfalls of that regime. And since historical research permits researchers to discuss the previous and contemporary issues in the framework of the present condition, it helps researchers to offer likely response to current issues and challenges pertaining to any phenomenon under investigation.

Another cogent reason for the adoption of historical research method is that, as it relies on information and data from the past, it therefore becomes somehow difficult to manipulate already existing data. The implication is that, it is unobtrusive in nature as the conduct of the study does not influence the outcome of the research hence; the likelihood of researcher's subject interaction is minimized. Again, it does not attract too much expenses and it is time saving. Historical method helps in no small measure to control and administer very large volume of data and information in a limited time available.

Accordingly, a researcher or scholar should apply any kind of research design that is suitable and applicable to the goals and nature of the research at any given time and circumstances, as there is no basis to underestimate the worth of qualitative analysis in relation to quantitative or empirical analysis. Furthermore, if we consider the reality that the difference between the qualitative and quantitative analysis is only in the style, then the method of study becomes irrelevant. Our point is validated by the fact that every good research is understood to derive from the same underlying logic of inference. It is equally important to note that both qualitative and quantitative researches are systematic and scientific and both combine features of

each. For example, in this study, we shall employ a little form of elementary quantitative analysis to illustrate and clarify certain arguments.

In the words of Obikeze (2013), because historical research involves data that are essentially natural behaviours of people, the analyses do produce results and findings that relate to the material world. Consequently, since data are generally presented in ordinary or natural language as distinct from mathematical or numerical forms, the analysis is also natural in the sense that it deals with direct observations under natural tendencies and settings. This makes it possible to be free from artificialities and computational manipulations of the original information. The point being stressed here is that even our own research might not have been free from errors and mistakes. But these mistakes will be identified and corrected. Our work need not be beyond criticisms and contemptuous comments to make our contribution to knowledge novel if we consider the reality that there is no perfection in research exercise. But this has tried to reduce its errors and limit its defects.

### **3.2 Types of Data**

This research essentially employed the use of secondary source of information collection such as reputable journals, articles, documentaries, newspapers, textbooks, periodicals, archival records, internet and websites.

There are various reasons for deciding to use the secondary sources of data. They include amongst others:

- i. It is not expensive and saves more time than primary sources.
- ii. Our research work involves great forms of historicism and historical facts which are basically past events and might not be studied directly by participant observation.

- iii. Again, this work entails massive and vast historical data which is beyond the scope of depending on new study alone.

### **3.3 Sources of data**

Marshall and Rosman (1998) remarked that qualitative researchers mainly rely on the following methods for information gathering: participant observation, non-participant observation, field notes, reflexive journals, structured interview, semi-structured interview, unstructured interview and examination of documents and materials. Also, other scholars agreed that the most repeatedly used qualitative research methods in the social sciences are: ethnographic research, critical social research, ethical inquiry, historical research, foundation research, grounded theory, etc.

In this our work, the researcher has resolved to settle with qualitative and historical research method. In doing so, we adopted secondary sources of data collection, as it was originally intended and designed to be historical and discursive analyses, relying on documents, records, books, journals, diplomatic channels, media sources, embassy diaries and official statements from foreign affairs ministry.

### **3.4 Method of data collection**

To aid the collection of information and data for this research, various libraries were consulted. For instance, we made use of Delta State University library, Imo State University library in Owerri, University of Port Harcourt Choba library. Also, the libraries of the following institutions: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Lagos, Nigeria Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) Kuru near Jos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja were of immense help to this study. We also sourced data from the internet for viable, cheap and vital numerical and literal information.

### **3.5 Validity and reliability of data**

In a bid to maintain a high degree of validity of data, this research work depended largely on the astute research questions and pertinent theory proposed as theoretical framework. The experienced supervisors to this work, Dr. F. Sanubi and Dr. E. V. Clark carefully and critically commented on the appropriateness of the research questions and theory. Data were sourced broadly from various fields such as history, economics, psychology, etc. due attention was given to the works of the experts in these fields. Because the materials were sourced from a mixture of secondary sources and comparison of differences was examined so as to determine their usefulness to the work, one can maintain that there was a reasonable level of reliability of research sources.

Also to avoid being affected by such extraneous variables like prejudice, bias, the unstable nature of the international relations, economic and political conditions, etc, the data obtained were critically evaluated and crosschecked from multiple sources to ensure its authenticity and accuracy. Again, our data were subjected to both in-house and outside criticism. Furthermore, to guarantee that the meaning of words and terms conveyed in this work are well understood, our operational definition of terms ensured that the problems of vagueness and presentism are solved by ensuring that the key words were operationally explained and the connotations of their present day meanings as it pertains to the past and to the work are preserved.

In addition, advancement in technology has assisted in no small measure in ensuring validity and reliability of information and data. Today, searching for data on past and current issues has become very easy and less unwieldy. With the aid of the internet and websites, surfing and sourcing data is now trendy. And researchers can now corroborate and validate any piece of

data in the internet by affirming what other writers have said on any particular issue or topic. And given the reality that President Obasanjo's foreign policy during his eight-year leadership was something in the public domain, there are plethoras of opinions in the net about his tenure.

### **3.6 Data analysis**

This research engaged the critical method of analyzing secondary data as it relates to a range of research questions of this work. According to Browne and Keeley (2001) critical analysis is concerned with the following:

- a) A consciousness of a set of interconnected critical questions.
- b) The capability to inquire and respond to critical questions at appropriate times.
- c) The aspiration to vigorously use the critical question.

Critical analysis entails thinking analytically which means engaging systematic and scientific thinking in our work. Critical method of analysis which is also called analytical induction method is heavily used in qualitative research.

All germane data in this work are arranged in a qualitative manner, but where necessary, quantitative data are collated and presented in simple tables, graphs and bars which enhances understanding and logical analysis.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

#### **4.1 Data presentation**

For the better part of her corporate existence, Nigeria was ruled by the military. From 1960 to 2007, a total of forty-seven years, the military governed for twenty-nine years. For the remaining eighteen years, civilians had a stint. The search for an operational and cohesive Nigeria was a constant recurrence that occupied the nation throughout the period. That search is what has been dubbed nation-building. The federal government of Nigeria was confronted with very crucial nation-building issues and challenges between 1999 and 2007. Some of these nation-building challenges are those of democracy, corruption, human rights abuse, battered national image, debt burden, militarism, federalism and aggressive ethno-regionalism. By 1999, when Nigeria's Fourth Republic berthed, most of these nation-building challenges were yet to be addressed. There was unmitigated tension in the land, the Nigerian nation was almost a Pariah State among the comity of nations as most friendly states, donor agencies, partners and the international community abhorred Nigeria and treated her like a leprosy child.

Back home, especially during the infamous Abacha regime, most of the nation's best and finest citizens took refuge outside the shores of the country as the military junta was hunting anyone of them with a dissenting view. Many pro-democracy activists were horded into prison detention for either condemning the repressive regime or calling for restoration of democratic principles. Again, this hostile domestic environment was expectedly going to drive the investors away and keep potential investors at a safe distance from Nigeria. Thus Abacha's putsch crafted a policy conundrum that made him lose popularity both at home and abroad. In such circumstances, brute force always is likely the state art of dictatorship and this was exactly the recourse of the Abacha regime (Mbang, 1997).

When Chief Olusegun Obasanjo became the first civilian president in the Fourth Republic in 1999, he was confronted with the task of establishing a governable, functional and cohesive Nigerian polity on one hand and reinventing a responsible foreign policy that will restore Nigeria's once enviable position in the international system on the other hand.

## **4.2 Data analysis**

### **4.2.1 Research Question One: what was the nature and character of Nigeria's foreign policy prior to the democratic rule in 1999?**

An over view of Nigeria's post-independence administrations shows that some of them played deciding roles in the image-building/destruction of the Nigerian state in foreign affairs. For instance, the Buhari/Idiagbon regime (1983-1985), which facilitated the nation's image crisis through its draconian anti-human rights decrees and policies almost, reduced Nigeria to a Pariah state. The regime gagged the mass media through its Decree No.4 of 1984, which prohibited any publications on public officials, including corrupt and fraudulent behaviours. This was the beginning of disastrous departure in Nigeria's image in global relations. This was consolidated



by the regime's policy of indiscriminate incarceration and detention of journalists, rights activists, ordinary Nigerians and politicians who served in the preceding regime, which peaked with the failed bid to kidnap Umaru Dikko, from Britain—a situation that could be viewed as a serious diplomatic embarrassment for Britain, and indeed, a homeland security breach by a non-democratic, third world regime. From this event, Nigeria increasingly started wearing the toga of a recluse state and a potential state terrorist.

According to Ajayi (2005), the over-throw of the regime in a countercoup in August, 1985, did not provide the needed image laundering for the nation. The nation's emerging image predicament became deepened under the Babangida military rule which succeeded the regime of Buhari. The Babangida regime advanced corruption and bribery to the stage of state policy, and thereby compounding the moral image of the nation as an awfully corrupt country. Prospective foreign investors increasingly found it difficult to do business in Nigeria as a large amount was spent on fringe, not appropriated items such as kickbacks and bribes to bureaucrats.

The lack of credibility of the regime's transition programme and the subsequent annulment of the 1993 presidential election presumably won by M.K.O Abiola, exacerbated the pace of the decline in the nation's credibility and image abroad. The whole transition programme, which had gulped about N40 billion (Awotide, 2005) became aborted as a consequence of the annulment. General Sani Abacha, who succeeded the General Babangida-installed Interim Head of State, Chief Ernest Shonekan, became the most *enfant terrible* for his very poor human rights records, which climaxed with the extra-judicial murder of the nine Ogoni minority environmental activists, including Ken Saro Wiwa, in 1995, and the indefinite confinement without trial of M.K.O. Abiola for declaring himself winner of the 1993 presidential election.

World leaders, individuals and the Commonwealth of Nations had mounted an international campaign for clemency for the Ogoni activists (Omotoso, 2004) but without reprieve by Abacha. On this, Osaghae (1995 et al) succinctly observed as follows:

However, in November, the regime incurred unprecedented opprobrium when it executed nine persons, including Ken Saro-Wiwa, a champion of the Ogoni people, who inhabit a portion of the Niger Delta, where oil production has resulted in severe environmental degradation. The defendants were alleged to have caused the deaths of four Ogoni chiefs, who were their political opponents. In defiance of appeals for clemency from many governments, the regime executed these prisoners in November 1995, while leaders of the Commonwealth, an international organization of sovereign states with historic links to Britain, were assembled for their biennial summit. Outraged by the regime's rush to execute the 'Ogoni nine', and its flagrant disregard for due process, the Commonwealth leaders suspended Nigeria's membership in the organization for two years, and threatened to expel Nigeria if the junta had not transferred power to civilians by that time. Other countries, including the United States and members of the European Union, imposed or tightened various non-economic sanctions, involving restrictions on diplomatic privileges and military cooperation (Osaghae, 1995), (Naanen, 1995), (Welch, 1995).

The international system was the un-dermined by the Commonwealth, European Union (EU), and the United States. According to The Editor Newspapers (1995), international community and friendly states, in addition, withdrew their ambassadors and High Commissioners from Nigeria. The junta's regime of human rights violations include the conviction of some retired and serving soldiers for phantom coups against the administration in 1995 including a former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, who was an unabashed critic of the regime for its human rights abuses. Indeed, it was during the Abacha rule that the Nigeria's image nose-dived to all-time low, and the nature of the state as a pariah was made more obvious. The nation and her citizens lost esteem and status both at home and internationally.

However, Abacha's abrupt death left Nigeria in the sway of global isolationism, and therefore, the subsequent regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar knew better than to try any type of perpetuation of himself in power. So, he initiated a foreign policy of transformation and endeavoured to restore Nigeria's image, most particularly on the human rights front. To this end, his situation was such that the home setting more or less dictated his foreign policy – he was

more interested in salvaging Nigeria's image at the global stage and preparing for a democratic change to civil rule, national reconciliation, respect for the rule of law, and human rights of the citizens. Thus, under his tenure, and agreed that it was short-lived, the Abubakar administration earned some enviable records especially at the international stage such as the re-admission of Nigeria into the Commonwealth of Nations, the improvement in relations with the European Union, Canada and the United States of America that had disengaged diplomatic ties with Nigeria, but more importantly, his regime "midwife" the subsequent civilian government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo.

#### **4.2.2 Research Question Two: what impact did Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy have in re-building Nigeria's international image?**

National image both at domestic and international levels is a moral concern. It may seem elusive but the profits and benefits derivable from a pleasant image are unquantifiable. Good image-building and its maintenance are the key yardsticks for the measurement of the level of authority and significance of a nation in international politics. Good image guarantees a measure of trustworthiness and honour for state among the comity of nations. Contrarily to this, awful image and lack of credibility and integrity crisis can deny a country the necessary reverence by other states. It will depict the state as a recluse state, which does not merit respect and honour by other states. A nation with image conflict is hard to advertise or promote in the 'diplomatic market.' Accordingly, laundering the tattered image of such state in the global arena is a complicated work.

Nigeria's image problem has its chronological foundation from the extended period of military regimes (1983-1999). Military dictators could not make any meaningful progress in promoting Nigeria's image in the global politics through their foreign policy goals. Contributing to this was the character of governance itself. Civilized nations are not usually obliged to relate

with other nations that are governed by the armed forces. During Abacha's regime, Nigeria's international affairs were limited by the atrocious infringement of human rights, corruption, absence of respect and insensitivity for the international public. The consequence of Abacha's behavioural mind-set towards the global community was the unprecedented worldwide outrage on Nigeria and the eventual isolation of the country in the comity of nations notably by the Commonwealth, European Union (EU) and the United states.

With the reinstatement of democracy on May 29, 1999 and inauguration of Olusegun Obasanjo as President, his government faced the challenges of restoring Nigeria's vanished fame and re-establishment into the global politics. This, he accomplished by engaging in a skillful shuttle diplomacy around the most important capitals of the world. The extraordinary tactic sought the translation of foreign policy actions into tangible attainments which are of direct benefit to Nigeria. The main objective is "peace, security and prosperity through friendship". The President, throughout his broad overseas journeys, spoke to the plenary of the United Nations (UN), ECOWAS, the Group of 8 (G-8), Group 77 (G-77), the Commonwealth of Nations, African Union (AU) European Union (EU) and the host of other state and non-state actors in the global arena.

President Obasanjo was to prove to the global public that it would not be enough to secure political power to civilians without seeking to address some critical socio-economic challenges facing the country. He believed that it was imperative for a one-to-one discussion with relevant world leaders on debt relief, economic assistance, investment, regional security, enhanced international cooperation, etc. He further organised intermittent town-hall meetings with Nigerian citizens in the countries that paid host to him so as to dialogue issues of mutual interest and update them on government policies, as well as possible ways they could help move

the country forward. As Saliu (2007), rightly stated that the option to regular traveling by the President was all that was required to re-brand Nigeria for international consumption. The objectives of these shuttles include: (1) Re-integration of Nigeria into the comity of nations (2) Attracting foreign investment and fresh financial flows (3) Securing debt relief/forgiveness from the country's creditors and (4) Promoting Nigeria's export trade (NACCIMA, 2008). The implication is that, the real meaning of shuttle diplomacy was to re-integrate Nigeria into the global system and attract foreign direct investment through bilateral/multilateral relations. Obasanjo also intended to use shuttle diplomacy to help Nigeria regain her lost status of being the hub of air and sea transportation in the Sub-Sahara which was harshly eroded throughout the Abacha's regime. According to Garuba, (2008), President Obasanjo's administration was instrumental in gathering African leaders to work towards establishing a system of conduct in economic and political restructuring that would suit the circumstances and prospects of donor agencies. At the June 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, Italy, Obasanjo was among the four leading African Heads of State to unveil an African initiated plan called the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

NEPAD was intended to garner aid from donors in reciprocity for African commitments to high-quality governance and transparency in all activities of government. Under Obasanjo's administration, NEPAD was able to push for administrative reforms, capacity building and human developments in Africa through its Africa Peer Review Mechanism. President Obasanjo's administration organized a few meetings on NEPAD including the March 2002 summit of leaders from 19 countries ([www.nepad.org](http://www.nepad.org)).

In the opinion of Alade-Fawole, (2000), under President Obasanjo's administration, the reinstatement of Nigeria's image, demonstrated to be a powerhouse in the region's economic and

security affairs. Without Nigeria, the West African Peace Monitoring Force (ECOMOG) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) would have been toothless, and African-led peacekeeping missions in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone would be fruitless. Nevertheless, the administration was successful in encouraging constitutional reforms in those African countries.

Under Obasanjo, Nigeria also disputed the marine borders, an economic region in the Gulf of Guinea that involved Equatorial Guinea. This made the administration to explore other means toward peaceful resolution, by constituting a joint commission between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea to oversee the peaceful implementation of treaties between these two contiguous countries as against applying force as what was witnessed under General Abacha. President Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy also recorded some success in trying to re-establish air-link between Nigeria and United States, Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA) with Germany, Trade Pact with India, and revival of confidence of foreign investors in the favourable prospect of Nigeria, particularly as articulated by the many trade contingents that approached the nation from Japan, Denmark, Ghana, Turkey, France, Germany and Belgium during his regime.

#### **4.2.2.i Peaceful settlement of Nigerian-Cameroonian dispute**

President Obasanjo's administration demonstrated once again, that Nigeria was a peaceful nation. His government displayed uncommon ability to pursue diplomatic resolution of disagreements between Nigeria and her neighbours: Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Arguments over land territory and marine border disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria on the Bakassi Peninsula was presented before the International Court of Justice, ICJ, but the process required drawing a new border between the two states and had previously been marred by

military confrontations. After the pronouncement of the ICJ judgment, the Republic of Cameroon was formally declared the rightful owner of the disputed peninsula. President Obasanjo's administration demonstrated its willingness to accept the ICJ verdict on Bakassi Peninsula in good faith, amidst public outcry among the cross section of Nigerians. On 10th October 2002, President Obasanjo and his Cameroonian colleague, Paul Biya, signed the agreement, which formally ceded the Bakassi Peninsula to the Cameroonians in ([www.peaceau.org](http://www.peaceau.org)).

#### **4.2.2.ii. Restoration of Nigeria into the global community**

Following the reinstatement of civil rule in 1999, the perception of Nigeria started to experience optimistic and positive adjustment. The abatement of Nigeria's 'global reclusion' status was exemplified by President Obasanjo's formal visits to numerous nations across the globe, as such, signifies acceptance and its readmission into the international system. Most of Obasanjo's official visits to a number of countries across the globe have equally been reciprocated. Assorted types of social, political and economic agreements have been signed with nations that previously reviled Nigeria (Osagie, 2007). Nigeria's complete restoration into the comity of nations is copiously demonstrated, which has served as an avenue for drawing overseas investment successfully to a large extent. These can be outlined by:

- ✓ The speedy return to the Commonwealth within the first month of the inauguration of the Obasanjo administration following a four- year expulsion.
- ✓ For the first time, Nigeria was instantly nominated into the eight- member Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG).
- ✓ Nigeria's hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 2003 was an indication of her total acceptance by the international community.

- ✓ Nigeria was often asked or conferred with in every proposal and subject that affected Africa, e.g. the AFRICOM question.
- ✓ Furthermore, Nigeria was often recognized to perform a significant function not only in the sub-region of West Africa but also in the African continent. It was central to the conversion of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU). Nigeria played/plays a major role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Commonwealth of Nations. Indeed, it enjoyed/enjoys a pride of place in the activities and programmes of the United Nations.
- ✓ Via an Open Skies Agreement with the US Airspace Agency in 1999 (US investment climate statement, 2008), the Obasanjo administration further negotiated the removal of sanction on straight flight between Nigeria and the US which was imposed during the days of Gen. Abacha.
- ✓ The pro-West external policy of Obasanjo also made Nigeria to play a forefront role in the relations between the G8 and developing nations. Nigeria, in addition, participated actively in the formation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and its brain-child – African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as a reaction to the growth crisis in the continent of Africa (Osagie, 2007).
- ✓ The Obasanjo government has performed outstanding tasks in the settlement of numerous crises in Africa and in the making of peace in places that were hitherto engulfed in conflicts. The reinstatement of tranquility in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Ethiopia/Eritrea, DR Congo, Burundi, Western Sahara, Liberia, and Sao Tome



and Principe is attributable in large measure to Nigeria's shuttle diplomacy/mediatory efforts (Osagie, 2007).

#### **4.2.2.iii Improved relations with the Great Powers**

Nigeria's rapport with the great powers was exceedingly warm, under President Obasanjo's administration. The administration tried within its powers to guarantee that Nigeria stay put in the good books of those most powerful countries. The reasons for that were not far-fetched. In the opinion of Ajayi (2005), first, Nigeria was indebted to them, so it simply made sense to maintain very cordial relations with them, in order to secure a listening ear, and also to curry their sympathy for Nigeria. Secondly, as a former African Union Chairman, the onus lied on President Obasanjo to uphold a good quality relationship with the European nations from whom Africa was demanding huge concessions on trade, and debt relief, etc.

Kolawole (2005) and Ajayi (2005) asserted that Nigeria, under President Obasanjo's administration, had realistic alternatives to strengthening Nigeria's trade and bilateral relations with the U.S, and other great powers via shuttle diplomacy. To give effect to the above, President Obasanjo engaged on a bout of diplomatic and trade tours to the US, which is the principal buyer of Nigeria most important commodity, oil, with Britain, a traditionally essential business associate and Nigeria's largest creditor state, and with European Union, among which were Germany and France which were also Nigeria's main creditors and trading partners.

To Kolawole (2005) and Ajayi (2005), relations with the great powers improved Nigeria's economic sectors. For instance, the repatriation of Nigeria's looted monies, from Switzerland and political relations between Nigeria and the great powers increased tremendously, in the areas of bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties, there were considerable relations toward addressing contemporary issues like HIV/AIDS; foreign aids; proliferation of

nuclear weapons; global warming; rule of law and good governance; environmental issues; human development and food security; human rights and strengthening of democratic institutions, etc, through their assistance to Nigeria.

#### **4.2.3 Research Question Three: to what extent was President Obasanjo's foreign policy framework able to address the domestic challenges prevalent in the Nigerian state in the previous military regimes?**

When on November 17, 1993 that General Sani Abacha carried out a 'Palace Coup' and toppled the Interim National Government of Chief Ernest Sonekan, he took a number of actions that were clearly antiquated in an age of globalized democracy. His dissolution of democratic structures and establishments, implementation of total military decrees and embracement of comprehensive powers, widespread arrests and incarceration of political opponents, crack down on the mass media and hounding of Chief M.K.O. Abiola following the Epetedo (Lagos) Declaration as President, demonstrated an apparent indifference in bringing a lasting and peaceful solution to the 1993 presidential election crises or stabilizing an already grounded system. The Abacha junta from conception was not only a product of circumstance, but was also the main beneficiary of the country's prolonged political imbroglio consequent upon the cancellation of June 12 presidential elections. This crisis coupled with Abacha's anti-democratic disposition from the inception unlocked the plethora of challenges for Nigeria's image and perception overseas and damaged its dignity in the global community.

According to Fawole (1999), Akinterinwa (2001), Nigeria had endured some image tribulations in her recent history. These had included the Britain-Nigeria misunderstanding during the Umaru Dikko abduction saga, the Billy Eko and Gloria Okon narcotics outrage to which erstwhile President Ibrahim Babangida was associated, sleaze and advanced fee fraud (419) and Babangida's nonstop transition programme. However, the crass human rights

violations, preposterous return to civilian rule programme under General Abacha and several cases of diplomatic failures in managing of the image problem fuelled the combined Western disapproval and accentuated the resolve to dismantle the military fortress in Nigeria's political project. The highpoint of the regime's blunders was the disregard of worldwide appeal for leniency in the capital sentence handed down on the Ogoni environmental rights activists, their consequent execution and alleged support of eliminations of apparent political opponents (Saliu, 1996).

In the words of Mbang (1997), the antagonistic local environment was predictably bound to scare the investors away and prevent possible investors at a secure distance from Nigeria. Thus, Abacha's approach fashioned a system puzzle that inadvertently made him lose attractiveness both at home and overseas. In such circumstance, bare force was probably the state art of despotism and that was precisely the option of the Abacha's stratocracy. The instant reaction of the global public to the capital punishment of the Ogoni activists was to isolate Nigeria. The Canadian government closed its high commission in Nigeria, South Africa cut off relations with Abacha's regime and the American and British governments slammed complete military and partial economic sanctions in order to discourage and, by so doing, compel the military junta to alter its unfavourable method of government. The Nigerian state had indeed, become a recluse nation. According to Fadope (1997), the Clinton administration rapidly damned the Nigerian military's actions and recommended partial diplomatic and economic sanctions against the regime. With General Abacha's incursion into body politics in November 1993; Washington had revoked the visas of important military functionaries, constrained weapons supplies, stopped all U.S. economic and military assistance, and restricted Nigeria's access to trade advances and guarantees.

Despite the initial embargoes and diplomatic showdown with the U.S. and the international community intended to influence the Abacha's junta to go back to the democratic course, political and human rights progressively deteriorated. General Abacha ruled by military fiat and pointedly counteracted all political resistance. Abiola was under arrest, unspecified number of labour leaders, pro-democracy and rights activists, and other opposition elements were locked up, and countless others, including protesters were killed. The state covert security team, Abacha's Strike Force led by Barnabas Msheila eliminated the coupist's seemingly and genuine political opponents in the ever rising group of the pro-democracy activists (Fadope, 1997). Abacha had dismantled all democratic structures, together with the institution charged with elections and the federal and state legislatures, and dismissed all the national and state cabinets. While he disregarded the June 12 question which had drawn the military embargoes from the civilized democracies, a fresh democratic timetable or transition agenda was not yet put up, except nebulous statements on a planned new transition, which would be centered on the outcome of a proposed constitutional conference.

By the indefinite suspension of the Commonwealth of Nations and other diplomatic moves made to segregate Abacha, Nigeria endured harsh economic downturn. Aside its oil, supplementary means of revenue were blocked. Technology transfer and machineries from the advanced world were smuggled in with a lot of difficulty, which brought about the depreciation of the domestic currency, *naira*, in the international market. Petroleum products thus became scarce and expensive as buy and sell within the global economy had become impaired. Except for France with which General Sani Abacha maintained cordial business rapport (Olawajaju, 1999), the Nigerian economy almost lost touch with the western market.

Despite its Pariah position, the military regime as it demonstrated afterward secretly supported state violence, assassinating the active crop of the country's democrats. In a frantic move to attain some measure of bogus legitimacy, there was enormous financial commitment on pro-Abacha rallies. In the words of Meier (2002), just the five registered political parties organized their nationwide conventions and one after the other, adopted General Abacha as their sole presidential candidate. Completely disillusioned with the political happenings, European countries escalated economic strain on Nigeria, pressing more sanctions and in some cases, cutting off diplomatic relations with it. For instance, Nigeria was targeted by a formidable coalition, including the European Union, South Africa, Canada, and the United States, in November and December, 1995 (Sklar, 1997). Notwithstanding, Abacha's administration carried on the job of foreign policy in a most pedestrian manner. While the intrigues at home and his external tribulations compelled him to lose foreign policy track and misled Nigeria's policy objective, Abacha's idea of foreign policy, it seemed was to earn more enemies for Nigeria. Nigeria was humiliated more than a few times by this attitude, which by all means was 'area boy' diplomacy, as Fawole (2004) and a number of other researchers have pointed out. Abacha confronted the international community to mind its business by insisting that Nigeria's challenges at the time were wholly Nigerian affairs, which should not concern them. Hence, Nigeria's foreign policy goals relatively engrossed sour acrimony from abroad and attracted greater agitation and estrangement at home.

General Abdulsalami Abubakar contended with mainly a tattered Nigerian global image, a secluded state and an untidy foreign policy in July 1998 on assumption of authority following the unexpected demise of General Abacha. Abubakar's quest to launder Nigeria's image overseas and relinquish the pariah toga, forced his regime to espouse a foreign policy of retreat.

He changed the combative nature of the earlier regime in the deployment of mechanism of policy to draw overseas understanding and consideration towards Nigeria. Ojo and Azeez (2002) have maintained that this was geared towards reintegrating Nigeria into the international system. The entire purpose of reintegration policy was to restore Nigeria into the mainstream of the international capitalist economy after a long period of social, political cum economic hiatus (Saliu, 1999). Abdulsalami's approach was nonetheless too beggarly and instead of restoring Nigeria in the previous uncompromising desirable standing, it demeaned the nation as Nigeria had often taken a distinguished place in international politics, never showing signs of handicapped.

These were the compelling factors that confronted Chief Olusegun Obasanjo administration when he assumed the wheels of leadership in 1999. In terms of foreign policy and Nigeria's exterior relations, President Obasanjo was greeted with a waning influence and image of Nigeria, engendered by a combative foreign policy of the military. The previous regimes had, by this time, isolated themselves from and had been further isolated by the global community. Hence, the first task of Chief Obasanjo was to overhaul the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and put in place a fresh policy programme that would take Nigeria out of its declining international fortunes.

#### **4.2.4 Research Question Four: how relevant were the foreign policy strategies of the Obasanjo's regime (1999-2007) in attracting to Nigeria foreign direct investment (FDI)?**

According to Saleh, and Usman, (2012), in line with the tracking down of the general economic aims and goals via enhancing the investment spectrum of the country, the military regimes promulgated the institution of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) in 1995 in addition to liberalisation and relaxation of the foreign exchange market. These served as the foundations of Nigeria's strategy of stimulating foreign direct investments. Nevertheless,

the domestic circumstances of the Nigeria's socio-economic and political environments were inhibiting the climate for external investment into the country, particularly during the immediate past military regimes. President Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy of exploration for foreign direct investment into the country regardless of the image crisis soon assumed a contentious issue after 1999.


Therefore, we may query ourselves, how did shuttle diplomacy of Obasanjo's administration (1999-2007) influence the amount of foreign direct investment to Nigeria? To answer this, it is relevant to determine the usefulness or contrariness of shuttle diplomacy as a prevailing factor of foreign investment inflow into Nigeria. Thus, this section centres on the effect of shuttle diplomacy in attracting foreign direct investment (in line with the correlation between the local investment ambiance and outside reaction to FDI inflow). However, in a historical way, it appraised the FDI inflow from 1990-2007 in order to undoubtedly demonstrate the facts that can establish positive or negative impact of shuttle diplomacy from 1999.

As many of you are aware, I have devoted much time and energy journeying to virtually all corners of the globe in my personal efforts to positively reintegrate our country into the international community and attract investment. We are happy to report that the results from these trips have been encouraging enough to confirm my personal belief and the advice of marketing experts, namely, that personal contact is the best way to market your product. And my product is Nigeria. (Oyedoyin, Nigeria World News, 18 July 2002).

In a short period of 168 weeks of Obasanjo's emergence as the President, he embarked on more than 103 overseas trips. That is, on the average of about two weeks in all the months of his Presidency from 1999 to 2002 (Ezeife, 2002). This evidently depicts the importance attached to shuttle diplomacy in the quest for overseas investors by the Nigerian administration under Obasanjo. The most efficient method to determine the efficacy or otherwise of shuttle diplomacy as an important factor in foreign direct investment surge to Nigeria is to discover if there is any

significant rise in the number of overseas investors spreading their fishing nets in Nigerian commercial/business waters as a consequence of Obasanjo's international trips and meetings with foreign investors and other key stake holders.

**Figure 4.2.4.1.:** Shows the review of probable relations amid Nigeria’s shuttle diplomacy and foreign direct investment inflow.



Source: Saleh, and Usman, (2012).

It is obvious that some of the relationships between Nigeria’s shuttle diplomacy and FDI inflow have direct link to the country’s business foreign policy endeavour. This section of the study beams its searchlight on the correlation of foreign policy to ascertain the *cause and effect* relationship between these variables. The study had envisaged that shuttle diplomacy served as the main engine for the influx of FDI through the following means: (a) facilitating the embracing of foreign policy in the direction of reabsorbing the state into the international community; (b) image laundering to assist in creating a consciousness of the favourable and steady macroeconomic environment that abounds for foreign investors to function; and (c) ensuing in better forging and resuscitation of mutual/multiparty investment linkages for home advantage. Accordingly, the subject of which variable is motivating another and the nature of any relation between FDI and shuttle diplomacy are summarized above. Figure 4.2.4.1 shows how FDI was



reliant on shuttle diplomacy under Obasanjo's government and exemplifies a number of the likely diffusion mechanisms whereby the two main variables influenced each other.

#### **4.2.4.i Transforming image and creating consciousness of investment prospects**

Increasing consciousness of investment prospects is of fundamental importance for many developing countries: Investment Promotion. This is called marketing strategy, what some analysts regarded as repackaging Nigeria for export. Image building comprises of a broad variety of separate functions and activities designed to create alertness of investment openings in the psyche of investors. At the local stage, the Nigerian government initiated a restructuring programme towards the end of 2003 labeled the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). The administration in addition, embarked on an extensive privatization programme. Freedom of speech and of the mass media was observed, and human rights infringements were reduced from the era of military rule. Government control on foreign investment was relaxed via investment regulations advanced to permit a suitable treatment and safety of foreign investment. Since 1999, the Bureau of Public Enterprise (BPE) raised over \$4 billion by privatizing and concessioning more than 140 enterprises, including cement manufacturing firms, banks, hotels, and automobile assembly plants (US Investment Climate Statement, 2008).

One of the administration's principal macroeconomic accomplishments of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy remains the rapid decrease of her international debt burden, which reduced from 36% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2004 to fewer than 4% of Gross Domestic Product as at 2007. On December 17 2003, the United States and seven other Paris Club countries endorsed debt reduction accords with Nigeria for \$18 billion in debt drop, with a condition that Nigeria clears the outstanding \$12 billion in debt by March 2006 (Osagie, 2007).

Under Obasanjo, foreign investors were contending to return and capture the benefits of Nigeria's huge market, hospitable population, and inexpensive but qualitative labour and abundant mineral resources.

#### **4.2.4.ii Creating and building bilateral and multilateral investment relationships**

Utilizing the global environment, Nigeria made way for economic expansion and growth at the local level through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); this study has discovered that Nigeria recorded successes as a direct fallout of President Obasanjo's foreign trips which included Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA) with Germany, trade deal with India, rejuvenation of confidence of foreign investors in the good prospects of Nigeria, particularly as articulated by the numerous trade and investment contingents that came to Nigeria from Japan, China, India, U.S.A, Canada, U.K, South Africa, Denmark, Ghana, Turkey, France, Germany, Belgium, etc. (Abdulai, 2007). Greece, Russia, Norway, Poland, Spain, Italy, Switzerland and Israel as well instituted multilateral investment relations with Nigeria (NIPC Annual Report, 2006; CBN Draft Annual Report, 2008).

The breakdown of investment inflow to the Nigeria under the period of consideration is shown in table 4.1 below. From the available data, it is obvious that there was unbalanced and modest level of inflow to the Nigerian business terrain in the 1990s as a result of the military obnoxious guidelines that led to global seclusion, embargoes and capital flight; nevertheless, an increasing turnaround was observed following the acceptance of diplomacy and discretion as marketing tools subsequent to the return to democratically elected government from 1999.

**Table**

**4.2.4.1:**

**FDI  
to**

**Inflows**

<b>Year</b>	<b>FDI INFLOW(\$) (PT)</b>		<b>Year</b>	<b>FDI INFLOW(\$) (AF)</b>
<b>1990</b>	<b>1002.5</b>		<b>1999</b>	<b>1177.7</b>
<b>1991</b>	<b>1123.9</b>		<b>2000</b>	<b>1309.7</b>
<b>1992</b>	<b>1156.7</b>		<b>2001</b>	<b>1277.4</b>
<b>1993</b>	<b>1878.1</b>		<b>2002</b>	<b>2040.2</b>
<b>1994</b>	<b>2287.4</b>		<b>2003</b>	<b>2171.4</b>
<b>1995</b>	<b>1271.1</b>		<b>2004</b>	<b>2127.1</b>
<b>1996</b>	<b>2190.7</b>		<b>2005</b>	<b>4978.3</b>

**Nigeria, 1990-2007.**

<b>1997</b>	<b>1642.5</b>		<b>2006</b>	<b>13956.5</b>
<b>1998</b>	<b>1210.1</b>		<b>2007</b>	<b>12453.7</b>

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008.


**Note:** *FDI inflows: includes capital given by a foreign direct investor to an FDI venture.*

*PT: prior to the commencement of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy.*

*AF: after the commencement of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy.*

The details of FDI inflow to Nigeria for the period 1990 to 2007 are shown in Table 4.2.4.1. The FDI inflows ranged from 1,002.5 million in 1990 to 1,177.7 in 1999; and from 1,309.7 million in 2000 to 12,453.7 million in 2007. This shows an increase compared to the stagnation of the 1980s and 1990s. The successive continued increases in FDI inflow can be credited to additional endeavours of the administration via the frequent foreign trips to re-launch Nigeria into the world economic order intended at arousing consciousness on the business opportunities that are present in the country (using local reforms, commercialization and privatization initiatives of the government and the formation of the Export Processing Zones, EPZs, to market Nigeria) while creating and resuscitating bilateral/multilateral investment relations.

Figure 2: Bar chart showing FDI Inflow, 1990-2007, from Table 4.2.4.1 data.



Nigeria has constantly profited from the Foreign Direct Investment inflows to Africa from all corners of the globe. It shows a boom in 1995 because of domestic reforms in investment policies and other market openness despite the political tension in the country after the June 12 1993 General Elections annulment saga. Thus, it indicates the significance of laissez-faire investment guidelines and market openness as induces or parameters for FDI inflow. The drop in investment inflow after 1996 could be ascribed to the global isolation of Nigeria following the Ogoni saga and economic embargoes slammed on the state.

The diagram illustrates an upward boost in FDI inflow from (\$1271.1) in 1994 to (\$2190.7) in 1996 but plummeted to (\$1642.5) in 1997 as a result of the image problem the military dragged the nation. The FDI inflow stayed uneven and sluggish regardless of the macroeconomic changes in the 1990s till the later part of the Obasanjo's administration when the

marketing strategies began to demonstrate optimistic impact by means of the various bilateral and multiparty investment agreements between Nigeria and the rest of the world.

FDI inflow achieved its peak in 2006 with (\$13,956.5) and the least in 1990 with (\$1,123.9) as indicated on table 4.2.4.1 based on statistics from UNCTAD (2008). In 2007, Nigeria recorded a decline from (\$13,956.5) to (\$12,453.7) in FDI inflow. Similar shortfalls in FDI inflow could be credited to some of the administration's policies or body languages: one, the President's sudden move to elongate his tenure in office and stay beyond the constitutionally stipulated two-terms and the ambiguity of that inauspicious ambition injured the image of Nigeria in the psych and mind of the global community; secondly, 2007 general elections and the uncertainty of successful transfer of power from civilian to civilian government (the first in Nigeria's history) for democratic strengthening that would facilitate smooth stream of foreign investment.

Also, it was during the Obasanjo government that Nigeria saw a leap in foreign earnings from 1999-2006 and enjoyed essential services that had long eluded Nigerians. Nigeria became investors' delight in information and communication technology. Nigeria's telecommunication sector was rated as the fastest rising market for mobile phone communication throughout the entire globe. With a subscription rate of over 60 million users, from 2001-2005 (ncc.gov.ng). A quick glance at the quantity of investments into Nigeria, sector by sector showed that the administration excelled far and above the preceding regimes.

Sectors	Sub-sector	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
	Infrastructures	9.16	16.12	4.65	34.23	140.91	178.25	122.57	1,217.91	1723.8
	Agriculture	8.44	1.15	11.4	6.00	7.45	8.6	6.98	6.97	56.99
	Services	22.69	14.69	22.29	77.48	86.12	147.75	786.27	40.23	1,197.52
Non Oil	Solid minerals	0.1	0.07	-	-	-	10.02	10.80	-	20.99
	Chemicals/Pharm.	0.13	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.4	0.36	8.32	9.49
	Manufacturing	90.85	86.19	62.25	79.03	.94.66	260.5	334.80	160.93	1,169.21
	Others	21.8	24.87	6.16	22.75	12.37	49.09	67.86	21.46	226.36
	TOTAL	153.17	143.17	106.83	219.53	341.59	654.61	1,329.64	1,455.82	4,404.36
Oil/Gas	Oil & Gas	37.44	23.98	29.12	47.71	99.27	6,612.88	7,183.47	2,707.65	16,740.0
Grand Total		190.61	167.15	134.95	267.24	440.86	7,267.49	8,513.10	4,163.65	4,716.57

**Table 4.2.4.ii Below is the summary of Foreign Investments inflow to Nigeria (1999-2006).**

**Source: Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (2009).**

#### **4.2.4.iii Effect of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy in attracting foreign direct investment in the Nigerian telecommunications industry.**

As he assumed office in May 1999, the Olusegun Obasanjo administration took up the challenge to completely deregulate the telecommunications sector, most especially the much canvassed granting of license to Global System Mobile communication (GSM) service providers. The government further initiated the idea to privatize Nigeria Telecommunication (NITEL). This

proactive approach by the administration in the telecommunications sector has made it possible for over 87million Nigerians to clutch GSM phones today (CBN, 2010).

Since the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector of the economy in 2001, capital investments in mobile networks and operations have constituted 80 per cent of overall investment going into the telecommunications industry – an aggregate of more than \$12bn by the middle of 2008. Total figure for the industry, as of March 2010, according to the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), reached \$18bn, of which \$16bn is related to mobile telecommunication. This sector has shown a significant increase in the volume of foreign direct investment in the Nigerian telecommunications industry, especially since 1999. From a meager US\$50 million at the twilight of 1999, total private investment in the sector rose to about US\$ 2.1 billion by the ending of 2002, out of which about 75% was attributable to mobile networks. Towards the closing stages of 2003, the total industry investment was anticipated at about US\$ 3.8 billion. The industry investment was projected at about \$18 billion in 2009 (CBN, 2010).

According Ezeanyeji and Ifebi (2016), since the Obasanjo's government in 1999, the country has demonstrated the highest potential for ICT investment in Africa; the NCC reported 64 million SIM cards in operation at the beginning of January 2009, with 23 million fresh subscribers signing up in 2008. This growth of 55% in 2008 alone has encouraged a bout of local and multinational investors into the sector. In 2007, Telecommunications attracted the most private participant investment in Africa (86% of total). Nigeria claimed the dominant share of the \$9.5 billion (reportedly the maximum since 1990) at 28% (\$2.66 billion) South Africa played the second fiddle at 11% (\$1.045 billion).

Deregulation of the Telecommunications system in Nigeria in 2001 gave way to private involvement which inadvertently led to emergence of major actors in the field - both



local and international companies. These include MTN, Zain (now Airtel), Etisalat, Globacom, Mtel, Multilinks, Reltel and Visaphone, though, the likes of Mtel, Multilinks, Reltel and Visaphone have now either merged or taken over by the dominant actors in the industry like MTN. These providers offer telecommunications services in the area of telephony service, Global System of Mobile Communication Services (GSM), fixed wireless access and Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT).

The explosion of the telecommunication sub-sector Nigeria propelled by foreign investment, has seen momentous inputs to the development and growth of the Nigerian economy. The banking and finance segment is reaping the benefits of deregulation as the telecommunications industry is creating more opportunities for investment. VSAT companies offering satellite-based services have also become operational, providing support for online banking and funds transfer services in the nation. The volume of investment in the country due to telecommunications liberalisation is currently valued at about \$18 billion. This is expected to rise with more operators coming on stream, Ezeanyejí and Ifebí (2016).

Foreign investments in the telecommunications sub-sector have as well added to the establishment of jobs in the economy. Employment opportunities established in the Nigeria as a direct consequence of telecommunications liberalisation cannot be easily estimated. This is because, GSM Service Providers have completely transformed the level of the Nigerian business landscape by creating innumerable openings for small and medium scale businesses in franchise, dealerships, and retailer-ships, street re-charge/refill card hawkers, to individuals selling second-hand handsets, accessories and value added services within the GSM market, not neglecting those directly employed by the service providers and engineering services firms engaged by the

telecoms to provide ancillary services, maintenance and repairs. It has employment explosion both directly and indirectly.

It has moreover enhanced internet and information technology (ICT) consciousness via Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) Services, Electronic-commerce in form of Mobile Payment Systems called M-Payments, POS, among others. The involvement of foreign direct investment into the telecommunications sub -sector of Nigeria to her economic well-being, growth and expansion can best be captured by the tabular figures below:

Table 4.2.3. Trend of foreign direct investment in telecommunication sector and the role of the telecommunications sector to the gross domestic product of Nigeria (1986 – 2014):

<b>Year</b>	<b>Role/input of the Telecommunications industry to the gross domestic product of Nigeria (N'm)</b>	<b>Foreign direct investment in telecommunications sector (N'm)</b>
1986	129.40	80.40
1987	130.70	75.60
1988	131.90	160.60
1989	134.60	158.20
1990	137.30	240.50
1991	140.00	373.20
1992	144.90	391.50
1993	150.00	426.40
1994	151.50	429.60
1995	159.10	374.80
1996	167.00	485.60
1997	177.00	672.60
1998	185.90	689.20
1999	195.50	820.30
2000	207.50	820.30
2001	2398.68	955.30
2002	2983.07	1736.30
2003	3785.47	2890.50
2004	6015.91	4281.10
2005	7851.66	5565.40
2006	10567.90	8291.00
2007	14226.75	10758.20
2008	19159.16	7996.80
2009	25812.44	13238.10
2010	35674.18	72073.30
2011	291712.09	7564.4
2012	331502.79	6519.6
2013	6621734.16	85606.6

2014	5420654.36	8506.4
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Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin; Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for various years: December, 2014.

The table above shows clearly the involvement of foreign direct investment in telecommunications sector and the impact of the telecommunications industry to the gross domestic product (GDP) of Nigeria from 1986 to 2014. A glance at the table would reveal that the foreign direct investment in telecommunications sector increased in most of the years reviewed with occasional decreases recorded in few years. However, the impact of the telecommunications sector to the GDP of Nigeria increased throughout the period of Obasanjo's Presidency. It unequivocally demonstrates that foreign direct investment in telecommunications sector and the input of the telecommunications industry to the gross domestic product of Nigeria have positive relationship in the period of study.

A major striking observation in the trend is that the impact of the telecommunications industry to the GDP of Nigeria increased astronomically from N207.5 million in 2000 to N2398.68 million in 2001. Besides, the telecommunications sector contributed significantly to the gross domestic product of Nigeria between 2001 and 2010 than what was recorded from 1986 to 2000. The rationale for this phenomenal growth is not far-fetched. It is the product of the full deregulation in the telecommunications industry of 2001 carried out by the Obasanjo administration which attracted huge influx of foreign investment to the sector using the economic vehicle of shuttle diplomacy. It is evident from the foregoing that Nigeria has profited immensely from foreign direct investment especially through the deregulation of the telecommunications sector by the Obasanjo's government.

Going by the analysis so far, a careful examination of our data reveals that Nigeria achieved significant gains through the Obasanjo regime's shuttle diplomacy. Besides the psychological relief following its accommodation and reintegration to the global affairs, Nigeria

had assumed leadership positions in several international institutions notably the ECOWAS, African Union, and Group of 77 (G-77). This yielded some economic dividends to the state which included the increase in Development Finance Inflow (DFI), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Portfolio Investments; the Paris Club forgave \$18 billion of Nigeria's more than \$30 billion foreign debt, a gesture that indicated the Club's assurance in Nigeria's economy and credibility as an external debtor. It could equally be deduced that Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy was the main engine for the inflow of FDI into the country. What his regime did was: facilitating the implementation of foreign policy ideas in the direction of assimilate the state into the comity of civilised nations; image making to aid generate the consciousness of a favourable and steady macroeconomic environment that abound for overseas investors to thrive; and ensuring superior establishment and resuscitation of bilateral/multilateral business relationships for home advantage.

At the home front, his administration initiated a series of reform programme towards the end of 2003 termed the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). The administration in addition embarked on extensive privatization programme. Rights of speech and of the mass media were observed, and fundamental human rights breaches reduced unlike during the military rule. Controls over foreign investments were reduced through investment regulations developed to permit international best practices in the treatment and safety of foreign investment.

#### **4.3 Discussion of findings**

Any meaningful assessment or evaluation of President Olusegun Obasanjo's foreign policy regime will rest on four major planks. They include among others: how his administration was able to transform Nigeria's traditional foreign policy posture from Africa as the centre-piece

to Nigeria and Nigerians as the cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy; the impact of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy in rebuilding the beleaguered Nigeria's international image; the extent to which his government's foreign policy framework was able to address the domestic challenges prevalent in the Nigerian state during the long years of military incursion into the body politics and; the relevance of his foreign policy strategies in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into Nigeria.

On these four broad standpoints, our data revealed that the administration broke major landmarks. For instance, prior to his emergence, Nigeria's foreign policy during the military was not only confrontational but also based on tit-for-tat as Gen. Sani Abacha shut out Nigeria out from the Western powers that challenged his human rights records. Also, from the available literature, Nigeria's traditional foreign policy posture was largely Afrocentric. However, President Obasanjo while not neglecting African priorities, concentrated efforts towards attracting Western attentions with a view to improving the home economy which to a very significant extent, uplifted the domestic economy.

Our data showed that before the inauguration of Obasanjo's presidency in May 1999, Nigeria's international image was at its lowest ebb. Nigeria was a laughing stock and worth nothing among her peers in the international arena as a result of long years of military misrule. Nigeria became recluse. Consequently, the task before Obasanjo's administration was to bring Nigeria back into the international community from its isolated position as a Pariah state. This involved extensive diplomatic moves to Nigeria's former allies. Thus between the months of May, 1999 and mid-August 2002, Obasanjo embarked on 113 foreign trips, spending a total of 340 days outside the country (Akindele, 2003). He was the most widely travelled president in the history of Nigeria who in a giant stride visited international and regional institutions such as the

United Nations (UN), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Group of 8 (G-8), Group of 77 (G-77), the Commonwealth, African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU). The international community responded quite positively to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo's diplomatic shuttles, rebranding diplomacy, charm and creative initiatives which in the end marked the reintegration of the country into the global community. As a direct consequence, Nigeria's image soon witnessed a dramatic positive transformation. Nigeria immediately assumed the leadership of some important international organizations including the African Union, ECOWAS, etc. Nigeria also was invited to address the plenary of the United Nations, G-77, the EU, the Commonwealth of Nations among others and played pivotal role in the formation of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

Furthermore, our data revealed that as a result of the prevalent repressive military regime, most prominent Nigerians sought political asylum outside country. Those who refused to elope were incarcerated in parlous prisons on trumped up charges and phantom allegations. As a result, most companies and multinational corporations relocated their offices from Nigeria to safer havens in far distant locations. The direct implication was that the local economy took a negative dive and the nation's gross domestic product plummeted under heavy economic sanctions and embargoes from trading partners. The ordinary citizens groaned and wallowed in disproportionate and absolute poverty. But when President Obasanjo came onboard, most political prisoners were released, those citizens that fled the oppressive regime were encouraged to return home, Nigerians in Diaspora started repatriating funds, the relocated companies came back to Nigeria and the political tension that pervaded the Nigerian landscape thawed. There was a new lease of life in both the socio-political and economic spheres in Nigeria once again.

Also our data are replete with empirical evidence to support that President Obasanjo's foreign policy strategies were apt and relevant in attracting foreign direct investments into Nigeria. In addition, the other aspect of President Obasanjo's diplomacy was centred on addressing the country's debt. On the assumption of office, he met an accumulated debt burden inherited from years of corruption and personal aggrandizement of the leadership. An external debt which at 1997 was \$27.008 billion making Nigeria the highest indebted country in Africa (CBN, 2002). This debt was owed to the Paris Club of creditors from previous military regimes; President Obasanjo on October, 2000 instituted the Debt Management Office (DMO) with the mandate of managing the country's debt. Not only did Chief Olusegun Obasanjo come to terms with the country's financial burden and the challenge of servicing it, which was starving the Nigerian economy of growth and development, he also enlisted the dexterity of his Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, in pleading for the forgiveness of Nigeria's debt owed to the Paris Club. At the end, Nigeria was able to reach an agreement with the Paris Club in June 2005 to pay \$6 billion out of \$31 billion owed. This made Nigeria pay an upfront deposit of \$6 billion thereby reducing the debt to \$25 billion. In return, the Club wrote off 67% of the remaining debt, amounting to \$17–18 billion (Alao, 2011). The debt reduction by the Paris Club to Nigeria was a remarkable achievement for the Obasanjo's administration. As a follow up to the write off of part of the debt, the Obasanjo's administration entered into a debt rescheduling plan that lasted till the end of his tenure in 2007. As a result, Nigeria's debt was drastically reduced to about \$3.035 billion made up of \$2.65 billion multilateral debt, \$326 million bilateral debt and \$101 million commercial debt (Ezeabasili, 2011) Consequently, Nigeria's foreign reserves rose from \$2 billion in 1999 to \$43 billion at the end of his tenure in 2007 (Ajetunmobi, Osunkoya & Omotere., 2011).

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

#### **5.1 Summary**



This study is an evaluation of Nigeria's foreign policy during the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo's from 1999-2007. In doing that, the study presented an appraisal of relevant literature focusing on Nigeria's foreign policy beginning from Nigeria's independence in 1960 till the end of 2014 under the government of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. The research discovered the ever-changing nature of Nigeria's foreign policy depending on the type of government in place at any given time. The literature review of the study also centred on the appraisal, objectives and principles of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence, the function of image and image building in international politics, personality and foreign policy, the nexus of leadership personalities, foreign policy and effects on Nigeria's international image, the personality of Olusegun Obasanjo and his leadership style, the connection between foreign direct investment and shuttle diplomacy.

The study identified the various interpretations given to the concept of national interest by the successive regimes in Nigeria. The study draws a lucid difference between the personal interest of the president or the policy makers from the national interest of the entire nation. The work found out the dynamism of Nigeria's national interest. To this end, Nigeria's national interests are taken more critical in some regimes while other regimes did not see them as core or vital. The study discovered that the proper use of foreign policy could be a veritable tool of projecting a nation's interest and opening up a nation to the exterior environment while the wrong application of it could make a country reclusive. And the study further identified shuttle diplomacy as the vehicle which the administration in review adopted to attract the much needed foreign direct investment to Nigeria.

The meaning of 'good image' was examined to show the goodwill which a country that enjoys it can attract to herself and her citizens. In similar vein, the notion of 'bad image' was

equally examined to depict what harm or damage it could cause both to the country and to her citizens in the worldwide arena. In addition, the research further examined the domestic challenges inherent in the earlier governments which inadvertently prompted the reactions and responses that heralded the Obasanjo's government.

The research adopted the realist theory of politics as the theoretical framework of analysis among other theories. The realist theory (*realpolitik*) was preferred here as the theoretical framework of analysis for this research, not because it was superior to other theories but because it was the most suitable to our work. The research adopted historical design and relied mainly on secondary source of data such as documentaries, quality journal articles, magazines, critical records of interviews and observations that were carried out by reputable organizations and individuals, textbooks and periodicals. Also, information for this study was collected and collated from various libraries, while the internet was handy and played a complimentary role. These enabled us to understand the nature and character of Nigeria's foreign policy from regime to regime, the shortfalls, advantages, achievements and cardinal objectives of different regimes in Nigeria.

Critical and descriptive methods of analysis were deployed to examine the work which was presented mainly in qualitative manner that enhanced logical analysis and understanding. We also employed a measure of quantitative analysis wherein we made use of simple tables and bar charts for the purposes of vivid clarity and better illustration. The various ways the global community responded to Nigeria's foreign policy strategies were also exposed in this study. The volume of debt forgiveness and the quantity of foreign direct investment which the Obasanjo's administration was able to source onboard using his shuttle diplomacy were also examined in this work. However, the work hinted that the introduction of democracy in Nigeria was a critical

success factor, which made the world very eager to reintegrate the state back into fold, so that she might continue to discharge her usual function as a leader in the West African sub-region and Africa at large. This study also discovered some pitfalls in the Obasanjo's foreign drives and solutions were proffered for future regimes.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

The research revealed that the Nigerian political, socio-economic sectors were suffering severe blow as a consequence of the protracted years of military regimes. Human and economic lives became depressed, meanwhile personal aggrandizement and avarice flourished in the economic and socio-political environments of the nation. Both the polity and financial systems were dilapidated and at the edge of disintegration as social policy, business and political associations were destabilized. The policy blunders of the previous regimes had fundamentally predisposed the arrangement of the entire Nigerian system. Political upheavals and foreign policy volatility dissuaded foreign investments notwithstanding the enormous local market and the strategic site of the nation.

This work maintained that the Obasanjo's administration initiated definite critical decisions to establish a conducive atmosphere for the flourishing of democracy, regaining international respectability and integrity and positioning the polity and economy on the pathway of peace, tranquility, sustainable growth and expansion. It is noteworthy that a number of the policies initiated by the administration which included the inauguration of anti-corruption bill; maintaining local and international crusade to repatriate stolen public wealth; inauguration of Universal Basic Education, tackling the energy crisis, founding of a Poverty Alleviation Programme, the upward increase of the basic wage and others were good steps in the right direction.

The government in addition encouraged private sector investment so as to attain quick economic development and growth. This research firmly believes that one of the government's major macroeconomic accomplishments of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy was the rapid decrease in its debt overhang, which reduced from 36% of GDP in 2004 to less than 4% of GDP in 2007. This work affirms that with the United States and seven other Paris Club countries reducing/cancelling Nigeria's debt for upward of \$18 billion with the condition that Nigeria clears the balance \$12 billion, the Obasanjo's administration did set Nigeria on the pathway of recovery and freedom. This study has observed that foreign investors were consequently, jostling to re-enter and take benefit of Nigeria's outsized market, amiable population, and inexpensive but qualitative labour and abundant mineral resources.

Again, this work confirms that in its 57years of independence, Nigeria's decision makers have continuously designed, shaped and maintained a foreign policy that has continued to make salient impacts on the global system, particularly in the aspect of facilitating peace-making at the global scene. The study maintained that without caring about the dictum that foreign policy derives support from the aggregation of a state's domestic politics, the Obasanjo's administration pushed Nigeria at the fore front of peace making in Africa even to the cost of Nigeria's national interest like the concede of Bakassi region to Cameroon.

The research further concludes that Obasanjo was an ego-trip president as he used the diplomatic opportunities to launder his own image while the Nigerian state's image crisis abroad, particularly for its citizens, remained an embarrassing challenge for the nation's foreign policy. In fact, this study maintained that sometimes, the president seemed not to be acquainted with what befitted the nation as demonstrated in the circumstances surrounding the take-off of the African Union (AU). The president preferred to be made the chairman of the organization, a

position he could only occupy for a one-year term, while the then President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, in a proactive and focused manner, lobbied for and got the African Parliament, a forum where African parliamentarians would sit annually, and by extension, boost the South African economy through their spending and possible investments.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

This research is an effort to establish that excellent foreign relations are useful in our interdependent world, as it yielded a positive result for Nigeria's international image outside of the country and boosted the domestic economy. But for more confidence and image building abroad Nigeria still needs to address some vital domestic issues which invariably have umbilical relations with its foreign relevance, as such, the following recommendations are proffered:

- (1) **Basic infrastructure:** Nigerian government should address the thorny domestic problems while creating a friendly investment climate and boost public and international image. The federal and state governments must make a serious attempt to provide security and basic infrastructure for Nigerians as well as the sought after foreign investors. People cannot invest in an environment in which they do not feel secured and no adequate infrastructure. This if achieved, will enable the country perform a major role in regional, continental and global affairs. If this is achieved, investors will naturally come without prompting.
- (2) **Strengthening bilateral and multilateral relations:** Strengthening bilateral and multiparty trade treaties are vital for the country to draw more FDI in its new refocused shuttle diplomacy that should be handled by a squad of sound diplomats via foreign missions. Consequently, corruption and favoritism in the appointment of diplomatic envoys must be avoided to create room for credible team of professionals and careful

selection of presidential entourage in foreign investment trips should be the common practice.

- (3) **Strengthening the Naira:** Nigerian government should initiate a well-orchestrated policy measure to strengthen its economy and save its currency from unnecessary devaluation as it affects its image and that of Nigerians living abroad. And Nigeria's image making ought to be the task of all Nigerian citizens, particularly those in alien countries.
- (4) **Consolidating image-building:** Having achieved international acceptance and retuning the nation to the mainstream of global politics by President Obasanjo's government via shuttle diplomacy, the next important phase should be carving a respectable image for the country and her nationals both those at home and others traveling abroad. The president and the nation's ambassadors should employ all diplomatic opportunities within their reach to campaign for a new vision and perception by the international community for Nigerians. It is the assumption that achieving an enviable image for its nationals abroad would strengthen and embolden the nation to exercise greater significance and influence in world affairs, and equally promote the realization of its aspiration and interest of attaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
- (5) **Redefining Nigeria's foreign policy:** Re-definition of Nigeria's foreign policy goals has, therefore, become imperative in the present-day international politics so as to bridge dissonance between foreign policies and expectations. The goal-values of Nigeria's external policy must be reconstructed to include what Nigerians as individuals intend to gain specifically from the nation's enduring strategic, political and economic diplomacy. In other words, Nigerians' welfare and alleviation of mass poverty ought to be made the

Nigeria's foreign policy priority, and by implication, Nigerians should be taken as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy.

- (6) **Creating a new identity for Nigerians abroad:** A major substance of the re-definition agenda should be creating a new identity and image for Nigerians. The Nigeria's foreign policy planners and diplomatic missions abroad have much to do in forging a new image for Nigerians abroad. Nigerians lack a positive international identity, designing one for them becomes an urgent task for the nation's diplomats. The diplomatic missions should engage in some aggressive image laundering for the nation and its nationals being exposed to ridicule and embarrassment across the globe. The president, as the nation's chief diplomat, needs to go beyond diplomatic appeals for international recognition, foreign investments and debt relief.
- (7) **Tackling Boko Haram rebellion and terrorism:** Finally, the ongoing insurgencies of Boko Haram in the nation which have claimed thousands of innocent lives should be handled effectively with more government commitment to end the menace else it will further degrade and downgrade Nigeria's image abroad.

#### **5.4 Contributions to knowledge**

One of the fundamental contributions of this study is its establishment of a strong connection between effective shuttle diplomacy and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In other words, this study has established the potency of foreign policy as an instrument for generating a robust FDI in Nigeria, and indeed, in any developing economy. The examination of secondary data obtained in the process of this research shows that, more than any other precedent regime;

the Obasanjo's government witnessed the highest inflow of international capital in terms of foreign direct investment. This is novel in the literature of foreign policy in Nigeria.

In addition, this study also unearths the personal leadership styles of Olusegun Obasanjo in stimulating in some instances and injuring in other stances, international relations between Nigeria and other nations. This study clearly shows that President Obasanjo was an ego-trip personality who would even project his own personal interest as national interest.

Furthermore, the study provides a subtle comparison of the different regimes in their dispositions toward foreign policy objectives since independence in 1960.

However, this work discovered that the era of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy gave much emphasis on foreign investors to the neglect of Nigeria's private investors. It was a neglect of home solution to that of external remedy. Consequently, we maintain that while image laundry and investment agreements did not bear a robust relationship to the immediate FDI inflow, it has a positive and considerable link with the growth of investment relations and long run huge capital inflow into the economy, as indicated from 2002. In addition, an investment relation through professional shuttle diplomacy has the potential to generate more FDI into the economy.

## **5.5 Suggestions for further study**

This research cannot claim or assume to have covered all aspects of Nigeria's foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo. Therefore, to explore other facets of his foreign policy, there is need for further studies. For instance, it is important to undertake another study that will reveal how much transformation that has come into Nigeria as a consequence of his economic policy which was anchored on shuttle diplomacy and its attendant fruits, FDI. Further research is needed to illuminate the tangible impact of debt cancellation or forgiveness. In other



words, a study that will show in concrete terms how much the common Nigerian benefitted from the-much- talked-about exit from the clutches of Paris Club and other creditor states has to be undertaken. Further research should be done in a repeated manner by using other research designs such as survey methods, or content analysis among others, to establish if indeed the image of Nigeria and Nigerians has improved abroad. Again, there is necessary to do another study to ascertain if the FDIs that President Obasanjo attracted into the system are still within the peripheries of Nigerian territory or whether they have gone extinct with the administration or relocated to other climes.

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